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From the early 1990s, my interest in Japanese local government and Japan’s
foreign affairs has continued to intersect for me, begging a comprehensive study
of Japan’s local governments as international actors in their own right. This book
is the result, a product of about a decade of thinking, questioning and researching
on this relatively unexplored subject. I could more fully focus my attention on this
study after I was awarded a large grant from the Australian Research Council for
a three-year period, 2001–03. This enabled me to pursue systematic research with
the help of part-time research assistants, and undertake empirical work through
fieldtrips in Japan and elsewhere. Without this grant, the book would have been
impossible, especially as the project needed frequent research trips to Japan to
collect information through interviews in localities across the country and library
research. The grant also provided me with teaching relief for one semester, which
greatly facilitated my writing and timely completion of the project. My sincere
thanks to the Australian Research Council.
As with any research project, support from a number of people became crucial.
Numerous national and local-level officials and politicians in Japan generously set
aside time to talk with me, share their ideas and insights and answer my specific
questions. Some also offered materials or supplied the ones that I requested. It is
impossible to list all of their names and some, anyway, preferred to remain
anonymous. I certainly acknowledge here with deep appreciation their coopera-
tion, time and patience in carefully explaining some of the very complex issues in
this little-examined epistemic landscape. I especially mention CLAIR officials
in the Tokyo, Sydney, Seoul and Singapore offices, who generously gave their
time and valuable verbal information and printed materials. Several officials in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs (now Somusho Home
Affairs), JETRO, JICA and JIAM readily agreed to answer my questions on the
wide-ranging issues examined in this book. Officials of Hokkaido, Miyagi, Gifu,
Hyogo, Niigata, Okinawa, Oita and Fukuoka Prefectures and Sapporo, Nagoya,
Hiroshima, Kobe, Kitakyushu and Niigata Cities were particularly generous with
their time. Staff at the Tokyo Municipal Research Library were very obliging,
especially Mr Tamura Yasuhiro and Mr Yanagihara Hirohiko. Inoguchi Takashi,
Shinohara Hajime, Menju Toshihiro, Yoshida Hitoshi, Nakamura Akira, Kanbara
Masaru, Tsujiyama Takanobu and Mizukami Tetsuo have advised, helped and
encouraged me throughout the project. I offer all of them my sincerest thanks.
x Preface
During the course of writing this book, I published several papers on related
topics, one of them with my colleague Yoshida Hitoshi. I have drawn on materials
published in these papers and I would like to thank the apposite journal editors
and my co-author for allowing me to reproduce some of the materials in various
sections of the book. These journals are: Global Change, Peace & Security, Asian
Profile and Policy and Society.
Several research assistants helped me with this project from time to time in
cataloguing materials, translating and advising on several aspects of this project.
First and foremost I owe my deep gratitude to Maureen Todhunter for helping me
with this project in many ways – as research assistant, critic and editor. I thank
her for her crucial support, invaluable assistance and professional attention at
every stage of this work. Carol Lawson, Midori Kagawa-Fox, Hidaka Tomoko
and Mahara Akiko also assisted me at various stages with research support and
I thank them accordingly.
While researching and writing drafts of this book, I presented seminars at
various institutions and received valuable feedback for which I am grateful. These
institutions include Meiji University, Bukkyo University, Rikkyo University,
University of Birmingham, University of Melbourne, University of Hawaii and
the University of Adelaide. Discussions at the Local Government Centre in
Birmingham University and Warwick, especially with Professor Mike Geddes,
were very useful for the conceptual and comparative analysis in Chapter 1.
Alan Rix, Ellis Krauss, Terry MacDougall, Lam Peng Er, Akaha Tsuneo, Glenn
Hook, Arthur Stockwin, Felix Patrikeeff and Gerry Groot generously gave me
useful comments on one or several draft chapters of the book and I thank you
all very much. I also thank Glenn Hook for encouraging me to consider the
Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series for publishing my work
and sincere thanks to the Routledge staff, especially Stephanie Rogers, for their
cooperation and support at every stage of producing this book.
Finally, I want to acknowledge my family for their support and patience. I espe-
cially appreciate their understanding during my frequent absences from home on
overseas trips for fieldwork for this book and during the many late nights/early
mornings when the annoying tap of my fingers on keyboard resonated through
an otherwise quiet home. I owe special thanks to Sam for his help as research
assistant, critic and especially for much-needed computer assistance.
My list of people to thank is long. But it is I alone who accept full responsibility
for the content and interpretation I offer in this book.
Conventions
Japanese names
In Japan, family name precedes given name and I respect that convention in this
book. However, in most English-language books, Japanese authors’ names appear
in the Western order, with their given name followed by family name. I retain the
order presented in the original publication.
Preface xi
Japanese words
Long vowels in Japanese words are marked, but there are some exceptions for
place name such as Tokyo, Hyogo, Hokkaido that are recognized in English
without these marks. I am responsible for translation of all Japanese texts and
titles. In translating titles I have used sentence case, for example, Menju Toshihiro
(1998) ‘Jichitai gaiko no susume’ (local diplomacy), Chuo Koron, October. I have
retained original translations where they are provided and these are indicated
through title case as in Menju Toshihiro (2002) ‘Jichitai gaiko no kadai to tenbo’




ALT Assistant Language Teacher 
APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Japan, China and
South Korea
CDI Community Development Initiative 
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CLAIR Council of Local Authorities for International Relations
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An outline of local government in Japan
Source: ‘Local Government in Japan’, Council of Local Authorities for International Relations
(CLAIR), 2002. Reproduced with kind permission from CLAIR.

In Japan today, local or subnational governments (SNGs) together with many
non-state organizations have joined national authorities to become important
actors in international affairs.1 This is a result of profound changes in the domestic
and international contexts of Japan’s external relations that have rendered a ball
game rather different from earlier times among the players on Japan’s foreign
affairs field. The forces of globalization and technological advancement continue
to erode the authority of national borders as defining mechanisms and regulators
of international flows. Inside Japan, the traditional capacity of the national
government to regulate international flows is also weakening. It is not just the
nature, the extent, the style and the goals of Japan’s international relations that are
transforming. Inevitably, the actors who initiate, participate in, and influence
these relationships are also changing. Conducting international relations and
influencing foreign policy are no longer the sole preserve of Japan’s central
government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other
Tokyo-centred actors. New actors are becoming significant in conducting and
influencing – indeed redefining – Japan’s international relations. SNGs are key
agents in this new context.
This book opens the window on these hitherto unexplored political developments
by examining the role of Japan’s SNGs as important new types of players in
Japan’s foreign affairs. It also considers the domestic and international political
implications of this move by SNGs into the international arena. SNG involvement
in international issues relates to two key transformations under way in most
nations, known in Japan as uchinaru kokusaika (domestic internationalization of,
and from inside, the nation) and sotonaru kokusaika (transborder international-
ization of, and from outside, the nation). The focus of this book is on the latter –
as we explore the role of SNGs as actors pursuing their own interests through
international engagements and the political consequences of this development.
The broad-ranging international initiatives of SNGs include not just promoting
cultural and educational programmes, technological and scientific cooperation
or trade and other commercial activities, but also providing foreign aid, a local
version of official development assistance (ODA) and importantly, carrying out
diplomacy by extension, as an arms-length vehicle for the national government.
All of these have significant implications for Japan’s international affairs.
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Furthermore, SNGs are also increasingly involved in hard-core diplomatic issues
(such as war, security and international peace) through their policies, pronounce-
ments and actions. Some of these involvements may have simply symbolic
significance but others certainly have major implications for Japan’s foreign policy
since SNGs are government bodies, after all. These actions are being pursued by
an increasing number of Japanese SNGs in various configurations: across differ-
ent levels of government (prefecture, city and town), bilaterally between Japanese
SNGs and their counterparts overseas, multilaterally between groups of Japanese
SNGs and external partners, and in partnership with or independently of the
central government. Very few SNGs are involved in activities that have explicit
political impact on national diplomacy or deliberately draw international political
or strategic relations into the domestic political arena. Generally, international
activity rewards the locality through economic and/or socio-cultural benefit and
may also reward the SNG through stronger domestic political leverage. Therefore
as the national level shifts more and more administrative responsibility without
adequate finances to the subnational level in the name of decentralization, there
may be a widening gap in performance between SNGs that pursue international
affairs successfully and those that focus narrowly on domestic issues.
This book reaches beyond the questions of who, what, when and where, to
address the crucial issue of ‘why’. We explore international and domestic factors
that have promoted SNGs’ rising activism in international affairs and consider
how SNG motivations influence the types of international programmes and
where/with whom these programmes are conducted. The political implications of
these locally initiated international actions are considered in two contexts – the
management of Japan’s international affairs and foreign policy, and relations
between the national and subnational levels of government – as national-government
actors tenaciously defend their political turf. We see that some SNGs use inter-
national activities to increase their leverage and their autonomy in domestic
politics.
That SNGs are taking initiatives in response to profound structural change
under way in Japan is not of itself an unprecedented development. Although
conventional wisdom has generally cast the role of SNGs as narrowly limited to
repairing streetlights, paving roads, collecting garbage and other community
services, their role expanded significantly several decades ago and as a result of
their own initiatives. From the late 1960s, as the consequences of rapid post-war
industrialization and urbanization began to confront local communities with
unforeseen problems, many progressive SNGs took steps ahead of the central
government to address these new challenges.
They responded effectively to the need for appropriate housing, childcare
and health-care facilities and for protecting people’s lives from new industrial
by-products such as noxious industrial wastes and other industrial pollution.2
SNGs have actively pursued the cause of human and political rights such as those
of Korean residents in Japan and voting rights of foreign residents.3 Japan’s SNGs
have played a pioneering role in these policy areas – not only in association
with the national government but also, importantly, at times in opposition to it.
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Japanese SNGs have long been unsung pacesetters in the nation’s political life
and now in response to complex domestic and international challenges, they are
again demonstrating innovative capacities, practical abilities and political acumen
by moving into the international arena. Although they are certainly driven by
developments in the national and international arenas, SNGs are not simply
reacting; some have moved proactively on many of the issues affecting Japan’s
international diplomacy. The end of the Cold War, the forces of globalization and
rapid technological advancement in the final quarter of the twentieth century have
served as vital enabling forces.
The entrance of SNGs and other bodies as increasingly active international
actors is an international trend; Japan is not exceptional. Across the world, these
developments have drawn into the policy arena new players, interests, concerns
and strategies. They have set in motion a shift in power relationships not just
between key players on the national and international stages, but at all levels of
government within the state, from national level down to towns and villages. The
changing international context has created situations that compel lower levels of
governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), citizens and others formerly
excluded from the narrow realm of foreign policy to pursue their own interests
and priorities at the international level in partnership with or independently of the
central government and with or without the centre’s approbation.4
Some observers have referred to Japan’s response to these international
developments as Japan’s ‘third’ opening up.5 International challenges and central
government responses to them have been felt nationwide particularly from the
1980s, and have sometimes prompted independent action, remedial or retaliatory, by
Japanese citizens and their representative bodies. As a post-war trading giant, Japan
needed to accept new, often dislocating rules of global trade, including opening
protected domestic markets, making currency adjustments and opening national
borders to an inflow of people from abroad. The impact was felt most severely at the
grassroots level, sometimes even in remote communities. Globalization of the distri-
bution process in trade forced the central government to open protected domestic
agricultural markets to overseas suppliers and began to erode the livelihoods of
rural producers and their communities, forcing them to search for alternative means
of economic, social and political survival. Internationalization of production
encouraged many of Japan’s industries to move offshore for cheaper labour to remain
competitive in the free market environment, taking a raft of manual jobs outside
Japan and exposing Japanese expatriates to new parts of the world.
The flow of people and ideas was inward as well as outward. In the labour-scarce
booming economy of the 1980s, workers from developing countries found Japan
an attractive destination for work in construction and industry. Foreign business
professionals and working-holiday visa holders, ‘foreign brides’ and international
students gave visible human presence to internationalization. This was the begin-
ning of Japan’s kokusaika (internationalization) at the grassroots level, as people
from outside Japan came to live within Japanese neighbourhoods. Local commu-
nities and their governments faced unparalleled challenges as most Japanese,
until then, had remained relatively isolated from the outside world.6
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For their part, many SNGs realized that they could not address the challenges
of globalization by continued reliance on the national government in Tokyo for
policy advice and financial support. Some national-government policies damaged
local economies, employment structures and communities, and the largely top-down
central government was not in the habit of consulting SNGs on policy decisions.
Central authorities also continued to reduce financial support for SNGs to meet
constraints upon the national budget arising from the long-standing economic
recession.
Some SNGs recognized in these circumstances not just the need for innovative
action but also opportunities for self-advancement through greater autonomy
from within Japan’s centralized unitary system of government. These opportuni-
ties are possible if SNGs can build financial autonomy and form new strategic
alliances. To this end, SNGs have pursued some opportunities to build the
strength of their local economy through innovative policies that include interna-
tional economic relations independent of the central government. These enhance
SNGs’ financial autonomy from the central government and help to strengthen
their position in relations with the centre, as the principal source of SNG income
and direction. SNGs recognize that the new politico-economic conditions have
served to further unhinge the tenuous alignment of interests between themselves
and the central government. The centre’s management of local economies through
vertical, top-down administration has proven to be increasingly inefficient and
ineffective.7 SNGs have discovered more useful partners in their counterparts
nationally and internationally, that share similar concerns and experiences and
can engage meaningfully with them in tackling new challenges, for mutual learn-
ing and support. ‘Horizontal linkages’ between localities inside Japan were
formed in the past for nationwide policy coordination and such linkages still
exist.8 Now some linkages cross national borders, as SNGs seek to develop ways
to address their problems with their counterparts outside Japan.
Deficit of attention to SNGs’ international reach
Today in Japan there is much greater recognition than before that Japanese SNGs
are genuine players in international affairs. But the full import of this develop-
ment and its potentially far-reaching consequences is as yet not appreciated.
There has been little discussion and analysis of this phenomenon in mainstream
literature, either Japanese or foreign, that deals with Japan’s subnational government,
national–subnational relations, or Japan’s foreign affairs.9 The issue of Japanese
SNGs in international affairs has not registered in the analytical frameworks
used by Japan scholars. It appears that outdated assumptions about Japan’s highly
centralized state have helped to block recognition of emerging actors like
SNGs. Some academic studies are available,10 but most accounts have appeared
in semi-official publications or from practitioners such as governors, mayors and
local officials,11 or have focussed on a few distinctive SNGs or a particular sub-
region of Japan.12 Meantime the comparative literature on SNGs as international
actors remains largely Western-centric with limited analysis of Asian examples.13
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This book is therefore an attempt to fill a significant void in the literature on
three important issues concerning contemporary Japan: first, the changing role of
Japan’s SNGs as they pursue their interests beyond Japan’s national borders;
second, the influence upon SNG relationships with central government actors,
which are surely affected by the SNGs’ newfound leverage from international
activities; and third, the conduct of Japan’s international relations and management
of foreign policy as SNGs extend their international reach. Many studies have
argued cogently that SNGs have considerable autonomy in certain domestic pol-
icy matters. This study explains how SNGs are gaining autonomy in international
matters, and alongside other relatively new players such as NGOs and citizens’
groups, SNGs are making an impact on Japan’s foreign policy.14 These develop-
ments indicate that the world’s second largest economy – industrialized, modernized
and internationalized Japan – has joined the frontline of this phenomenon that
began to flourish in the West some decades back.
It is important at this point to acknowledge the need to maintain a sense of
proportion about what is under the lens here. This study confirms increasing
pluralization in the conduct of Japan’s international affairs, but it does not by any
means deny the role of the central government as the main player with primary
responsibility in the country’s international affairs. Rather, this study asserts that
the national-level actors’ monopoly on foreign affairs has been broken by the emer-
gence of a range of other actors including ‘governments’at lower levels. The national
ministries and agencies can no longer control all aspects of foreign affairs. These
bodies no longer have the capacity, the expertise, and the resources to fulfil the func-
tions required of national foreign policy under the new global circumstances and
other actors such as SNGs are willing and able to become involved. SNGs now have
the precedents set by their counterparts outside and inside Japan, and some are keen
to pursue opportunities now available. They also recognize the need to help shape
proactively the course of international relations rather than to retreat behind the cen-
tral government and live with the consequences of the centre’s actions or inaction.
SNGs see that the interests of national and subnational governments conflict more
and more, and only through their own direct actions, sometimes transborder, can
SNGs seek the outcomes best suited to their local interests. The evidence presented
here therefore suggests that in future we are likely to see more pluralism and less
centralization in Japan’s approach to managing foreign relations. The central
government has, willingly or not, taken an accommodative stance rather than being
stubbornly exclusive in foreign affairs issues, recognizing that it has no better
alternative. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the central government
generally takes an inclusive stance on foreign affairs matters. And as ironic as it
might be, the national government still treats SNGs acting internationally as part of
the private sector (minkan) and NGOs.15
A second caveat concerns the extent to which SNGs are involved in international
pursuits. Although this study produces wide-ranging evidence of SNGs’ interna-
tional activities, I do not claim that all Japanese SNGs are involved in interna-
tional affairs or that they are involved to the same degree. Quite the contrary. The
level of interest among SNGs varies considerably, as do their motivations, strategies
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and wherewithal. Some still hold the conventional view that ‘foreign affairs’ is
a national matter and SNGs should not intrude. Yet some local leaders, policy
advisors and think-tank staff believe strongly that SNGs have a distinctive and
significant role to play in international relations.16 They believe that the era when
SNGs were concerned only with local issues has passed and as globalization has
reached into even the smallest corners of localities, it is time for SNGs not simply
to ‘think globally and act locally’ but also to ‘think locally and act globally’. Here,
the message of their advocacy is unambiguous.
Theoretical and comparative issues
Much of this book’s discussion is empirical and proceeds from discussion in
Chapter 1 of two broad theoretical concerns, one in international politics and the
other in domestic politics. I discuss these from a comparative perspective, with
examples from industrialized and developing countries. The first takes us to the
debate in the International Relations literature between the state-centric realist
and pluralistic complex-interdependence approaches to understanding relation-
ships across national borders. This study identifies the emergence of a pluralistic
interdependent framework in Japan’s foreign affairs. This pluralism is consistent
with the trend noted as far back as at the start of the 1970s by pre-eminent
International Relations scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, with sub-state
and non-state actors playing a crucial role in initiating, maintaining and shaping
the nation’s international relationships.17 The Japanese case illustrates how in the
present era of internationalization and increasing global interdependence, trans-
border relationships are less and less between ‘nations’, and boundaries between
domestic and international policy appear ever more indeterminate. Even so,
this does not signal the end of the nation state, or the complete redundancy of
national governments in framing foreign policies and attempting to commandeer
international diplomacy, as the Japanese case illustrates clearly.
The second theoretical concern relates to how the rise of SNGs as international
actors is shaped by, and itself shapes, Japan’s highly centralized political structure.
It takes us to the power struggle between levels of government as the centre tries to
maintain its firm grip on policy and administrative authority in the face of increas-
ing demands from localities for policy autonomy, flexibility and decentralization of
functions. The capacity of SNGs to conduct some international activities more
effectively than the centre, and the centre’s own internecine conflicts, serve to
accentuate this struggle. A related issue that feeds directly into the first, concerns
the increasing conflict of interest between national and subnational governments.
Gradually, the central government has relinquished some of its authority and is will-
ing to work with SNGs in partnership, at least where the interests of both coalesce.
The evolution of SNGs as international 
actors in Japan
By comparison with SNGs in North America, western Europe and in some other
countries, Japanese SNGs have been slow to extend their reach internationally.
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Even so, SNGs’ involvement in Japan’s international affairs is by no means new.
It is, and always has been, shaped by the administrative constraints of Japan’s
centralized system of government that restrict what SNGs can do. Historical
accounts record how some centuries ago, a few cities tried to pursue their own
interests by opening their territories to foreigners and pursuing activities
overseas.18 However, as Meiji leaders centralized national administration and
increased their control during the second half of the nineteenth century, national
level actors came to monopolize most areas of public policy. In the post-war
period, SNGs were granted some autonomy under the new 1947 constitution, but
the ‘centralized’ unitary structure remained at least partially intact.19
Taking advantage of this new constitutional status granted to SNGs, local leaders
and bureaucrats took time to try to assert some autonomy in policy development.
Sometimes they acted in consultation and cooperation with the national govern-
ment but at times some SNGs acted contrary to the wishes of the national
government.20 SNGs’ initial steps internationally from the mid-1950s were
through sister-city relationships, a so-called ‘soft’ area of foreign policy where the
aims and interests of both levels of government were mutual.
The rise of progressive mayors and governors in the 1960s and 1970s politicized
some local issues that had a direct bearing on Japan’s foreign affairs. Tension set
in as local–national interests slowly began to diverge. For example, in the early
1970s Mayor Asukata Ichio of Yokohama City refused to grant permission for
Japan-based US tanks to pass along the city’s roads on their way to the Vietnam
War. Some SNGs began to form ties with SNGs in countries from which Japan’s
diplomatic relations were estranged because of Cold War ideological differences.
The Japan–Soviet Coastal Mayors’ Association (now the Japan–Russia Mayors’
Association of the Sea of Japan Coastal Cities) established in 1970 and the 1972
Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan–North Korea Friendship and
Trade Promotion are two main examples. Here SNGs aimed to demonstrate how
governments below the national level could sustain productive ties even while
Cold War animosities ruptured ‘official contacts’ at the national level. These
actions demonstrated that SNGs could do what the central government, because
of diplomatic baggage and concerns for national security, could not.
During the 1960s and 1970s, some SNG leaders involved their administrations in
international relations simply by expressing opinion on critical issues such as war
and peace and by making policies or pronouncements that were directly against
Japan’s official position. Yet, these acts remained on the periphery of SNG activi-
ties and were largely symbolic except in a few localities such as Hiroshima where
the legacy of the atom bomb is pushed nationally and internationally. Until the early
1980s, SNGs generally confined themselves primarily to the symbolic aspects
of sister-city relationships. Only a few pursued initiatives with clear political
overtones and even these were mostly consistent with the centre’s diplomatic
planning and did not indicate an irreconcilable clash of interests. Except for a few
prominent localities, SNGs did not seriously consider themselves in the role of con-
ducting international relations since they had very little opportunity, motivation,
precedent, political willingness or know-how to do so. The national authorities also
had no need to acknowledge or co-opt SNGs in the policy domain.
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Recognition that SNGs could play a vital role in international relations gained
significant currency with the end of the Cold War. SNGs now recognize they have
both the need and the capacity to pursue this avenue. Even the national govern-
ment now accepts that SNGs constitute an important part of the team in selected
areas of foreign affairs, largely because they have the practical ability but some-
times precisely because they do not have the diplomatic baggage of the central
government bodies.
What differentiates the recent upsurge of SNGs as international actors from the
earlier, much smaller-scale pursuits? It is not just the expansion in programmes
and numbers of SNGs involved. Part of the difference is the institutionalization
of SNGs as international actors. New institutions with the necessary administra-
tive arrangements have been established at local, regional and national levels to
initiate and sustain SNG international activities. For example, all prefectures
and large cities have established international affairs departments or sections
(kokusai-bu or ka) and third-sector organizations (kyokai) – often a collaborative
structure between SNGs and local private organizations – for administering activ-
ities related to issues of international relations. To some extent these institutions
enable the central government to coordinate and regulate SNGs’ international
actions.
The Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), a
national body representing SNG interests, has branch offices throughout Japan
and even overseas. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) in particular has
supported and promoted SNGs’ international role.21 Other ministries such as the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now METI), Ministry of
Education (ME, now MEXT) and central agencies like Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
have recognized the crucial role of SNGs in a range of foreign affairs issues. Even
the MOFA, stridently protective of its bureaucratic turf, is coming to terms with
a new status quo where other actors including SNGs pursue actions outside Japan
beyond the Ministry’s full control. These central government players accept SNG
involvement and see SNGs as potential partners in situations where interests are
shared, such as generating economic benefit and creating goodwill abroad.
However, central government players try to restrict and even curtail SNG activi-
ties when the centre sees SNGs as competing with it or pursuing initiatives and
policies that intrude on the centre’s bureaucratic turf or that the centre thinks may
adversely affect national interests, illustrated particularly in Chapter 6.
‘The international’ has become new policy turf for bureaucratic battles between
government actors. It is well known that Japanese ministries and central agencies
do not speak with one voice in policy matters; they compete for power, prestige,
authority and budget.22 MOHA has been the ministry with least influence in for-
eign affairs given its responsibility for domestic issues, local-level governments
and local concerns. However, with development of SNGs as international actors
in their own right, MOHA has come to discover that it can compete with MOFA
in some areas by using SNGs. Thus MOHA as the supervising ministry of
SNGs has acted as their strongest ally in supporting their international ventures.
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MOFA, which assumed for itself the mantle of exclusively conducting Japan’s
international diplomacy and has very little interest in domestic development, has
proved to be the weakest link in nurturing SNGs’ international role. These themes
of rivalry and alliances at various levels of government, and conflicting or shared
interests in issues beyond Japan’s borders, are discussed in detail in later chapters.
What we need to recognize is that SNGs have attempted to use this situation to
their own advantage. Recognizing this helps to shed light on how SNGs are also
influenced by the interests and politicking of individuals, other SNGs and central
governments both inside and outside Japan.
The changing debate and language
The discussion above suggests how official perceptions of SNGs’ international
engagements have changed from politically benign to somewhere between diplo-
matically useful and potentially or actually polemical and threatening to some
central authorities. With the arrival of increasing inflows of foreigners as long-
term residents in the late 1970s and 1980s, government actors were instrumental
in popularizing a new discourse of kokusaika (internationalization). One dimen-
sion of this discourse concerns uchinaru kokusaika (domestic internationali-
zation), a sub-discourse setting out the role and responsibility of Japanese
government actors at national and subnational levels in addressing the new inter-
national challenges inside Japan. To be sure, SNGs’ actions towards foreigners
inside Japan are related to SNGs’ actions outside Japan and towards foreigners
outside Japan. However, as indicated earlier, this book explores the other sub-
discourse – sotonaru kokusaika (transborder internationalization).
In the late 1970s and 1980s, discussion of SNGs’ interactions with the
international community mainly concerned the various types of exchanges and
collaborative arrangements then under way. In the 1990s, the style of these activ-
ities was linguistically recast: from koryu (exchange) to kyoryoku (cooperation).23
This shift symbolized the expansion of SNGs’ international programmes and
highlighted the programmes’ mutually beneficial nature. It was also part of
SNGs’ move to increase their independence as international actors. ‘Kokusai
yakuwari’ (international role) and ‘kokusai seisaku’ (international policy) refer-
ring to SNGs’ limited international engagements were replaced with ‘kokusai
kyoryoku’ (international cooperation), ‘chiho gaiko’ (municipal diplomacy)
and ‘toshi gaiko’ (urban diplomacy) to accommodate the diplomatic import and
overall importance of these actions.24
Structure of this book
This study progresses from the ‘big picture’ to specific details of the Japanese
case. Chapter 1 sets the context by exploring three strands of discussion. First is
conceptual, turning to the International Relations literature to identify how the
forces broadly understood as ‘globalization’ have (1) profoundly transformed and
expanded relations across national borders; and (2) forced new approaches to
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managing these relations through various types of ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy.
The second strand is comparative and here we turn to studies of the increasingly
active, diverse and politicized role of SNGs in many countries. These works help
to contextualize the Japanese case with insights into: (1) how and why SNGs in
other countries pursue international action in their own right; and (2) the domestic
consequences of these SNGs’ actions for foreign policy and intra-governmental
relations. The third strand considers Japanese context as a prelude to empirical
discussion that follows.
Chapter 2 contextualizes the actions of Japanese SNGs in international affairs
by considering developments inside Japan. Here, we overview the complex mix
of international, national and subnational factors at work. We consider how these
factors promote, constrain and ultimately shape the SNGs’ international actions
through influencing SNGs’ capacity, ability and willingness to pursue these
actions.
Chapter 3 is the first of four chapters that focus on the specific types of
international activities and programmes that the SNGs pursue. Analysis in all four
chapters is guided by questions of what, where, how and why. I illustrate with
examples gleaned during fieldwork in specific locations in Japan, each location
chosen carefully for capacity to reveal the diversity, extent and impact of SNGs’
international pursuits. The chapters follow the evolutionary path of the SNGs’
overseas pursuits, beginning in Chapter 3 with international exchange programmes
that have been in place since the early 1950s. Here the major focus is on the key
vehicles of international exchange, which are sister-city relationships and the
Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) programme.
Chapter 4 highlights a new era of international relations in Japan initiated at the
grassroots level. As noted earlier, in the 1990s MOHA and some SNGs put
forward the slogan Koryu kara kyoryoku e (from exchange to cooperation). Here,
I look particularly at SNGs’ involvements in their principal types of international
cooperation: (1) cooperative problem-solving with foreign counterparts; and
(2) foreign-aid delivery. We find that in some cases SNGs are doing what the
centre cannot do because SNGs have the practical capacity, experience and use-
ful networks. As a result, some central authorities are keen to involve SNGs in
international collaboration, but the central government still attempts to control
them through new institutional arrangements.
One of the most important motivations for SNGs pursuing international
activities at present is to maximize the economic interests of their locality. This is
a relatively new approach in Japan by comparison with its Western counterparts.
Here, the national government shares with SNGs a keen interest in positive
outcomes, appreciating the potential for national economic benefit. Chapter 5
examines the various types of economic and commercial relationships that SNGs
are pursuing independently or collectively as regions, the strategic motivations
behind these relationships, and what they produce.
Japanese SNGs do not have the legal and constitutional power of their
counterparts in the United States, and administratively and traditionally they are
bound quite firmly to the central government. These circumstances by design and
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in practice weaken SNGs’ political will to pursue international actions that
contravene the stance of the central government. Yet, there are strong indications
that as the elected representatives of local constituents, some SNGs are keenly
interested in hard-core diplomatic matters that impinge on their locality, includ-
ing national security and territorial conflicts. Some matters inspire resistance by
local leaders and communities that are affected by the treaties and arrangements
that the national government puts in place in the name of the national interest.
Some localities have articulated their own ‘local interest’ on security issues and
other matters of conscience and have worked wholeheartedly to resist the centre’s
unilateral behaviour. In Chapter 6 we consider the role of SNGs in matters of
security and other political concerns. We find that in some ways, for example
through protests at the central government’s laxity on non-nuclear principles and
its support for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, SNGs function as a vent supporting
popular grievances against the central government.
In a brief concluding section, I draw together observations and findings
discussed in the previous chapters. Here, we consider the domestic and international
political implications of SNGs’ move into the international arena, particularly
how the role of Japan’s SNGs as important new players in Japan’s international
affairs influences three areas. One is the overall role of SNGs as administrative
bodies that are responsible primarily for meeting local concerns. The second is
the relationship between SNGs and the national government, questioning whether
SNGs’ newly won international clout strengthens their leverage vis-à-vis the
central government by increasing their fiscal and administrative autonomy on
domestic issues and international issues. The third area is management of Japan’s
international relations, considering how the central government’s ministries that
are responsible for foreign affairs respond to the wanted and unwanted contribu-
tions of SNGs as interests synchronize, collide or are in some other relationship
across and within the different levels of government. The overall picture that
emerges casts Japanese SNGs as increasingly active international actors within a
highly regulated unitary state, in ever more globalized international and domestic
environments.
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In this chapter I consider the context for the analysis in this book. I take up three
strands of discussion: conceptual, comparative and Japanese. The first presents
a conceptual framework for explaining SNGs as international actors, drawing
principally from International Relations literature. The second strand considers
the international activities of SNGs in other countries to provide comparative
examples for examining Japanese SNGs. Most experienced are North American
and European SNGs where the trend has been under way for some time.
Examples from Asia help to focus our lens for understanding the Japanese case.
The third discussion strand concerns the Japanese context. I explain the key devel-
opments in Japan’s political and foreign affairs environments, especially post-Cold
War, that have enabled and encouraged the emergence of Japanese SNGs as inter-
national actors. These developments have opened up space for new actors to
act in what was previously the sole preserve of central government actors. The
developments also gave rise to the limited decentralization of foreign policy that
is rendering SNGs – and non-government actors – an increasingly important role
in Japan’s foreign affairs.
This book takes us to an evolving area at the intersection of Japan’s international
and domestic politics, through a new prism and a new context. Although most
studies of Japan’s foreign affairs have been largely through the prism of national-
government actors, this study concerns the role of subnational governments. And
whereas the locus for analysing relations between different levels of government
in Japan has been principally the domestic context, this study extends the context
to the international arena where players derive and exert power that can influence
relations inside the arena of domestic politics. This new approach begs two
central questions, which this book seeks to address. First, how are Japan’s
international relations being penetrated by SNGs and what are the implications of
this development for understanding Japan’s international relations? Second,
what is the impact of the expanding role of SNGs as international actors on
national–subnational government relations in Japan?
The entry of lower levels of government into Japan’s foreign affairs arena has
brought a new dimension to the territorial fragmenting of public policy and
government functions. Such ‘fragmentation’ now also needs to be considered
in the much broader international context, where SNGs are increasingly active
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Conceptual, comparative and Japanese
players given the partial decentralization of function and responsibility in national
foreign policy. By their very nature SNGs have an ambiguous status in the inter-
national arena as neither ‘state’ nor ‘non-state’ bodies. In the International
Relations lexicon, the noun ‘state’ is usually understood as nation (nation state)
and the adjective ‘state’ refers specifically and exclusively to national govern-
ment. The SNGs’ ‘neither/nor’ status allows them to take some international
actions that neither ‘government’ (read central or national government) nor
non-government bodies can. Let us turn here to that arena and the conceptual
understanding we need for this study.
SNGs as actors in international relations
Complex theories of International Relations explain actions across national
borders and their consequences, as observers seek to identify who (or what), does
what, how, and for whom (or what) in the international arena and why so. Since
the end of the Cold War, a period when divisions and alliances seemed to be more
clearly drawn, a ‘new world order’ or disorder, creating structures that sustain
predictable behaviour among international actors, is still evolving. The end of
Cold War structural alliances and the advent of ‘globalization’ and its ubiquitous
forces have stimulated a steady output of scholarship that is transforming earlier
understandings – not just of how international relations are conducted and to what
end, but also of the nature of the actors, their motivations, their processes and
consequences. Schools of thought have been established, diversified, or ‘neo’-ed
as a result.
Yet observers have generally failed even to recognize, let alone examine,
subnational governments as international actors. The primary shortcoming
appears to be an oversight that locates official governance exclusively at the
national and supranational levels and thus fails to recognize the lower ‘sub’ levels
of government that legitimately govern administrative units within the nation and
are international actors themselves.
The general theoretical assumption of mainstream International Relations
theories is that even after the Cold War, the world is still comprised of nations
represented officially only by a unitary national government whose mandate
and responsibility align with the nation’s border. This government is ultimately
responsible for overseeing the international affairs of those whom the national
government is elected to serve – the citizens of the nation. The national government
may form part of higher levels of governance internationally through suprana-
tional bodies (e.g. the European Union (EU), United Nations, Association of
Southeast Asian Nations). But that is where ‘government’ stops in most of this
theorizing; governments of administrative units within the nation are largely
ignored. Failure to recognize lower levels of government blinds observers to the
huge bulk of SNGs that have some autonomy and capacity to act internationally,
in ways that are not expressly through national government fiat and are with 
a certain degree of independence. We then cannot take account of the consequences
of SNGs’ international engagements for domestic political life.
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Realists endow primacy and exclusive regulatory capacity in the international
arena to nation states led by national governments. Other observers extend their
vision beyond the state to non-state actors and their ever more diverse inter-
national roles. But the status of SNGs as neither state (national government) nor
non-state (non-government) has left them generally outside the viewing lenses.
Various factors may help to explain how SNGs seem to have fallen through the
cracks, as observers try to take note of unprecedented, perhaps revolutionary,
global change. One is the sudden proliferation of new international actors with
the advent of globalization, which has overstretched observers’ attention. A sec-
ond is that even though SNGs are becoming more significant as international
players, their international engagements generally have neither clout nor cachet as
media-grabbing developments. A third is the lingering dominance of Cold War
theorizing that upheld national government as the predominant and unitary
player.
These oversights mean that a conceptual appreciation of SNGs as international
actors (what they do, how they do it, and the domestic and international conse-
quences of this) is yet to register seriously in scholarship. Our discussion of prac-
tical examples of SNGs in various countries in this chapter helps answer these
questions. Yet a review of International Relations scholarship is nevertheless
conceptually helpful here. First, it reveals how traditional international power
structures involving nations, national borders and unified national-government
control over international affairs have gradually weakened, creating space for
non-government and other government actors (including SNGs) to operate on this
terrain.1 International engagement links domestic with international politics to
influence power arrangements inside as well as outside national borders. Second,
contrasting with national government and non-government actors enables us to
identify some distinctive qualities of SNGs as international actors.
The realist school that established and still dominates the academic discipline
of International Relations sees international relationships purely through the
prism of power politics, Realpolitik.2 It proceeds from recognizing the primacy of
the nation state in an anarchical international society where ‘law and order’ can
be maintained only through balancing power between nation states.3 In this view,
the nation state is a singular entity and its capacity as sovereign actor and its inter-
nal and external politics are in separate realms. A unitary national government
conducts and controls foreign policy exclusively and is compelled to speak with
a single voice. There is no room for other actors to compete with the national
government in this arena. Some variants such as neo-realists, neo-liberals and
structural realists recognize the importance of economic actors that are not
national governments, but see the role of these economic actors as subordinate
within a tightly defined state-centric system.
Other observers acknowledge the sovereignty of nations and the role of
national government in both maintaining order and acting as the final adjudicator
in many areas of international life. But they see that international traffic has
become too complex to be managed by national governments as unitary actors, if
indeed it ever was so managed. They marshal mountains of evidence attesting to
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complex interdependence between a multiplicity of actors, including national
governments, that cross national borders to pursue their own interests, which may
include helping to address international concerns independently or collabora-
tively. National borders are crossed incessantly by tourists, business people,
students, refugees and migrants; by international organizations for aid, environ-
mental protection and other humanitarian concerns, and the list goes on, including
a hugely significant non-human element. Revolutionary technological development
has facilitated these international flows. Moreover, for many actors, self-interest
dominates over national interest.
The growing load of international concerns now stretching the global agenda,
such as communicable disease, poverty, climate change, pollution, environmental
destruction, refugees, human rights abuses and terrorism, require collaborative
responses from multiple types of actors working with and beyond national
governments.4 In this milieu the scale of national governments’ international
engagements has mushroomed such that national governments need cooperation of
other entities, particularly to perform the practical work that their foreign ministries
and foreign offices are not equipped to handle. This point is crucial in conceptual-
izing our study; it means that there is legitimate space for new types of actors,
relationships and outcomes to reshape international relations. The vast and diverse
flow of people, goods, capital and information gives rise to complex interdepen-
dence between people, nations and governments and effectively weakens national
boundaries and national governments’ singular capacity to ‘maintain international
law and order’ through ‘balancing power’ between adversarial nations.
Observers who work outside the realist paradigm therefore argue that national
security and power politics are not the only defining elements of international
relations as realists emphasize, especially since socio-economic factors have
become so significant in the global context.5 They also argue that domestic and
international politics are becoming inextricably linked, rather than taking the
quite separate and divisible paths that realists claim to observe. In arguing that
international relations can be explained more accurately if actors other than
national governments are also considered, the broad offering of perspectives
sheds light on many types of state and non-state actors including at supranational,
regional and local levels. But they do not illuminate the SNGs.
Keohane and Nye were among the original proponents of the complex
interdependence model, which sees multiple channels of transborder contact
between societies through transgovernmental and transnational organizations that
bring various government and non-government actors into the equation.
These multiple channels of contact blur the distinction between domestic and
international politics, so that ‘politics does not stop at the waters’ edge’.6
Rosenau, another key proponent of the interdependence model, points to a variety
of authority structures other than national government that play a role in world
affairs. But his attention is on the dynamics of bureaucratic politics, since ‘much
of what transpires in world affairs derives from the initiatives and activities of
governmental sub-units, of bureaucratic agencies that work independently with
counterparts abroad as well as through their superiors’.7
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Mathews speaks of a ‘power shift’, with the end of the steady concentration of
power in the hands of states that began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. With
different types of power and ability dispersed across a range of non-state as well
as state actors, Mathews speculates that ‘nation states may simply no longer be
the natural problem-solving unit’.8 Camilleri and Falk also observe the erosion of
monolithic national power structures. They see that continuing penetration of
national boundaries through the growing role of subnational, international and
transnational actors has made the earlier preserve of the sovereign state (i.e. the
national domain) ‘a contested territory’.9 The primacy of sovereign national gov-
ernment is therefore now out of place in a world shaped by ‘shifting allegiances,
new forms of identity and overlapping tiers of jurisdiction’,10 but SNGs are not
identified among the new international actors that challenge, support or serve
national government in this contested territory.
Sapping of the traditional power structure of the state has also been noted in
contexts beyond the mainstream International Relations literature. For example,
Strange advances the thesis of the state’s retreat in a globalized world in the con-
text of market forces and the increasing role of corporations.11 Willetts proceeds
from this ground in claiming that two of the most fundamental attributes of
sovereignty, control over both currency and foreign trade, have been substantially
diminished.12 Willetts also points to pluralization of international policy, observing
that in any area of global policy-making, developments need to be understood
in terms of ‘complex systems containing governments, companies, and NGOs
interacting in a variety of international organizations’.13
Horsmann and Marshall offer a more comprehensive view, recognizing multiple
forces that curtail the role of the nation state ranging from the changing nature
and reach of capitalism, economic liberalization and technological revolution, to
the changing relationship between citizens and their governmental structure, and
instability in the international system.14 They identify how the emergence of two
opposing forces, integration (e.g. the European Union and the North American
Free Trade Association) and fragmentation (e.g. the demand for new states based
on ethnic identity and greater autonomy for constituent units), directly threaten
the identity of the classically constituted nation state.15 Horsmann and Marshall
come close to the terrain of our discussion in this book in recognizing the demand
for greater autonomy for ‘constituent units’ of nations, but there is no mention of
SNGs even though they are some of the influential ‘constituent units’ that help to
fragment policy while not seeking to create new states.
Here it is useful to note that although some observers point to erosion of
traditional international structures that include national government, since they
have not acknowledged SNGs as levels of government below the national level,
their analyses cannot point to decentralization of international ‘work’ – practice or
responsibility – by the national government to SNGs. There is no acknowledgement
of governments below the centre to which international affairs can be decentralized.
Hence such observers fail to recognize decentralization as another force that weak-
ens but does not erode national government hold on international affairs, even
though it is vital to our understanding of the evolving international relations picture.
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This observation can also be made of Nicholson, who presents a pluralist
‘complex interdependence’ model based on the Rosenau schema. Here ‘the
billiard-ball state has ceased to be solid’ and sub-state actors (cities and regions)
penetrate as international actors.16 Yet Nicholson offers no discussion of SNGs in
the context of levels of government that administer cities and regions as sub-state,
that is, subnational actors, whose international penetration helps to make the
billiard-ball state less solid.17
Other observers come close to identifying SNG involvement in international
affairs by recognizing the importance of international grassroots activity as the
world becomes more complex and national governments are unable to respond
effectively on their own. We can recognize ‘grassroots’ as the terrain of SNGs
since they work much more closely than national government with ‘the people’
and with grassroots communities. Still, SNGs remain unnoticed as internationally
involved grassroots actors. Clough, for example, has noted the growth of grassroots
actors in international affairs and their influence on national foreign policy
without mention of the levels of government that work at society’s grassroots.18
Overall, the literature outside the Realist school favours a pluralist paradigm
that acknowledges the broad diversity of non-government actors and their
considerable and increasing influence on international politics and on the global
system in general.19 This literature does not deny that national government plays
a crucial role in international affairs, but argues that the involvement of multiple
actors inside and outside national government, with conflicting interests and
contradictory positions on international affairs, makes nations and national
governments anything but unitary actors. This multiple involvement also makes
for complex interdependence between players. It means that sources of power and
influence cross over between the domestic and international domains such that
domestic politics cannot be hermetically sealed from international conditions.
Most observers who argue for a pluralist approach to understanding
international relations appear to have conceptually subsumed the subnational
level of government within national government or have failed to recognize
subnational governments as bodies capable of independent international involve-
ment, and so do not per se see SNGs as international actors. Some rare exceptions
have identified SNGs’ international activity but, like Breslin and Hook, catego-
rize the SNGs themselves as non-state actors. This distorts our understanding
of SNGs’ capacity and their political potency.20 Overall, SNGs have not been
allowed to stand alone conceptually, as the ‘neither/nor’ actors they actually
operate as in contemporary international affairs.
Features of SNGs as international actors
Being neither national governments nor non-government gives SNGs a unique
position in international affairs. Their quasi-diplomatic status can allow them to
play a valuable role that sometimes neither of the other two types of actors can
play, as the Japanese case attests most clearly in Chapter 6. In this book we can
most constructively examine SNGs as a subset of the national government distinct
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from the national level and its departments and agencies but ultimately still
answerable to it.
As a subset of government, SNGs are responsible for administering public
services to their constituency as effectively as possible, and for serving the interests
of their constituents collectively. To some extent they must answer to the national
government and carry out its instructions because the national government is
largely their paymaster and their position is circumscribed by law and/or the
national constitution that set down SNG responsibilities. Because they are
governments, irrespective of their level they are usually elected bodies returned
to or ousted from office through the electoral system. This makes their actions –
domestic or international – inherently political, however small-scale or innocuous
these actions may appear to be. Most importantly, the SNG subset is not the same
as the full national set, and the subset itself comprises a diverse array of SNGs
with distinctive local features that we consider in the next section. Their distinc-
tiveness and diversity mean that the interests, concerns and priorities of the ‘local’
members of the subset may or may not always align internally or with those of the
full national set of which it is part. It also means that SNGs as international actors
present a very diverse picture. There is no one-size-fits-all model that reveals
similar experiences for SNGs across the board.
To identify some defining features of SNGs as ‘neither/nor’ international
actors with their own capacities, objectives and limitations, it is useful to compare
SNGs with the types of international actors that they are not: national government
and non-government organizations. SNGs resemble the national government in
some ways because they are, primarily, government, with the distinctive features
of government discussed earlier and which come into effect when SNGs engage
internationally. They do not comprise privately organized citizens. They are
mostly elected representatives of the public and as such often have easier access
to the corridors of power nationally and internationally. Their purpose is not to
generate profit for themselves, although it is certainly to cultivate the economic
climate for profit-making within their constituency,21 and in contemporary times
when labour supply exceeds demand in many nations, there is a strong compul-
sion for both national governments and SNGs to bring jobs (often seen as votes)
as well as profit-making opportunities to their constituency through international
channels. Like national governments – and unlike most non-state actors that are
issue-oriented and act in the interest of a specific-purpose group – SNGs have a
complex, internally competing set of public interests to serve in their international
engagements.
In other ways SNGs resemble non-government actors. Most significantly,
although they must accept the consequences of their international actions, they do
not have the ultimate responsibility for the national ramifications since this rests
with the national government. Although they have a complex set of public
interests to serve, they are not responsible for the nation’s economic well-being,
cohesion and protection. Their international actions do not have the full diplomatic
import of national-government action. The scale of their international involve-
ments is limited and nothing like the worldwide reach of national government.
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Nor are they bound by the domestic and international conventions that apply to
the national government such as official diplomatic standing and procedure.
Moreover, inside and outside their national context, SNGs have ‘liberating’,
non-national government qualities in their roles as international actors. This is
important because perception matters enormously in international affairs.
Because the international interests of this subset of government may synchronize
with or depart from the interests pursued by the national government, SNGs can
work hand-in-hand with the national government, independently of it, or some-
times in opposition to it. They can be policy supporters or policy spoilers. SNGs
may be divided or united by political party and other expected domestic loyalties
and these can also influence their international behaviour. While SNGs are not
‘sovereignty-bound’ like national governments, neither are they ‘sovereignty free’
like non-government actors. Yet, SNGs usually have some policy autonomy even
in foreign affairs.
The gradual weakening of national-government control over international
affairs and national governments’ growing dependence on new international
actors has given the SNGs greater leeway, especially in the post-Cold War period
to act on the international scene, once a coveted area of national policy firmly
held by the national government alone. To understand more fully what SNGs are
doing internationally, let us turn to practical examples of SNGs in various coun-
tries that have responded to this international climate now open to a much wider
collection of actors.
SNGs in comparative perspective
There is an expanding and eye-opening literature on the practical roles and
consequences of internationally active SNGs from specific countries or regions.22
It serves to puncture the silence in the theoretical literature discussed earlier.
This literature is rich with neologies for SNGs’ involvement in international
affairs, acknowledging both diplomatic and policy dimensions and its
non-national-government source. Observers use terms such as ‘multilayered
diplomacy’,23 ‘plurinational diplomacy’,24 ‘proto-diplomacy’,25 ‘para-diplomacy’,26
and ‘micro diplomacy’,27 and speak of ‘perforated sovereignty’,28 ‘foreign policy
localization’,29 or simply ‘local foreign policy’.
The examples discussed in these studies reveal the extent and diversity of
SNGs’ and their increasingly important international role. We see the diversity of
their approaches to international engagement, the types of relationships SNGs have
with other actors, and how these relationships can serve to shift leverage among
the government players at different levels in national and regional contexts.
Engaging with these studies enables us to see the localized consequences of the
international transformation discussed in the section above in countries across
Europe, North America and Asia–Pacific, as globalization has drawn multiple
new actors and new sources of power or influence into the international field. The
new international relations dynamic is changing power relations between national
and subnational governments on the ground, while both increasing national
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government dependence on SNGs and increasing SNG autonomy through
international contact.
The comparison also reveals other features that distinguish SNGs as international
actors. The SNGs can serve as a valuable arm of their nation or region for out-
siders such as national governments, commercial interests, or others who want
this access. They have formed strong global networks that offer useful support
and opportunities for collaborative arrangements that national governments, with
inescapable diplomatic baggage, are sometimes unable to make. Often, they form
clusters of similar actors with shared interests, which present opportunities for
alliances and other strategic action. They are also realigning strategically across
and within the national/subnational divide as pressures and opportunities from
globalization reconfigure SNG interests. New competitions among all involved
actors seeking to satisfy their interests as effectively and efficiently as possible
require SNGs to be politically expedient both nationally and internationally. In
both contexts, a view is gaining currency that national government is less
efficient than SNGs in representing the localized interests of individual SNGs
within the global economy.30
The international scale of this dynamic change for SNGs means that we find
examples in countries with domestic political systems as different from each
other as communist China’s unitary system and democratic India’s federal system.
Conventional wisdom would suggest that federal structures (such as in the United
States, Australia and Canada) that allow more autonomy to federated units would
enable SNGs to take active roles in international affairs and influence national
foreign policy through their actions. Yet European and other national examples
(such as Japan) show that even in centralized unitary systems, SNGs are actively
involved in international affairs. Hocking has noted that in looser federations and
in highly centralized states, SNGs have been equally motivated to operate outside
their national environment.31 Pursiainen’s study points to the increasingly ‘inde-
pendent’ stance of Russian regional SNGs (particularly through self-declared
freedom) in their external relations, but also through international policies that
are generally in line with the Russian government’s official position.32
The comparative literature reveals multiple factors other than the unitary/federal
nature of the political system that are instrumental in shaping who does what,
where, why and how. Some are contingent on the nation, including whether its
legal/constitutional framework confirms SNGs’ roles or offers an ambiguity that
SNGs can tap into to pursue international roles. Other factors are contingent on the
SNG. These include its location, size and importance (e.g. Japan’s capital metrop-
olis of Tokyo with its concentration of human, financial and political resources has
an international role very different from that of rural Tottori on the Japan Sea side);
the political and personal will of SNG leaders, and the geostrategic location of the
SNG’s locality in relation to other domestic and international actors. The capacity
to work with the national government and its agencies, corporations, NGOs,
counterparts and others in pursuing international relations is also central.
The pace of development has also differed. Starting in the 1970s, SNGs
in Europe and the United States were earlier starters and models than their
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counterparts elsewhere. Forces of globalization leading to new international
economic norms around market liberalization for example the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO)
and regionalization (in bodies with supranational frameworks such as the
European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) have
intensified pressures on SNGs and lubricated, or for some compelled, their inter-
national engagements. The comparative literature reveals how this development
has emboldened the SNGs in their quest for greater autonomy, while shifting the
levels at which citizens identify their loyalties – not just up from national level to
supranational bodies but also down from national level to localities.
Overall, the message from the comparative literature is that there is real
diversity but also enough similarity to recognize some more general trends. The
goal of SNGs as international actors is usually far from having grand aspirations
to establish an international identity for their locality. It is to manage local issues
as efficiently as possible and pursue constituents’ collective interests internation-
ally, whether directly, with national governments, or with supranational and inter-
national organizations. There is a compelling overall reason why this goal draws
SNGs increasingly towards international action: local issues are increasingly
internationally conditioned. Let us turn here to consider the domains where SNGs
are most active internationally – economics, diplomatic action and international
cooperation and networking. We can then consider the impact of their actions
upon the national–subnational government relationship.
Key areas of SNGs’ international engagement
Economics
Trade, investment and other economic relations pursued by SNGs with partners
overseas are the most common and least controversial aspect of SNG involvement
in foreign affairs. Most SNGs are to some extent responsible for the economic
conditions in their locality, so they are keen to pursue commercial and other
arrangements that will enhance the economic climate of their locality and ideally
bring jobs, technology and other commercial operations. National governments’
failure to protect local markets and cuts to SNG budgets have forced SNGs
to take more responsibility for the economic welfare of their locality and for
managing local budgets prudently. Seeking economic opportunities internation-
ally is also a means to a particularly important political end: greater financial
independence usually also means greater SNG autonomy from their national-
government masters.
SNGs take a number of approaches to stimulate and maintain overseas
economic linkages: trade missions seeking new markets for local products and
help local industry establish linkages overseas, and overseas offices that facilitate
commercial linkages and support trade missions. Overseas offices have been
common for some European, US, Canadian and Australian SNGs for the past two
or three decades. Even before the end of the Cold War when SNGs’ international
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actions were more firmly regulated, 43 US states maintained 132 offices overseas.
By the late 1990s, US states maintained almost as many offices overseas as the US
federal government operated embassies.33 Some economically oriented regions
in Europe operate overseas offices that function as quasi-embassies to negotiate
regional trade agreements. France’s Rhone-Alpes region centred in Lyon reaches
into Switzerland and Italy and so maintains overseas ‘embassies’ in Geneva in
Switzerland and in Turin in Italy.34
Quantified data suggest that the Canadian province of Quebec is the world’s
most active SNG in international economic activity. Around the mid-1990s,
Quebec spent more money in this activity and operated more overseas offices
than Canada’s nine other provinces combined. Its expenditure and staff were also
more than for all 50 US states combined. Quebec recognizes responsibility for
independent action as a Canadian province since 40 per cent of the country’s
gross domestic product (GDP) and one-third of jobs in the private sector depend
directly on export activity.35
Other approaches to stimulating international economic linkages are carried
out within the locality or the region that a group of localities form, to create local
conditions attractive to specific types of commerce or industry. One of these is
establishing infrastructure such as transport and communication that supports
commercial activity. Some European cities have linked themselves in state-of-the-art
transportation networks and have been largely successful in attracting the foreign
businesses they solicit.36 Another approach is financial incentives through induce-
ment packages, tax breaks and other financial enticements. These competitive
packages are put together to attract high-profile companies that would bring jobs
and attract other economic stimulation. For example, SNGs in Alabama in the
United States offered nearly $300 million in incentives to draw Mercedes-Benz to
the state. Fry’s study presents many similar examples across the United States.37
Most SNGs have very limited financial resources compared to their central
governments and need to operate judiciously when seeking business opportunities;
they are not private corporations. However, despite being publicly accountable
government bodies, the SNGs strive to develop market advantages on whatever
basis they can: geographic, demographic or through other sources of local
strength or distinctiveness. An important consideration is how they can maximize
their interests: through bilateral relations, domestic regional groupings or multi-
lateral regional groupings or some combination of these. Citing developments in
Germany, northern Italy, the Rhone-Alpes in France, and Catalonia in Spain,
Newhouse argues that regionalism involving local actors is the coming dynamic,
especially in Europe.38
SNGs use multilateral regional groups to establish webs of alliances at the
micro-regional level to create opportunities for trade and other economic activi-
ties in their localities. Breslin and Hook’s volume, for example, presents several
cases of micro-regional collaborations.39 In the Chinese case, SNGs in the
Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas and in the Tianjin area have promoted the
idea of building an economic region around the Bo-Hai Sea to harness their
traditional ties with European countries such as France, Britain and Germany, and
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also seek investment from new players such as Japan and Korea. The aim is to
make the area a centre of heavy industry, technology, finance and transportation
in Northeast Asia.40 Some observers claim that many of these initiatives fail to
meet these aims, but here it is important to recognize that SNGs and other
local actors recognize they must supplement their bilateral economic networks
externally with multilateral linkages.
Since geographic proximity, regional orientation and other considerations
orientate Japanese SNGs towards China, it is useful here to further consider the
Chinese example. The decline of central planning and pursuit of marketization in
the post-Mao era have made foreign investment a significant source of capital,
employment and technology for China’s provinces, so it is not surprising that
action to expand foreign economic relations has become the most important
aspect of provincial external affairs.41 Some Chinese provinces are actively
pursuing their commercial interests overseas independently and doing so with
central government encouragement.42 For international relationships where there
are unresolved diplomatic issues between the national governments, the Chinese
national government has encouraged provinces to seek commercial links that it is
unable to pursue bilaterally at the national level. For example, the central govern-
ment approved special arrangements to facilitate economic contacts between
Shandong and South Korea even before formal diplomatic ties were established
in 1992. Shandong has since used its ties with South Korea extensively to accel-
erate its own development. South Korean investment in Shandong was insignifi-
cant in the 1980s, but increased dramatically in the 1990s while South Korea
replaced Hong Kong as Shandong’s second most important export market
and overtook Taiwan as the second most significant source of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in 1995.43
India provides another interesting example. Although India has a federal political
system, Indian states have had few contacts overseas. Until very recently, even
their trade and other economic matters were dealt with via the national govern-
ment in New Delhi. However, economic liberalization from the early 1990s has
given states greater autonomy to pursue external economic relations indepen-
dently. Central authorities such as the Ministry of Finance now encourage state
governments to negotiate directly with multilateral agencies such as the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Sridharan’s study offers examples from
the southern and central states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka
and Maharashtra, showing the increasing efforts by these state SNGs seeking
commercial opportunities overseas and attracting foreign investment in high-tech
industry, tourism and even in providing municipal services. Although she sees
that in the early 2000s, the international role of Indian states is ‘nascent’, discussion
of trends under way makes it clear that India’s national government will increasingly
share the commercial dimension of foreign policy with SNGs.44
Russia also provides an interesting example, as a former communist regime
that established a federal system in the early 1990s. Many of the larger Russian
SNGs now actively pursue trade and commercial interests overseas.45 Pursianen
regards them as ‘foreign policy players in their own right’, since at least in some
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issues they have their own distinctive policies towards the outside world.46
Regions are becoming important centres for international contact and the pre-
ferred route for approaches from external parties is increasingly via the regions
directly rather than via Moscow. INTERREG (the EU-based Inter-regional Initiative
programme), which aims to promote cooperation between the border regions in
Europe, now includes the Russian regions. And as with the Chinese example, the
Russian government is keen to have SNGs pursue economic linkages that it feels
it cannot so pursue, where unresolved diplomatic issues curtail national-government
capacity. We see this in the economic cooperation between Russian regions and
Japanese SNGs on the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin and the Maritime Province, despite
the territorial dispute and absence of a peace treaty at the national level.47
Diplomatic action
SNGs in some European nations and particularly in the United States have pursued
political activity for a few decades, with both covert and overt involvement in
national diplomacy. As with international economic action, national circum-
stances shape the ability and the will of SNGs to take international action that is
explicitly political. Federal government systems generally present SNGs with
greater structural capacity than unitary government systems for taking indepen-
dent international political action. Capacity to act is usually legitimated in the
legal system and the constitution, with restrictions that ensure that SNGs do not
have a free reign in international politics. In the United States, for example, the
constitution expressly forbids SNGs from making treaties, engaging in war,
exchanging ambassadors or negotiating with foreign governments on matters
vital to the nation, such as national security. States may enter into international
‘agreements or compacts’ with the approval of Congress. But the main consider-
ation is this: ‘whatever power is not expressly assigned to the national government
[through the constitution] belongs in the state governments and the people.’48 This
clear allocation of power to SNGs in the United States – notably to US states
rather than lower levels – contrasts with the Japanese and many other cases where
SNGs have had to carve out a niche for their international political actions in the
gaps of ambiguity between imprecise power allocations within the constitution.
SNGs engage in various types of political action with diverse consequences
both nationally and internationally. Sometimes their actions are consistent with
national-government policy and may support or reinforce the national level’s diplo-
matic efforts by default. Sometimes these supportive actions are more deliberate,
by national-government design or at least in collaboration, with SNGs seeking to
carry out the work of the national government at arms length since diplomatic or
other policy considerations prevent the national government from taking direct
action. At other times, however, the political actions of SNGs have been in direct
opposition to the stance of their national government and pose challenges to the
national government’s supremacy in foreign affairs. Here the national government
has little choice but to work around these challenges, although it may try to obtain
a more cooperative arrangement with SNGs through domestic policy levers.
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Most cases where SNGs imposed their own sanctions on oppressive foreign
regimes and on others who systematically abused human rights were in direct
opposition to their national government’s stated policy. Oppositional action like
this has been rare in Asian countries and is most common in the United States,
where some have oppugned ‘the worrisome foreign policies’ of SNGs.49
Some US states have made independent policies seeking to oppose oppressive
regimes, promote democracy and protect human rights by imposing sanctions on
foreign nations. In the 1970s, to protest the apartheid regime in South Africa and
the US government’s stance on it, the state of Washington passed measures to
divest pension and portfolios of securities in corporations doing business in South
Africa. Other SNGs enacted anti-apartheid sanctions that caused some two-thirds
of their companies to leave South Africa or sell their equity, which helped force
the US government to drop its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South
Africa.50 Similar resistance actions came from various states’ referenda and
support for measures against the Vietnam War in the 1970s, and their diverse acts
of opposition to Washington’s policies against Iran and the former Soviet Union,
including embargos in the aftermath of the Soviet 1983 downing of a KAL
passenger jet.51 More recently, in 1996, the state of Massachusetts introduced the
‘Burma Law’ that effectively bans state agencies from signing contracts with
companies doing business with Myanmar.52 Some efforts have opposed national
policy stances on other than specific bilateral concerns. For example, at the height
of the Cold War, more than 50 localities, including the city of Chicago, selectively
banned research, manufacture, transhipment or deployment of nuclear weapons
within their jurisdiction.
Other acts of opposition are constructive. In the 1970s, Idaho sponsored trade
missions to and from Libya when the country was out of favour at the federal
level and various SNGs over time provided sanctuary for illegal immigrants and
refugees. SNGs’ move to establish sister-city relations with municipalities in
Nicaragua at the height of conflict between the Reagan and Sandinista adminis-
trations were clearly to oppose Washington foreign policy and the 86 US cities
with Nicaraguan ‘sisters’ sent more humanitarian support to Nicaraguan towns
than all of the aid that the US government provided to the anti-Sandinista Contras
that these SNGs opposed. Their move also helped to keep US public opinion
two-to-one against US aid to the Contras.53
Some European SNGs have also pursued independent policies seeking to
oppose oppressive regimes, promote democracy and protect human rights by
imposing sanctions on foreign nations. For example, in the mid-1970s, several
Dutch cities forced Stevin, a major dredging and building firm, to cancel its pro-
jects for the repressive regime of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. SNGs in
Europe have also mounted cases for decent treatment of refugees.54 Furthermore,
some local authorities in Britain and the Netherlands have mounted special pro-
grammes to absorb refugees in their localities, while others have even challenged
their national-government policies of deportation.55
Although national governments try to dissuade or prevent SNG political action
opposing national policy, they support SNGs taking political action that upholds
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national diplomatic objectives or indeed substitutes for, or enables, formal
diplomacy. SNGs can conduct de facto diplomacy as a conduit for national
government because of their ambiguous neither/nor status; they are free of the full
diplomatic baggage that attaches to national government in the name of sover-
eignty but still have representative status and formal connection to the national
level. Provinces in China, for example, have been active in ‘informal diplomacy’,
as discussed above in Shandong Province’s economic connections with South
Korea. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, when China’s national
leaders were unwelcome in some national capitals, especially those that staunchly
criticized the Chinese leadership’s quashing of freedoms of assembly and speech,
some SNG leaders made trips to these countries. No high-ranking national politi-
cians were invited to Canada, but eight senior local leaders visited Canada in
1991. The then Shanghai Mayor Zhu Rongji (later China’s prime minister) visited
the United States and a number of European capitals, paving the way for a diplo-
matic breakthrough between Beijing and Western nations. Similarly, before the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and South Africa
in 1997, contacts with post-apartheid South Africa were maintained mainly at the
provincial level.56
In recent years, India’s national government has acknowledged the political
utility of SNGs in international affairs with governments of Indian states involved
in diplomatic discussions with India’s neighbouring countries. Sridharan notes
awareness at the national level that regional leaders can help facilitate negotia-
tions because of common cultural ties between the people of their province and
people across the border.57 The chief ministers of West Bengal in the east and
Tamil Nadu in the south have often been involved in negotiations with
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka because of their linguistic and cultural connections to
these countries.
Although SNGs are commended for their role as supporter, their spoiler role
draws mixed appraisal. Some observers believe strongly that SNGs should not
involve themselves in matters of foreign policy. In the 1980s, when more than
800 US localities passed nuclear-freeze resolutions, some critics dismissed these
as ‘hortatory measures’ that had little influence on US nuclear policy despite their
intention to incite policy change. Realist scholar Spiro has criticized such actions
of opposition or resistance as ‘local interference in foreign policy’.58 Yet others
see these actions as a sign of healthy democracy. Some have argued that SNG
action against repressive regimes such as in pre-Mandela South Africa and
Myanmar should not be seen as central government losing control over the
foreign policy agenda but as a legitimate function of democratic government in
a federal system.59 Former Los Angeles Mayor, Tom Bradley, claimed that
because SNGs are closer to the people than the federal government, they are
better placed to register popular dissent expressed through locally elected repre-
sentatives, especially since many national policies are felt initially and most pro-
foundly at the local level. Guay stridently claims, for reasons such as these, that
SNGs cannot be dismissed as political actors in the international arena.60 Some
prominent public figures in the United States have moved further, encouraging
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SNGs to pursue their own foreign policy. For example, some have exhorted
California to orient itself towards the Asia–Pacific region and rediscover its old
relationships with Mexico, especially while Washington focuses on trans-Atlantic
policies.61
Some SNG international engagements are not overtly political but can have
political consequences. One area is SNG involvement in international develop-
ment issues through assisting SNGs and communities in developing countries.
Donor SNGs use their own resources and financial support from the development
assistance budgets of their national governments. SNGs in Germany, France,
Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain were early actors in this field through
support for NGO projects. Shuman notes many cases of involvement in north–
south assistance programmes by European SNGs that have provided money,
volunteers and technology to build schools, hospitals, roads and bridges. The
German city-state of Bremen is exemplary here, providing technical assistance
through biogas projects in China, India and Africa that created local jobs as well
as energy for cooking.62
As Shuman has noted, SNGs’ capacity to assist in international development
programmes is not just in the practical areas of technical expertise for road
building, water systems and so forth but also in public administration and ‘good
governance’ including sound planning, efficient administration and effective
leadership.63 Since the 1980s, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM)
has been involved in this area.64 These examples show that SNGs in some coun-
tries are becoming important players in delivery of international aid, labelled by
some as ‘local ODA’ or ‘mini ODA’ programmes. The precedent of European and
Canadian SNGs has been followed by Japanese SNGs that are responding
with enthusiasm to the opportunity to contribute to international development
programmes, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Networking and international cooperation
It is widely recognized that the nation state does not have the capacity to look
after the distinctive interests of all of its many diverse SNGs. In an environment
where many non-state actors are gaining significance in foreign policy through
national and international networks, SNGs have also recognized the value of
establishing formal linkages bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally. Sister-city
linkages are the most common formal ties between SNGs bilaterally and are
largely outside the auspices of any central government involvement.65 Thousands
of American cities and states have established sister-city ties with foreign coun-
terparts, as have SNGs in many European and Asian countries (especially
Northeast Asia). SNGs in Australia and New Zealand have also pursued this path
enthusiastically.
Sister linkages were designed initially in the wake of the Second World War to
promote mutual understanding through cultural and educational exchanges, but
have now evolved into vehicles for pursuing a wide range of shared interests
including commercial opportunities. These formal linkages include educational
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exchanges, staff visits, cultural celebrations, pursuit of shared interests or
concerns, exchange of trade missions and mutual assistance at times of disaster.
O’Toole has explained the transformation of SNG linkages from an ‘associative
phase’ of cultural and educational ties to the ‘commercial phase’ involving various
economic connections.66
There is no single template that sister-city relationships follow. As noted
earlier, in the United States, some sister-city links have been used for expressly
political purposes. These include promotion of democracy abroad, helping to
train elected foreign officials of nascent democracies in Eastern Europe, and as
Spiro notes of many US sister-city relationships, ‘more to send a foreign policy
message to Washington than merely to cement subnational ties’.67 We certainly
see signs of Japanese SNGs expanding sister linkages into commercial arrange-
ments, however the political aims of US counterparts are not at all evident in the
Japanese case.
Some SNGs use sister and other formal or semi-formal bilateral linkages as
mutual problem-solving mechanisms, especially with geographically adjacent
counterparts. Several US state governments have environmental accords with
Canadian provinces or Mexican states, and have hosted these neighbouring
SNGs in discussing solutions to acid rain and other shared problems concerning
environment and climate. This type of cooperation at SNG level increased pres-
sure on the US government to enter into formal negotiations with the Canadian
government over bilateral approaches to some problem solving and prompted
new legislation by the US government.68
Recognizing the logic of strength in numbers, SNGs are also moving beyond
bilateral relationships into multilateral organizations to fortify both their national
and international networking and their capacity to influence decision-making on
global concerns. A number of international associations represent SNG interests
at international forums and transnational and supranational organizations. Three
international bodies – the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the
World Federation of United Cities (FMCU–UTO) and Metropolis (the interna-
tional association of major metropolises) – combined in 2004 to form a new
organization called United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), to present
SNGs as an internationally coordinated body. The UCLG is driven by lofty goals
of pursuing international cooperation, fostering city diplomacy in all realms
concerning local life, particularly peace efforts, building a formal role for SNGs
as a pillar of the international system and working in partnership with the UN to
meet Millennium Development goals.69 Another body, the International Council
for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLE) helps several hundred municipalities
worldwide to share state-of-the-art technologies and policies for environmental
protection.70 My interviews with Japanese local leaders and officials revealed
a reasonable level of interest in membership in these international associations.
Recognizing sustainable development and ecological management as prime
areas where SNGs can contribute internationally, associations representing the
interests of SNGs across the world have participated in high-level international
meetings such as the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the World Summit on
28 Concepts, comparison and Japanese context
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. At Johannesburg the message
from SNGs was clear: ‘Nation states cannot, on their own, centrally manage and
control the complex, fast moving, cities and towns of today and tomorrow – only
strong decentralized local governments, in touch with and involving their
citizens, and working in partnership with national governments, are in a position
to do so.’71
The terms ‘decentralized’ and ‘partnership’ appear to be crucial for understanding
the nexus between the two levels of government in contributing to effective
management of local and global issues. This is true of the Japanese case where
the national government has decentralized to SNGs, some tasks and responsibilities
in foreign affairs, recognizing that SNGs work more closely with citizens and so
are placed ideally to work in partnership with the national government. But this
message at the Johannesburg Summit was to resonate not just in national contexts
but in an international context where institutional arrangements reflect this
philosophy. Regionalization gives this message a particular resonance as we see
manifest in the EU.
SNGs have generally worked hard to establish their place – and their voice – in
the EU. Literature on local government in Europe features considerable discussion
of the move by SNGs to bypass national governments and represent their own
interests at the European Commission (EC) in Brussels, where many SNGs have
set up offices. Here some SNGs have been motivated to secure much-needed
funding directly from Brussels, as well as to influence policy made in Brussels
through direct communication with policymakers. Eurocities, an SNG organiza-
tion founded in 1986 with headquarters in Brussels, pushes the agenda of a 
pan-Europe urban policy that recognizes cities as significant centres of sub-
national governance and mobilizes city administrations to work collaboratively
in this direction.72
The push to collaborate is linked to political imperatives that are locally
defined but influenced by increasing economic internationalization.73 Yet as we
may expect, the interests of all EU SNGs are not always in sync with each other,
so that some political battles must be waged and compromise reached. And while
many SNGs establish links directly with counterparts abroad, they have not
completely bypassed the nation state in favour of a Europe of regions; regional
lobbies are still more powerful in Brussels when they work with national govern-
ments than when they act on their own.74 The EU Commission has itself promoted
partnerships with local authorities to learn what is happening at local levels
directly since central governments have acted as barriers and gatekeepers. Many
initiatives for SNGs have come from Brussels and were later approved by national
governments.75
The EU example highlights the absence of concerted action by SNGs in any
Asian regional grouping to collaboratively register their capacity, their voice and
their potential clout within the group. Japanese SNGs have not moved proactively
like European counterparts to institutionalize SNG contributions to the regional
organizations of which Japan is a member such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations plus Japan, China and South Korea (ASEAN3), the Pacific
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Basin Economic Council (PBEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
(PECC) and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Failure to take initia-
tive, build momentum among Asian counterparts or flex their own political muscle
may contribute to the apparent inertia on the part of Japanese SNGs vis-à-vis
regional groupings. The EU example presents not necessarily a model but a guide
to the types of collaborative arrangements that Japanese SNGs could forge if they
perceive that circumstances will sustain their efforts. Also, the preferred political
style of many Japanese and other Asian SNGs may simply differ from that of their
Western counterparts.
The national–subnational government relationship
The entry of SNGs into the international arena extends the strategic space in
which SNGs relate to national government as one of a multitude of new types of
international actors. It provides SNGs with further opportunities for political
voice and action, as the transformative processes of globalization render foreign
policy a contested territory. In this environment there is room, indeed compulsion,
for new alliances and divisions that cut across national–subnational government
barriers and create new sources of leverage on both sides of the government
divide and both sides of national borders. This is true of centralized unitary
systems of government (like Japan’s) and looser federal systems (like those of
the United States and Canada). Expressed plainly, national governments need
what some SNGs are well placed to contribute to managing international affairs.
Under these conditions, the earlier structures of dependence between government
players within nations, and the relative unity of their interests in international
matters, have both begun to adjust.
Structures of dependence between national and subnational governments are
still institutionalized through financing, legal, constitutional and practical admin-
istrative arrangements. But as the discussion above suggests, the complex inter-
dependence that now marks relations between a vast array of international actors
is increasing national governments’ reliance on their subnational ranks to support
or actually do what national governments cannot do given the bulk of work
and responsibilities and at times unwanted diplomatic incursions in managing
international affairs. Central governments are inundated with issues of trade and
globally generated pressures, and are unable to satisfactorily handle these without
the cooperation of SNGs. Simultaneously, this very process of ‘going interna-
tional’ makes SNGs in some ways less dependent on their national government
for financing and for practical advice on problems and policies. SNGs have more
confidence in their capacity to operate as international actors and increasingly
more experience to do so. Importantly, many SNGs regard themselves as valuable
players in the policy process, no longer dutifully policy-compliant or subservient
policy-followers in relation to national policy.
Here, we can recognize how this gradual shift in dependence between the two
government levels serves to weaken the underlay for top-down intergovernmental
relations and can help to strengthen the capacity for SNG autonomy inside and
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outside the nation. This does not mean that SNGs are becoming independent
political entities at home and abroad. But it does mean that national governments
must share some foreign-policy territory with SNGs through partnerships and
other co-operative arrangements. This is the source of decentralization of foreign-
policy tasks. Our comparative overview above suggests some decentralization of
foreign policy is under way in all nations, at least partly in response to global
forces. Its nature and extent are shaped by multiple factors that derive from local,
national and international contexts.
Incongruity of interests with national government helps firm the will of SNGs to
reach beyond national borders. If there was ever unity of interests between national
and subnational governments, it no longer exists as the underlay for relations
between and within levels of government inside the nation. We have noted above
that the local ramifications of global transformation have created new competitions,
particularly economic, between government actors such that the interests or at least
the priorities of the national government in foreign relations at times conflict with
the interests of competing localities. While SNGs internationally pursue their
explicitly local political interests or priorities that diverge from the national
governments’ big-picture interests in national economic strength, national security/
defence, national image and regional stability, cleavages sometimes appear.
What are the consequences of these developments for national–subnational
government relations as SNGs begin to share the national government’s foreign
policy space, albeit in a limited way? National governments have recognized the
emerging role of SNGs in foreign affairs and generally welcome SNGs’ valuable
contribution to the national economy through local efforts. However, national
governments firmly resist relinquishing what they regard as the dedicated
‘national’ turf of foreign policy, which is a vital source of their representative
capacity and authority over the nation. This turf particularly involves national
defence and security and other areas of explicitly national interest. Even here, in
some countries such as the United States (and in Chapter 6 we see this in Japan)
SNGs have implemented policies that challenge their national government’s
foreign-policy stance. Such posturing suggests that although national govern-
ments allocate to SNGs some responsibility for practical action to which both
sides agree, national governments will not relinquish their capacity to regulate the
actions of any actors, including SNGs, that influence those outside their nation,
particularly other national governments. Retaining this regulatory capacity
appears to be crucial. This is why we see limited decentralization of foreign
policy that allows national government to retain overall regulatory capacity and
thus ultimate authority for international affairs.
China provides us a useful comparative basis as a highly centralized nation
where the central government still has a relatively tight hold on all national
policies. Even in China, SNGs are no longer involved in foreign affairs only to
promote the central government’s interests; they now conduct external relations to
pursue their own economic interests and enhance their own international image.76
And by pulling together, SNGs as international actors may have capacity to shift
national policy. Segal claims that the Chinese central government could lose some
Concepts, comparison and Japanese context 31
of its hold over human rights and defence spending if a bulk of Chinese SNGs
respond collectively against the central government to embargoes by foreign
suppliers and major importers on goods produced in Chinese prisons.77 In other
words, SNGs pursuing local interests could force Beijing to do what it would not
have done of its own volition. In a ‘centralized federal structure’ like India, this
has already happened. States in India have been able to force the central govern-
ment to be more transparent and inclusive when dealing with external entities that
have implications for states’ economies. As Sridharan observes, in India ‘the
states have served notice on the Centre’s monopolistic behaviour’.78
The comparative examples discussed in the previous section indicate variation
in SNGs’ roles in foreign policy, influenced by national context and differences
between SNGs even within the same national context. It is unwise and impossible
to speak conclusively of this trend. But overall, we can say that national govern-
ments are beginning to treat SNGs as an integral part of foreign policy that
supplement rather than replace the efforts of the central authorities. Whereas
some observers speak of ‘local foreign policies’,79 SNGs are acting with some
autonomy from their national governments but by no means as independent actors
whose policies could supplant those of their national governments in the interna-
tional arena. The involvement engages SNGs with multiple domestic and inter-
national actors including counterparts at home and abroad. They may be able
to use these connections practically and strategically to gain leverage in their
relations with the central government. But the fundamental structures of unitary
and federal systems remain in place to help sustain the formal power relations
between levels of government even as globalization transforms much of the
international landscape.
The case of Japan
How does the above discussion relate to Japan as a unitary state with a strong
tradition of centralization? Japanese SNGs are firmly restricted even in the
domestic policy arena and we might expect that central control would also limit
SNGs’ reach into the external arena and their capacity to influence foreign affairs
independently, except where acting on the central government’s behalf. Yet as we
see throughout this book, although SNGs sometimes operate externally in
partnership with the national government, they have shown a surprising degree of
independence in the international arena. Some have successfully devised and
implemented their own policies for international engagement, without central
government guidance or support. Some have also spoken and acted against
central government policy on foreign issues, and where interests have collided
a few have carried out policies that have embarrassed the central government on
such ‘hard core’ diplomatic matters as Japan–US security arrangements.
Some Japanese SNGs have actively engaged themselves on an array of issues in
the international arena despite operating within a centralized unitary system. They
are later starters than counterparts in Europe and North America, whose prece-
dents and international networks have to some degree facilitated Japanese action.
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But now Japanese SNGs sit comfortably beside their Western peers with unitary
or federal governments, and in the Asian context they are pioneers. Japanese
prefectures and cities are much further advanced with strategy and initiative than
are their counterparts in China’s still authoritarian unitary system and in India’s
‘liberalizing’ federal system. However their constitutional status and institutionally
subordinate relationship to the central government mean that Japanese SNGs
cannot be as assertive in their approach as US counterparts (enabled by a more
liberal political system) or European counterparts (enabled and encouraged by
the supranational body of the EC in Brussels). Japanese SNGs have responded
strongly as international actors particularly since the early 1990s, despite consti-
tutional and legal restrictions and a centralized political tradition that long
debarred SNGs from international engagement. It is useful, then, to consider the
circumstances inside Japan that have enabled, prompted and pushed SNGs into
this position.
Actors in Japan’s foreign affairs
The national government through its principal representative organ, the MOFA,
has long been seen as the main player in Japan’s foreign affairs. Other ministries
such as the METI have played critical roles in some foreign affairs issues
and MOFA has seen these ministries as rivals competing for influence. MOFA’s
vigorous struggle to protect its ‘international’ bureaucratic domain indicates that
Japan’s foreign policy has long been produced on contested turf rather than
being the product of a united national government. In these defensive struggles
the constitutional or legal authority of other ministries to establish links overseas
and negotiate agreements and treaties on behalf of the state has never been
challenged. The involvement of various central government actors is itself a type
of pluralism in foreign affairs, one that Alger observed in the early 1980s.80
Japan’s foreign policy arena remained largely untouched by actors other than those
at the national-government level, with minimal involvement by non-state actors
especially until the end of the Cold War. Aggressive economic expansion through
trade and other commercial activities from the 1970s prompted some observers to
see Japanese corporations as transnational actors,81 but it is only with the appearance
of other non-state actors that the term ‘pluralism’ was applied to Japan’s foreign pol-
icy actors.82 In the late 1990s, an issue of Gaiko Fuoramu, which is MOFA’s official
printed mouthpiece ran a collection of articles on tayoka (pluralization) in Japanese
diplomacy. Officially translating the theme as ‘diversifying Japan’s diplomatic
actors’, the feature considered mainly ‘diplomatic’ actors from the private sector.
The few cases of SNGs presented reveal that MOFA understands the status of SNGs
as private or non-state actors, rather than other, lower-level, government actors.
Recognizing MOFA’s highly defensive approach to its bureaucratic patch we may
appreciate this somewhat dismissive disposition towards SNGs.83 Other recent stud-
ies such as Tanaka’s have analysed the influence of a number of different types of
domestic actors on Japan’s foreign policy in the context of domestic and international
transition.84 However, none of these studies treats SNGs as foreign-policy actors.
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One particularly noteworthy type of entrant into Japan’s foreign-policy arena is
NGOs. NGOs were for a long time on the periphery of social and political spheres
in Japan, but they have come to play a diverse and valuable international role
through involvement in a range of major international concerns. Mekata has
analysed their successful role in the international campaign against landmines,
Hirata has explored their role in delivery of Japan’s ODA and Jain has offered an
overall assessment of the growing influence of Japanese NGOs through a range
of international matters.85
When we recognize that tayoka is a recent and still incipient trend in Japan’s
international affairs, we can appreciate that theoretical and empirical studies are yet
to keep pace with the plethora of new international actors. The seminal nature of
this very book on Japanese SNGs highlights the present circumstances while
observers try to adjust their viewing lens to a more diverse foreign-policy spectrum.
As our theoretical and comparative discussion reveals, inside and outside Japan
a powerful mix of pressures domestically and internationally provides new space,
new capacity and new need for players beyond the national government to supple-
ment the ‘business’ of foreign affairs. SNGs are one of many types of new interna-
tional actors. Across Japan, all levels of government, NGOs, the private sector and
citizens individually and collectively try to respond most effectively as local and
national matters are inescapably internationally conditioned. Let us turn here to
consider these developments that have pushed and pulled Japanese SNGs into the
international arena and enabled them to play a greater role in international affairs.
The international context
Post-war Japan kept a low-profile internationally – active in low politics (trade
and other economic matters) but passive in high politics (diplomatic and other
political issues). Japan’s ‘peace constitution’ and security blanket provided by the
United States allowed Japan to focus on national economic development and
become the world’s second largest economy over approximately four decades.
During the Cold War period, Japan operated largely in the shadow of the United
States and supported US strategic designs. The end of the Cold War, however, saw
growing expectations from within the international community that Japan would
play an international role commensurate with its economic status. This expecta-
tion intensified with the Gulf War in 1990–91 when Japan was accused of
cheque-book diplomacy by contributing only money to an international crisis.
Many observers expected Japan to lift its veil of caution on international involve-
ment, as the looming security threat formerly presented by the former Soviet
Union in the north dissipated and the attention Japan had focussed on security
matters during the Cold War could be directed to other international concerns.
A number of observers claim that the first Gulf War generated the most serious
discussion inside Japan since the end of the Second World War about the nation’s
international role,86 with the relative speed of responses by the Ministry of Finance
and the Defence Agency highlighting the inertia and inadequacies of the MOFA.87
Ensuing debate highlighted a serious foreign policy dilemma: international pressure
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and domestic consensus affirmed that contributing to the international community
made good foreign-policy sense for Japan, but the nation appeared to lack the
wherewithal to make these contributions in a practical form other than money.
Japan’s contributions to the international community were limited to non-military
engagement given the constraints of the Japanese ‘peace’ constitution.
In what some described as a ‘civilian role’, Japan contributed financially to
a number of emerging global concerns including environmental management,
fighting diseases such as AIDS, building social capital, protecting human rights,
promoting democracy and advancing global peace. But through most of the 1990s
Japan’s national government had neither capacity nor experience for practical
involvement; the national contribution was still largely pecuniary – writing
cheques or supporting new projects from ever-increasing ODA budgets. One
response was reform of the ODA programme that had been geared to large infra-
structure projects and criticized as primarily helping Japanese businesses, with
little regard for either local communities or the environment in recipient nations.88
Policy reform saw the national government introduce new philosophy and
practice to the ODA programme to meet the new demands of the international
community more effectively, but assessments of the reformed programme have
not been positive.89 Through the 1990s, then, we observe the mounting challenge
to Japan’s foreign policy to respond to complex demands.90 MOFA, as the respon-
sible national-government actor, lacked the resources, expertise, experience and
connections to sustain multi faceted ‘international contributions’ (kokusai koken)
that were cast, at least rhetorically, as the hallmarks of Japan’s foreign policy.
Here was the practical and conceptual space for new, capable international actors
to contribute domestically to Japan’s international contributions. Until this time,
actors other than those at the national level were kept on the periphery, their contri-
butions not fully recognized and their full potential untapped. As noted earlier,
MOFA as the ministry responsible for the nation’s foreign affairs has been reluctant
to share conduct of public policy with new non-state actors and has struggled to hold
the reins of power over this policy area. MOFA worked with business for decades
while the renowned ‘iron-triangle’ of big business, bureaucracy and the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) operated as the lynchpin of Japan’s postwar trading
success. But it resisted rather than embraced new entrants to the field, with reports
of its attempts to thwart initiatives by non-state actors such as NGOs. Developments
from the early 1990s have therefore forced a different understanding and a different
approach on MOFA’s part. Despite its self-conscious bid to continue to protect
bureaucratic turf, imperatives from external and internal pressures are forcing
MOFA to accept new types of international actors as valuable members of Japan’s
foreign-affairs community. These actors include NGOs and SNGs, with which
MOFA has begun to form constructive partnerships to achieve mutual objectives.
The domestic context
Since the end of the Cold War, significant domestic developments have worked
in tandem with international developments to open the way for new actors to join
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the cast involved in Japan’s foreign affairs. The economic and political turbulence
that struck Japan from the early 1990s are the two main drivers of change. The
so-called bursting of the economic bubble that was an overheated national
economy in the late 1980s induced a decade of recession through the nineties
with some inconsistent signs of growth in the early 2000s. While the economy
remained stagnant, some of the key organizing principles of the Japanese eco-
nomic and political systems came under scrutiny. The 1993 defeat of the LDP, the
party that ruled Japan continuously for 38 years, marked an important transition
in Japan. This was despite the fact that the LDP was out of power for less than
a year and has been returned as the dominant party in coalition governments ever
since. The short period when non-LDP coalitions took the national helm triggered
changes that made room for involvement by actors other than national-government
bureaucracies even in foreign affairs.91 A crucial move in this direction was the
1995 Decentralization Promotion Act and subsequent changes in laws that legally
increased SNGs’ autonomy through transfer of central responsibility and devolution
of power in designated areas.92
The consequences of these developments have enhanced the zeal of SNGs to
pursue international engagements to bolster their local economies. Reform and
devolution of functions increased SNGs’ responsibilities to serve their con-
stituents but without financial support to do so. Cuts in budgetary allocations
from the central government reduced SNGs’ financial capacity to deliver these
services and an aging population stretched demand for services even further.
SNGs’ financial shortages increased drastically in the 1990s to the point where
borrowing for the shortfall was no longer a viable option.
This situation is vitiated by the national government’s failure to consult with
SNGs in developing responses to globalization, which has hit every nook and
corner of localities. The national government has moved independently in policy-
making, even though it is the SNGs that come face to face with the consequences
of these policies much more closely than national-government bodies, because
SNGs are in the localities and physically on the ground with the people and the
problems they experience. One example is the Large-scale Retail Stores Law
passed in the early 1990s as a result of US pressure. The law had a huge and
deleterious impact on small retailers in local areas but SNGs could not introduce
ordinances to address the problem since ordinances would violate the interna-
tional agreements made by the national government. The national government did
not consult with SNGs before introducing this law.93 Similar circumstances have
surfaced on matters of land use, environmental regulations and many other policy
areas. Abe and Shindo have spoken up for SNGs claiming, ‘This is an era where
SNGS can no longer be treated as the bottom administrative organizations
(mattan gyosei kikan). For international agreements to be effective, SNGs and
national government must reach agreement.’94 But the national government does
not appear to have heard. SNGs are left to bear the burdens of decentralization
that increase SNG responsibility for practical policy implementation but
give them little or no voice in policy decision-making. SNGs are also left with
both the debt and the dilemma of how to solve their local problems. International
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relationships are thus surely attractive to SNGs for their potential to remedy both
the debt and the local-problem dilemmas.
The situation of Japanese SNGs has mirror images in countries worldwide as
they experience dislocation from globalization’s ubiquitous reach. Little wonder
that SNGs have formed cooperative international bodies for mutual support and
collaboration. Many share problems of addressing local issues and virtually all
are bound by budget cutbacks while needing to increase the services they provide.
Hobbs’s observation of city SNGs in the United States is true of Japanese SNGs
and presumably SNGs in other nations when she claims, ‘these policies, concur-
rent with the cutbacks on federal and local assistance funds and the promotion of
free trade, pushed cities into the international arena economically’.95 Since suffi-
cient national-government support is not forthcoming and since remedial options
are limited, we may well say that domestic and global forces have ‘pushed’ SNGs
into the international arena economically. But while they are there, many SNGs
recognize other opportunities for pursuing their interests and in the Japanese case,
they now have a national government more willing to accept their roles rather
than resist or reject as in earlier times.
Conclusion
SNGs across the globe are today on the rise as active players in international
affairs. They have been pushed, pulled and have launched themselves into the
international arena as evolutionary developments reconfigure the landscape of
international relations. This has been particularly so since the end of the Cold War,
as globalization and other forces are eroding earlier international power structures
formalized through the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in nations and national govern-
ments. These forces open the international arena to multiple types of actors whose
interests and motivations are not attached to a nation and who behave to a consid-
erable extent independently of national attachment. SNGs are one of many types
of government and non-government actors that have pluralized the line-up of
international actors and helped to create complex interdependence between them.
This has brought significant consequences for relationships between national
and subnational levels of government and comparative examples show similarity
across national experiences. In Japan and other national contexts, the national
government and its ministry responsible for international matters are keen 
(perhaps desperate) to retain the regulatory capacity that sustains their hold on
levers of power in the national and international domains. They have cautiously
decentralized some practice and responsibility to the lower government levels
since they now need what SNGs can contribute to managing an ever more demand-
ing foreign policy. Limited decentralization is therefore a useful management
strategy in foreign policy, as the national government still has some control over
SNGs. For Japan as elsewhere, complex interdependence therefore runs not just
across national boundaries but also within them, across the divide between levels
of government within the nation. SNGs are supplementing though certainly not
replacing the efforts of national government in foreign affairs and are gradually
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helping to weaken, but by no means erode, national government’s overall
responsibility for foreign policy.
In our discussion of conceptual and comparative contexts we have seen how
this picture plays out in both unitary government systems and the somewhat
looser federal systems. In the Japanese case these big-picture developments do
not signify that the national government is losing control over foreign affairs but
it is ‘loosening the reins’ to the lower levels. Japan’s national government is
decentralizing some practical work and responsibilities through partnership and
other cooperative arrangements with SNGs and Japanese SNGs are strengthening
their autonomy from the centre in the process, at times taking a course that
conflicts with that of the national government when national and subnational
interests diverge.
The ambiguous status of SNGs as being neither national government nor
non-government gives them a distinctive position within the line-up of interna-
tional actors. They have quasi-diplomatic ‘government’ status to rely on when
useful, but because these are not elements of national government they do not
have diplomatic baggage that can at times be a hindrance in their international
pursuits. Their duties and experience at home equip them well to connect at grass-
roots levels with other nations. Many now have informal and well institutional-
ized formal connections with counterparts across the globe. And ever more SNGs
are developing stronger political will to explore opportunities to satisfy local
interests in the world outside their national border.
Today while the spotlight still shines on national governments and other inter-
national actors, from multinational corporations, to NGOs, to private individuals,
SNGs are quietly building an international profile, largely beyond the spotlight.
Present trends suggest that we are likely to see SNGs continue to develop their
international profiles as important international actors alongside, but separate
from, national governments. Japanese SNGs are today working actively as the
strongest national example in Asia. Surely it is time that we pay more careful
attention to what they are doing and what are the consequences of their actions
for Japanese and regional political life.
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Forces at work inside and outside Japan have helped to propel the reach of Japanese
SNGs beyond the administrative borders of their locality and the sovereign borders
of nation, into the international arena. In this chapter we turn first to the domestic
arena to contextualize SNGs’ international actions. Inside Japan, the reach by more
and more SNGs for international engagement is driven largely by the complex rub
of the nation’s political economy as it responds to the domestic consequences of
globalization, prolonged economic recession and pressures to decentralize govern-
ment and conduct political reform. These powerful forces have continued to
rearrange the nation’s political turf as well as its institutional players, their interests,
and the alliances and divides between them. The process has encouraged – in some
cases compelled – SNGs to pursue the interests of their local constituencies beyond
central government directives and beyond the national border, usually with central
government acceptance but sometimes without it.
New institutions, legislation and policies have been established to strengthen the
role of SNGs in international affairs. The central government has been forced to
recognize the potential for national benefit from SNGs’ reach outside the nation’s
borders, particularly since SNGs have some wherewithal to achieve internationally
what central bodies cannot achieve. MOHA (now Somusho Home Affairs, SHA)
is responsible for SNGs and has been one of the chief advocates of SNGs’ more
active international life. Growing international activism at the SNG level since the
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s led MOHA to create new institutions to both
assist SNGs with their grassroots contacts overseas and extend its jurisdictional
capacity from the purely domestic domain to the international arena.
Resistance has come mainly from the MOFA as it struggles to assert its
responsibility for national foreign policy and in so doing to regulate SNGs’ ‘local’
foreign policies. MOFA has begun to decentralize certain aspects of foreign policy
by allocating some responsibility for practical functions to SNGs, while retaining
its overall authority on foreign policy. However, neither the SNGs nor the central
government are monolithic. Differences in the interests and capacities of players
within the two layers of government have produced competitions and allegiances
that cut across these layers and are also played out through extra-ministerial
bodies. SNGs’ international pursuits therefore complicate national–subnational
relationships, particularly since some international activities give SNGs valuable
2 Japanese SNGs as 
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leverage in their relationships with other government actors inside and outside
Japan and in their quest for greater autonomy from the national government.
I begin with discussion of the key actors – Japanese SNGs, the central government
ministries and extra-ministerial bodies involved here – and then consider the
evolving relationships between these players. Next, I explore policies, legislation,
funding and personnel as official mechanisms used to promote SNGs as officially
sanctioned international actors by helping to shape their actions, motivations and
capacities. I also discuss other measures explicitly for building the capacity of
SNGs in their international pursuits, and the intellectual and political lobbies that
support these developments. Overall we find that while a complex political
terrain generates and sustains these developments, the domestic environment has
become far more conducive for SNGs to conduct activities in the international
arena. The foreign policy context is of pluralizing actors and decentralizing
to SNGs. Here we see the reorientation and creation of institutions trying to
bring together ‘the local’ and ‘the international’ through the actions of SNGs.
We could describe this as a distinctive approach seeking to ‘institutionalize
internationalization’ through ‘internationalizing SNGs’.
Japanese subnational governments
As explained in this book’s introduction, I use the term ‘subnational government’
rather than the term ‘local government’ that is often used in English language
discourse.1 Both words in the term I have chosen require some attention before
we proceed further. ‘Subnational’ includes all layers of governments below the
central government in Japan. This enables cross-country comparison since in
some national contexts such as the United States, Canada and Australia, ‘local
government’ does not include state governments even though they are below the
national level.
‘Government’ is also a slippery term. In the Japanese constitution, the title of
Chapter VIII is Chiho jichi in Japanese and Local Self-government in English, but
the word ‘government’ appears nowhere in the text of the English-language chapter
(Articles 92–95); instead the term ‘local public entities’ is used. The term ‘seifu’
(government) is not used in the Japanese title of Chapter VIII and ‘jichitai’ (local
public entities) rather than ‘seifu’ is used throughout the text of this chapter.
In Japanese the term ‘seifu’ is usually used to refer exclusively to the national
government.
During the 1960s and 1970s when a number of progressive local administrations
were elected to subnational governments, a debate ensued about whether or not
‘seifu’ (government) was an appropriate term for elected units below the national
level. Progressive Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi fuelled this debate in 1970
when he announced in the assembly that the Tokyo Metropolis (Tokyo-to) was
a ‘chiho no seifu’ (local ‘government’). Critics denounced Minobe’s statement
as an exaggeration, claiming that ‘government’ (seifu) by definition includes
power and authority on matters of defence, diplomacy and law.2 But nowadays, the
administrations of many prefectures and other municipalities speak of themselves
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at least in the English-language version of their websites as ‘government’, instead
of ‘authority’.3 To be sure, in Japan’s centralized unitary form of government,
SNGs are not officially authorized to conduct what are seen to be the national
matters of defence, diplomacy and law, as are some of their counterparts overseas.
Yet Japanese SNGs have influenced policies in these areas, particularly through
finding space for action inside their officially sanctioned regulatory capacity,
such as in streets and ports as we find in Chapter 6.
The introduction of a centralized system of government in the Meiji period
(1868–1912) firmly restricted the role of Japanese localities in domestic and
international arenas. The Meiji constitution made no mention of the role of local
administrations which were completely under central government control.
Postwar, the 1947 constitution enshrined a new status for Japan’s SNGs. A new
chapter on Local Self-government (Chapter VIII) sets out the role and responsi-
bilities of SNGs, as does the 1947 Local Autonomy Law (LAL). But neither legal
framework mentions international functions, leaving SNGs legally unimpeded to
follow the examples of European and American SNGs in pursuing their own
interests overseas and to innovate with their own international initiatives.
Administratively and legally, the types of government below the national
government vary considerably (see p. xv): prefectures (to, do, fu, ken), cities (shi)
and municipalities that include towns and villages (cho and son). Then there are
varying divisions within levels of government. For example, wards (ku) within
the Tokyo Metropolis (Tokyo-to) have functional responsibilities different from
those of other wards as, for example, in Yokohama City. As for cities, there are
13 designated cities (seirei shitei toshi) that operate on the same level as prefectures
in selected policy areas, and other exceptions are core cities (chukaku toshi) and
special-case cities (tokurei-shi).4
Variations in type, status and functional responsibility only begin to signal the
diversity of Japan’s SNGs. They are made much more diverse by differences between
them in size, geography, history, constituency, political colour of the governing
administration and other aspects. Two strands that unify these diverse administrations
are their position as ‘subnational’ with all that it entails and their responsibility to
exercise local governance through elected representatives. Subnational governments
do not share the same interests and do not agree collectively as a united front on most
policy issues. Indeed, government restructuring in the 1990s has forced SNGs to
compete increasingly against each other for resources and policy initiatives, so as in
other countries, cooperation and competition shape relations between SNGs in
Japan. Hence, while some are keen to pursue international linkages, others have
scant regard for any international pursuits.
In moving into the international arena, Japanese SNGs are reaching well
beyond what was long seen as specifically ‘local’ business conducted within their
locality. This is a reach onto external political turf where there are potential ram-
ifications for national policy, which makes SNGs’ international actions contested
by some, especially within the Foreign Ministry as I discuss later in this chapter.
In fact, the constitutional and legal status of SNGs gives them the opportunity to
expand their jurisdictional territory into the international arena by failing to even
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mention this action as a possibility – or impossibility – for SNGs. They have been
able to take on roles as international actors by regulatory default.
Discussion throughout this book gives us continuing reminders that in pursuing
their ‘local’ international policies and actions, the SNGs do not constitute a
unified body that speaks with a single voice that can be used to assert their
position in the national political context. Some SNGs see the international arena
as potentially rich with opportunities for financial gain, problem solving, and
developing political leverage. But since SNGs have been pressured ever more to
produce their own sources of funding and their will for greater autonomy
strengthens, competition between some SNGs is inevitable as they seek to share
the bounty of international activities – from cooperation, trade, and investment,
to membership of regional SNG associations and delivery of the nation’s official
aid programme. We see that SNGs cooperate with each other to form regional and
policy alliances (e.g. the Japan Sea Group) to support their international pursuits,
but they also compete against each other for the rewards that flow from these
pursuits. This denies them the clout they could derive vis-à-vis the national
government if they were able to present a united front on the issue of SNGs as
international actors. However, as we see in the next section, the national govern-
ment too is not a monolithic body with unity of interests and a unified voice in
this area. This disunity within both levels creates space for competition, shared
interest and allegiance to create new alliances and divides that cut across the
national and subnational levels.
National-government ministries
A number of government ministries support SNGs in their international activities.
For example, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) lends consid-
erable support through its extensive networks across regional Japan. However, as
mentioned above, divisions run through central government players on this issue,
essentially because ministries use it to strengthen their own turf against each
other, as well as to achieve their own ends. So the landscape is marked by coop-
eration and conflict, especially between the two ministries that are most involved.
MOHA which is responsible for managing SNGs, has been the strongest advocate
and most active promoter of SNGs in their international pursuits. MOFA, on the
other hand, which is responsible for managing the nation’s international diplomacy,
has generally recognized SNGs’ international actions as an intrusion on its
ministerial terrain, especially where diplomatic matters are involved. Thus, while
MOFA would like to regulate SNGs as much as it can to protect its own jurisdic-
tion, MOHA supports SNGs in their international relations to increase its own
power and its authority vis-à-vis MOFA.
Inter-ministerial rivalry is a well-known phenomenon within the Japanese
bureaucracy. Various bureaucratic battles indicate that Japan’s international diplo-
macy is hotly contested ministerial turf and MOFA has struggled with an iron-fist
to control it.5 Yet in this instance of SNGs on the nation’s diplomatic turf,
circumstances have forced MOFA to temper its apprehension and outright
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opposition and to take a more accommodating stance. MOFA has come to
recognize that SNGs as international actors can make valuable contributions that
MOFA itself is unable to and that these have created some dependence on SNGs’
international contributions by MOFA. MOHA has helped to create new institu-
tional arrangements that facilitate and maintain its hold on SNGs’ actions as inter-
national actors and help to mediate potentially damaging power struggles between
the players. Through these new arrangements – institutional and legal – that we
explore later in this chapter, MOFA has begun to work with MOHA and SNGs to
influence, if not fully regulate, SNGs’ international actions. Nevertheless, asserting
control where they can, MOFA staff still refuse to recognize SNGs as actors
in Japan’s foreign policy and as noted in the previous chapter cast SNGs as
‘non-government’ actors in international affairs.6
SHA has immense financial control over SNGs. It manages a large bulk of
SNG funding including the local allocation tax (LAT) (chiho kofuzei) for general
equalization that constitutes over 20 per cent of SNG income, and it controls
SNGs’ capacity to issue local bonds (chihosai) that are an important component
of SNGs’ budgets. SHA has strong influence on and regulatory power over SNGs
through administrative and legal controls. It also exerts influence through political
channels, particularly prefectural governors, many of whom have moved from
Home Affairs into these positions.7 Muramatsu and Iqbal acknowledge the potential
tension in this ministry’s role, noting how, ‘The Ministry of Home Affairs is
supposed to be a national spokesman for local interests vis-à-vis the other central
ministries, while it also tries to control local governments’.8 The examples
discussed in the following chapters illustrate this tension well.
MOFA is the weakest of all the ministries in Japan since it does not have an
influential domestic constituency. In this case MOFA had to transmute its initial
resistance to SNGs. It was forced to realize that unless it became involved in coor-
dination and guidance, the Ministry would be left behind while some SNGs launched
further with their own international policies. MOFA effectively saw that through
new intermediary institutions it could become involved in connecting the local
level with the international, rather than simply allowing the local level, through
SNGs and other domestic bodies, to make its own international connections.
When SNG international activities began to intensify in the 1980s, MOFA saw
some merit in liaising with SNGs and supporting their actions. In 1986, MOFA
established the Internationalization Consultation Centre (Kokusaika Sodan Sentaa)
within its Domestic Public Relations Section (Kokunai Kohoka),9 offering assistance
to SNG officials in charge of international exchanges.10 From 1989, it offered
subsidies to regional international associations (chiiki kokusaika kyokai).11 MOFA’s
Economic Cooperation Bureau had subsidized prefectural administrations to train
foreign aid recipients as part of the Ministry’s official aid budget since the early
1970s. From 1991, it began to offer subsidies to dispatch experts from SNGs on over-
seas aid-delivery assignments and for recruitment as Japan Overseas Cooperation
Volunteers (JOCV) personnel for the Ministry. These moves were part of what
MOFA saw as ‘internationalization of local communities’ (chiho no kokusaika). But
MOFA did not have a long-term strategy in place to engage SNGs on this issue.
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Here MOHA saw an opportunity to strengthen its ties with SNGs which it was
well placed to engage because of its extensive networks with SNGs at all levels.
MOHA has used various legal and extra-legal instruments to promote, coordinate
and steer SNGs in their international role. Organizations such as the Japan
Municipal League for International Friendship (JAMLIF) (Kokusai Shinzen Toshi
Renmei) established in 1962 and the Japan Center for Local Autonomy (Jichi
Sogo Sentaa) established in 1977, had served as external arms of MOHA, even
though established through private funding, since both have been headed by
retired or seconded MOHA officials.12 In April 1993, MOHA established an
international section (kokusai shitsu) within the Ministry to coordinate SNGs’
international activities. It declared 1995 ‘the first year of local government inter-
national cooperation’ ( jichtai kokusai kyoryoku gannen), symbolizing a landmark
shift in SNGs’ involvement in the international arena from cultural activities to
comprehensive relationships that have a more profound impact on the nation’s
foreign policy.
But most important for MOHA is its involvement in CLAIR (Jichitai Kokusaika
Kyokai), which has overall responsibility for SNGs in their international relations
as discussed below. MOHA was instrumental in establishing CLAIR in the late
1980s in response to phenomenal growth in the international activities of SNGs
during this period. Through CLAIR, MOHA plays a significant role in the JET
programme (discussed in Chapter 3) that CLAIR was established to implement.
The JET programme was the product of high-level diplomatic negotiations
between Japanese and American leaders,13 but MOFA recognized that it could not
take charge since MOHA’s role was crucial in implementing the programme.
Support from MOHA was essential in convincing SNGs that they needed to
accept JET participants in their schools and offices and MOHA quickly became
a key player in administering the JET programme, especially through CLAIR.
SNG–centre relations
The account above indicates two major undercurrents of the political and
bureaucratic power that shapes SNGs’ actions, especially through new cleavages
and alliances between all layers of government. First, some in the central government
resent SNGs’ moving onto the international turf that they claim is the prerogative
of national rather than subnational policy. Second, some ministerial actors enthu-
siastically respond to these developments as an opportunity to flex muscle or gain
further control. The divide appears to be essentially between those who support
SNGs and those who support MOFA, but the interests and loyalties of all players
on this scene weave through this divide and create a complex scenario that is by
no means bi-polar. It is therefore useful to appraise the relationship between the
national and subnational levels.
Here national–subnational relations are more complex than general literature
suggests. Conventional accounts of Japanese government explain that because of
a centralized structure, the national government’s provision of finances, policy
and fiat in general, as certified in the constitution and law, makes SNGs highly
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dependent on the national government and compelled to comply with its
directives. External observers speak of 30 per cent autonomy (sanwari jichi) and
numerous officials who I interviewed, especially in smaller SNGs, used this term
when explaining the restricted action that SNGs can take, considering their limited
autonomy. This simplistic term derives from the understanding that SNGs raise
about 30 per cent of their total budget income through local taxes and the other
70 per cent is provided by the national government in various forms. But this is
a misreading. Local taxes comprise some 35 per cent of SNGs’ total revenue and
the Local Allocation Tax (chiho kofuzei) that is transferred automatically from
national to subnational governments as a general equalization grant calculated on
a set of prescribed measures, constitutes another 22 per cent of SNG revenue.14
So more than half of subnational revenue (57 per cent) has no direct strings
attached to the national government. Even more importantly, financial dependence
does not necessarily and proportionately translate into policy dependence.15 And
in this instance, the results of the vast bulk of SNGs’ international actions are of
great value to the national government, which gives SNGs considerable purchase
in this domain.
The central government’s control on what SNGs can and cannot do overall is
exercised by several ministries and defined by law, such as the LAL. But none of
this has completely prevented SNGs from taking independent action domestically
or internationally. At times, some SNGs have been more proactive than the central
government in policy matters, and have even set the lead that the national
government followed. Many SNGs resisted the centre to pursue innovative policies
on minority rights, health care and pollution control. Progressive (kakushin) admin-
istrations in the 1960s and 1970s implemented bold policy initiatives in areas such
as social welfare, medical services and child-care facilities.16 Some among the
current group of reformist chief executives (kaikaku-ha) from the 1980s have again
implemented innovative policies long before the central government. For example,
the small town of Kaneyama in rural Yamagata Prefecture was the first to establish
an ordinance on information disclosure in 1982, some 17 years before the national
government passed legislation on the matter.17
The second round of reformist local chief executives was elected to office
through the 1980s and 1990s, backed by a broader mix of political parties
(ainori). These leaders have tried to pursue explicitly ‘local interests’ through
local policies, putting into practice the increasingly palpable recognition among
some at the subnational level that ‘national’ and ‘subnational’ interests do not
always coincide. These SNG leaders have rejected their conservative predecessors’
strategies of simply following their party headquarters or establishing a direct
pipeline to the central government (chuo chokketsu), for reciprocal flows of
favour and compliance. They are well placed and have the political will to take
independent action rather than wait for instruction from central bureaucrats who
self-interestedly perpetuate the system’s tight centralization.18 The progressives’
tradition of policy initiative and struggle for greater autonomy is now manifest in
SNGs’ international activities. The cases examined throughout this book reveal
how, as in other administrative areas, the philosophy, innovative capacity and
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leadership of both levels of government influence SNGs’ relations with central
government actors.
Yet as noted above, we should not imagine that this aspect of national–
subnational relations is riven with conflict. On the contrary, parties at both levels
have compelling reasons to cooperate with each other in many of the SNGs’ inter-
national endeavours. Both levels share an interest in (1) building the strength of
local economies; (2) effectively addressing issues that concern the welfare of
residents and; (3) SNGs carrying out effectively the responsibilities that the
national government can no longer maintain, such as some types of aid delivery
and involvement in a broad range of international programme like environmental
protection and community development. As discussion in later chapters reveals,
actors from the same and different levels of government work together coopera-
tively in a number of areas for national and subnational benefit.
Extra-ministerial and quasi-government 
institutions: old and new
The national government’s response to the flourishing of SNG international
activities particularly from the 1980s has involved a steady institutionalization to
maximize the ministries’ capacity for assistance, regulation and influence. This
has enabled the concerned ministries to provide advice, guidance and coordination,
through an accretion of government and quasi-government bodies that have come
to recognize SNGs as valuable partners. Let us consider these bodies that now
work with SNGs and enhance their capacity to contribute positively to the nation’s
foreign affairs. I begin with the three central agencies that have existed for some
time – Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), JETRO and JBIC – and
then turn to two newer institutions – CLAIR and JIAM.
Japan International Cooperation Agency
JICA was established in 1974 as a central agency under the direct supervision of
MOFA to manage Japan’s ODA in the area of technical cooperation, one of the
three core areas of Japan’s official bilateral aid programme.19 In October 2003,
JICA’s status was changed from special public institution (tokushu hojin) to
independent administrative institution (dokuritsu gyosei hojin), with a great deal
more budgetary and management autonomy from its supervising ministry.20
Under its former status, ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (MAFF) and MITI had vested interests in JICA’s work.21 MOHA
and its SNG constituents were not part of this scene – until SNGs’ increasing
involvement in technical ODA delivery prompted significant change in JICA
arrangements now reflected in JICA’s new official status.
JICA has 14 regional training centres across Japan that provide technical and
other developmental training to trainees from developing countries. MOFA has
little direct interaction with SNGs, but JICA has worked in ever-closer association
with SNGs for some time to conduct technical aid programmes. In Hyogo
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Prefecture, for example, in 2002 SNGs ran 20 of the 30 different programmes
conducted by the JICA Hyogo Centre, with huge contributions from the SNGs of
Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture.22 JICA staff recognize clearly that SNGs have
the technical know-how that national-government agency staff simply do not have
to pass on through the training programmes.23 Sumita Kiyoshi of Sapporo City
Office who has worked on secondment with the Foreign Ministry’s Economic
Cooperation Bureau agrees firmly, lauding the bulk of expertise and know-how –
‘yakusho (local government office) technology’ – within city governments on
matters such as sewerage, water supply, road construction, emergency services
and environmental management.24 Officials who I interviewed in JICA centres in
Hokkaido, Kobe and Tokyo all claimed that the cooperation and assistance from
SNGs is indispensable to effective conduct of their diverse training programmes.
Yet the benefits are not one way from SNGs to JICA. Some SNGs compete to
attract JICA centres to their areas. These are usually the SNGs that provide tech-
nical training through their own international cooperation programmes, and JICA
centres in their areas offer these SNGs opportunities to share resources.
JICA began a new partnership programme, JICA Partnership Programme (JPP)
in 2002 with SNGs and NGOs, recognizing the growing importance of organiza-
tions beyond the central government. This is consistent with JICA’s new objectives
to draw on the expertise and experience of SNGs and local communities for inter-
national cooperation activities. One of the four pillars of the newly organized JICA
is to promote public participation in its programmes, partly through SNGs.25 JICA’s
new domestic division is for liaising with domestic partners and identifying possi-
bilities. Those interested in JICA’s success hope that in its new position as an inde-
pendent administrative institution, it can attract more partnership programmes with
SNGs and NGOs that are attracted by JICA’s more autonomous status.26
Japan External Trade Organization
JETRO was established in 1958 as a special public institution to promote
Japanese exports and help build the Japanese economy. MITI was its supervisory
ministry and even after the 2001 administrative restructuring and change in the
status of JETRO, MITI’s successor METI supervises JETRO. However, in
response to profound changes in the Japanese economy, JETRO has been allo-
cated new roles such as promoting imports and seeking domestic investment.
JETRO was one of the SNGs’ earlier supporters in their campaign to operate
overseas. In the early 1980s when the central government, advised by MOFA,
denied SNGs permission to open independent overseas offices, JETRO came to
their rescue where it could by allowing SNG employees to work within JETRO
overseas offices to gain experience and pursue business opportunities for their
locality.27 JETRO has an extensive network domestically and internationally,
with 80 offices in 60 countries abroad and 38 domestic offices, employing some
1600 people.28
Like JICA, JETRO was made an independent administrative agency, which has
given it more autonomy from its supervising ministry, METI. JETRO Chairman
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in 2003, Watanabe Osamu, noted the growing role of SNGs in attracting foreign
investment and businesses to Japan, as well as in helping small and medium
Japanese firms to expand their business overseas, especially in East Asia.29 JETRO
has established a number of programmes by forming vertical alliances between
itself and SNGs to promote two-way trade and investment as I discuss in Chapter 5.
It has also promoted horizontal alliances with other national agencies to coopt
SNGs in international activities. For example, JETRO and CLAIR overseas offices
conduct joint seminars and forums to promote trade and investment, indicating
a new era of cooperation between national agencies and SNG organizations.30
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Whereas JICA is responsible for technical assistance or the ‘soft infrastructure’
side of the ODA programme, JBIC (Kokusai Kyoryoku Ginko) is responsible for
the ‘hard infrastructure’ side of this programme.31 JBIC’s main task is to provide
long-term low-interest loans to developing countries for large infrastructure
projects such as railways, roads and bridges. In recent years, JBIC has also
supported environmental projects in the fields of pollution control, cleaner
production, energy conservation, mass transit, waste management and afforestation.
JBIC now commits some 30–40 per cent of its yen loans to environment-related
projects.
JBIC has worked for some time with NGOs for project design and
implementation. Like JICA it has come to recognize the value of cooperation with
SNGs given their expertise in the many areas of JBIC projects such as for the
environment and in 2001 it commissioned a study into the possibilities of coop-
eration with SNGs for its yen loan programmes in developing countries.32 The
study discussed the important contributions that SNGs can make to the success of
JBIC projects, pointing to possibilities for SNGs to provide ‘soft infrastructure’
such as management, maintenance and technical support to complement the ‘hard
infrastructure’ such as roads and highways provided through JBIC loans to
Chinese cities and provinces.33
In February 2002, JBIC held a ‘Local Government–JBIC Partnership
Promotion Forum’ to discuss prospects of collaboration and partnership since
the two bodies have complementary capacities. About 40 representatives from
19 SNGs participated in the Forum held in Gifu Prefecture, with SNG presentations
on the kinds of projects where they can be valuable partners with JBIC.34 These
again point to the capacity and institutional need for SNGs to involve themselves
further in various types of official aid delivery. Examples of actual and proposed
collaborative projects are discussed in Chapter 4.
Recent changes introduced through legislation to the longer-standing institutions
of JICA, JETRO and JBIC highlight the national level’s changing perceptions
of SNG capacity to make valuable contributions to international cooperation
programmes. We have seen how ministries and central agencies have become
more willing, even eager, to extend SNG involvement in certain types of activities
such as international cooperation and exchange programmes since SNGs can do
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what these bodies cannot, especially since SNGs have personnel with experience
and know-how from their own work at the grassroots level where these institu-
tions’ overseas programmes are directed. As well as changes to the existing
institutions, several new institutions were established from the late 1980s to
support, strengthen, guide and even equip SNGs in specific types of international
activities. Here, we look at two of the most important bodies: CLAIR and JIAM.
While both these institutions have strong connections with SHA because
their senior management is drawn from senior ranks of SHA retired or serving
bureaucrats, they also empower SNGs to promote their international activities.
Council of Local Authorities for International Relations
Jichitai Kokusaika Kyokai, which is known widely inside and outside Japan as
CLAIR, was established in July 1988 as a foundation (zaidan hojin) with funding
from SNGs and private bodies and no direct financial contribution from MOHA
or any other ministry.35 CLAIR is perhaps the foremost institution behind SNGs’
rapid rise as international actors from the late 1980s. It is devoted to promoting
and facilitating the international role of SNGs, and networking for them
domestically and internationally through continuously evolving, innovative
programmes. As an organization expressly for this purpose, CLAIR is unparalleled
internationally in its size and capacity. CLAIR’s original purpose was to set up
and implement the JET programme (discussed later), but as a visit to CLAIR’s
website reveals immediately,36 CLAIR has taken on a life of its own. CLAIR
has rapidly become the most instrumental body in Japan for developing SNGs
as international actors, practically and philosophically. MOHA and SNGs are
involved inextricably, and largely cooperatively, in CLAIR’s organizational direc-
tion and performance, and effectively they drive the organization. MOHA and its
successor SHA are closely involved with CLAIR’s policy direction as almost all
high-ranking officials of CLAIR are either former MOHA officials or currently
on secondment from SHA.
CLAIR literature explains CLAIR’s work as internationalization at the local
level. As its original raison d’etre and still one of its primary tasks, CLAIR imple-
ments the JET programme. It recruits from abroad Coordinators for International
Relations (CIRs), Assistant Language Teachers (ALTs) and Sports Exchange
Advisors (SEAs), dispatches them to SNGs across Japan, and provides overall
coordination for the programme. But CLAIR’s reach now extends much further.
First, it promotes the international exchange activities of SNGs by helping to inform
and introduce prospective exchange partners to develop international affiliations
such as sister-city ties. Second, CLAIR assists SNGs’ international cooperation
efforts through programmes that bring foreign SNG officials to Japan for training
in Japanese SNGs and sending abroad experienced Japanese SNG officials to
work as experts/trainers in various fields. Third, CLAIR responds to SNGs’ needs
for information about internationalization and undertakes related research projects
in conjunction with CLAIR’s overseas offices. Fourth, it supports development
of human resources by creating opportunities for Japanese SNG employees to
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experience life working abroad and by strengthening networks of associations and
others involved in international exchanges throughout Japan.
CLAIR has its headquarters in Tokyo and offices in each of the 47 prefectures
and 13 designated cities within Japan. It has also established offices in major
cities around the world: New York and London (in 1988), Paris and Singapore
(1990), Seoul (1993), Sydney (1994) and Beijing (1997). Some of these offices
coordinate activities in neighbouring countries; for example, the Sydney office is
responsible for New Zealand and the New York office takes care of Canada. The
location of these overseas offices reflects the focus of CLAIR’s overseas linkages
initially in North America and Europe and later in Australia and Eastern Asia.
These nations have the bulk of Japan’s sister-city and other local-level coopera-
tive relationships and are the source of the majority of JET participants.37 SNGs’
interest in developing connections in East Asia has boomed through the 1990s, as
I discuss throughout this book. The newest office opened in Beijing in 1997 gives
institutional form to the interest that SNGs share with CLAIR, MOHA and other
domestic bodies in developing grassroots relations with counterparts in this
neighbour that is vitally important to Japan.
CLAIR’s sudden institutional pre-eminence in developing grassroots relations
between Japanese SNGs and their international counterparts sends various impor-
tant signals about Japan’s international relations and who conducts them. First, it
marks the rise of SNGs as more active and valued international actors within
Japan. The bulk of CLAIR officials below the rank of director come from SNGs.
More and more SNG officials now have ‘diplomatic skills’, and within SNG ranks
there is a growing pool of expertise and knowledge useful for a range of issues that
concern international affairs. Second, CLAIR’s high profile bespeaks how impor-
tant SHA has become in Japan’s foreign relations as SHA has considerable influ-
ence on CLAIR’s philosophy and practice. The Ministry plays a highly influential
managerial role that includes providing policy guidance to CLAIR’s top levels and
supplying all of the high-ranking officials in CLAIR’s domestic and overseas
offices. Particularly through the Ministry’s involvement in CLAIR, SHA staff have
acquired a great deal of country and policy expertise that in earlier times was the
exclusive claim of MOFA officials. CLAIR itself, with SHA and SNG coopera-
tion, has been able to take on a firm role in coordinating local-level international
activity since its institutional reach extends broadly to SNGs nationwide.
It is therefore not surprising that an increasing flow of visitors from overseas,
including local business leaders and SNG officials, contact CLAIR for introduc-
tions and business contacts in Japanese locations. Their Japanese counterparts
seeking overseas connections also go to CLAIR rather than to Japanese embassies
or consulates abroad that in any case have very little contact at the grassroots levels.
Small and medium-sized businesses feel much more comfortable dealing with SNG
officials through CLAIR than with the diplomats at Japanese missions overseas.
CLAIR offices are a point of contact for local officials and in a limited way for
business people. CLAIR itself is not able to assist with all kinds of enquiries and it
refers them to relevant organizations such as JETRO or local consulates and so
forth. Thus, while CLAIR is a relatively new outfit to promote SNGs’ contacts
50 Domestic dimensions
overseas, by no means is it designed to step over JICA, JETRO or consulates’
jurisdiction. CLAIR’s role is rather as a lynchpin. Mostly the different organizations
involved here cooperate and coordinate their activities rather than compete or con-
front each other. CLAIR functions ‘relatively independently’ as an intermediary
body that enables grassroots connections between SNGs inside and outside Japan.
It is not a central government body bogged down in bureaucracy and it has both the
central and non-central connections that are essential for this task.
Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities
The surge of interest in international affairs among SNGs from the late eighties/
early nineties has created the need for more SNG personnel who have ‘interna-
tional’ skills. These skills include expertise in responding to new situations with
people from other countries who have cultural experience, protocols and
languages unfamiliar to SNG personnel. National training centres such as the
Local Autonomy College (Jichi Daigakko) in Tokyo and the Japan Academy for
Municipal Personnel (JAMP, Shichoson Akademi) in Chiba City near Tokyo have
provided programmes specifically for SNG employees for quite some time. From
fiscal 1993 the Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities (JIAM, Zenkoku
Shichoson Kokusai Bunka Kenshusho) came into operation aiming specifically to
improve the intercultural understanding and capabilities of SNG personnel
through a range of training programmes, and to better equip SNG personnel for
their international engagements.38
The Academy is a training ground for SNG officials in both domestic
internationalization (uchinaru kokusaika) and transborder internationalization
(sotonaru kokusaika). Trainees come from throughout Japan to the newly con-
structed premises in Otsu in Shiga Prefecture near Kyoto for programmes that
include training in foreign languages and in issues of globalization, area studies
and appropriate administrative practices. The Academy especially serves the
needs of smaller cities, towns and villages whose employees may have limited
knowledge and few opportunities to learn about how to respond effectively to the
impact of globalization on local communities.39 As with CLAIR, former MOHA
officials head the Local Autonomy College, JAMP and JIAM, and current SHA
officials are seconded to these institutions. By the end of fiscal 2003 after its first
decade, some 18,000 SNG personnel had completed JIAM training programmes.40
Policies, legislation, budgets and personnel
SNGs and the other institutions discussed above use or are influenced by various
mechanisms that shape the international actions of SNGs. Here we turn to the
most important of these: policies, legislation, budgets and personnel.
Policies
In the discussion above, I noted how some SNG administrations have at times
preceded the national government in action and policy. This has certainly been the
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case with SNGs’ move into international affairs. Unlike earlier times, here the
creative response to local problems was to reach not just beyond the national
government but also beyond the national border. Some SNGs took the initiative
to pursue local interests in the international arena and develop their own ‘local’
foreign policies.
The national government began to pay serious attention to SNGs’ international
initiatives only when it recognized it could no longer afford to overlook or reject
them. But this did not translate into incorporating SNG actions within national
foreign policy. Through the 1980s, some SNGs expanded their international involve-
ment well beyond overseas cultural activities and set up new international sections
(kokusai koryuka) within SNG offices to oversee their expanding international
work. MOFA responded on the back foot with some small initiatives as discussed
earlier. But SNGs were not part of MOFA’s long-term vision for the nation’s
foreign policy, and favouring resistance over incorporation of the potential of
SNGs’ international involvements, MOFA effectively allowed the creation of
a policy vacuum in the central government, one that MOHA responded to as
a valuable opportunity for ministerial leverage. As the ‘SNG’ ministry without
‘foreign affairs’ expertise, MOHA sought to play a proactive role, as a ministry
itself and through the SNGs. Yet as McConnell observed:
The effect of these local initiatives was to force the Ministry of Home Affairs
into an uncomfortable and unfamiliar role. Accustomed to providing
top-down guidance to local governments, officials found themselves mere
bystanders. In addition, when local governments did approach them for
guidance on international matters, they found it frustrating to have to rely
exclusively on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their overseas offices to
be their eyes and ears abroad.41
One means that MOHA used to establish its responsibility was policy. In 1985,
MOHA established an international advisory board (kokusai iinkai) to research
ways to enhance its own profile as a player in the international scene. In July that
year, MOHA released Plans for International Exchange that mapped out a variety
of possible projects for SNGs, including sister-city relationships and international
exchanges of SNG personnel. In March 1987, it issued Guidelines on the
Promotion of Local International Exchange (Chiho kokyodantai no kokusai koryu
no arikata ni kansuru shishin), a statement on developing comprehensive policies
for SNG action that signalled the Ministry’s recognition of the importance of
national policy direction – and MOHA’s instrumental role in forming this policy
direction – to guide SNG action. In 1988, MOHA issued Guidelines for Creating
Municipal International Exchange (Kokusai koryu no machizukuri no tameni
shishin) and followed up in 1989 with Outlines for Planning for Local
International Exchange Promotion (Chiiki kokusai koryu suishin taiko no sakutei
ni kansuru hoshin).42
In 1995, the Ministry released another detailed follow-up aimed directly at
SNGs, in the form of Guidelines on Developing Charters for Promoting Local
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Government International Cooperation (Jichitai kokusai kyoryoku suishin taiko
no sakutei ni kansuru shishin ni tsuite). This detailed for SNGs how to fine-tune
their own institutional structures for international cooperation, so that SNGs
could prepare their own comprehensive policies appropriate for the specific con-
ditions of their locality. In 2000, the Ministry released its Policy on the Status of
Community Groups in Charters Promoting Local Government International
Cooperation and in Charters Promoting Local International Exchange. Here were
guidelines for SNGs to strengthen links with NGOs and other community groups
in pursuing international cooperation, a further attempt to achieve a comprehensive
approach to management and coordination.
MOHA has initiated policy not just to promote SNGs’ international action, but
also to help maintain its control over this development. Here MOHA has demon-
strated not only its capacity to supervise SNGs as its main constituency, through
guidance, coordination and developing an official structure for international
cooperation at the SNG level. It has also demonstrated its leadership over MOFA
in pluralizing Japan’s foreign affairs. Institutionalizing SNGs’ international coop-
eration in Japan through the central-government body responsible for SNGs
appears to be distinctive internationally, since in other national experiences, the
SHA counterpart generally does not take these actions. This has not been exclu-
sively a top-down process by MOHA. Initiative, ideas, actions and plans for insti-
tutionalization first came from a few forward-looking SNGs. The national
government, mainly MOHA, gave the new initiative a national and international
profile and a formal space in national policy after SNGs had demonstrated the
pragmatic sense of their actions. Action and policy were the products of two-way
engagement between the national and subnational levels, eventually reaching
to semi-government and non-government bodies for a comprehensive policy
approach to maximizing the national gains from SNGs as international actors.
Legislation
Consistent with its policy initiatives, MOHA moved to give legal footing to the
international work of SNGs, though largely without success. In the late 1990s,
MOHA pushed to have SNGs’ international role written into Chapter 2 of the
LAL and proposed inclusion of a new clause to give SNGs legal authority to act
in international affairs. The proposed change to the LAL would have given a legal
footing to much of the international role and responsibility of SNGs that so far
have been practical and tacit. However, MOFA successfully thwarted MOHA’s
move with its claim that ‘diplomatic’ power belongs exclusively to the ‘national
government’ – read ‘the Foreign Ministry’ – in a bid to block the rise of SNGs.
They are, after all, increasingly important international actors that MOFA still
regards as a threat to its ministerial domain, which is partly why MOFA derogates
their status as international actors to ‘non-government’.
Two pieces of legislation that did translate into law are worthy of mention here.
One is the epoch-making Local Employees Overseas Dispatch Law (Chiho komuin
kaigai haken-ho) enacted in April 1988.43 The law provided the much-needed
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legal space for SNG employees to pursue opportunities outside Japan in their
capacity as SNG personnel. Under this law, SNG employees can be sent abroad
to offer specialized technical knowledge, engage with overseas government orga-
nizations and other bodies, collect information and data, promote local trade and
tourism, assist in natural disasters and participate in international organizations
such as the UN and bodies under the UN umbrella. Importantly, the law also
enabled SNGs to establish overseas offices in partnership with Japanese national-
government offices.44 It also legally sanctioned Japanese SNGs engaging directly
with overseas SNGs and other institutions useful for subnational international 
networking. Ebashi observed in the early 1990s that whereas some SNG personnel
dispatched overseas might mistakenly think they are beholden to the national
government, the Overseas Dispatch Law gives these personnel the ability to make
decisions for their SNG independently of the national government.45
The second piece of pertinent legislation is the Omnibus Decentralization Act
of July 1999 that has given some administrative independence to SNGs in
managing local affairs. Overall the Act has served to create a new political and
administrative environment in which SNGs are better placed to push the cause
of their international activities. This act also does not specifically mention SNGs
as international actors and by maintaining the legal silence, it allows SNGs to
continue their international actions without the potential constraint of national law.
Financing
Parallel with developments in institutionalization and national policy direction,
during the late 1980s, the central government began to include SNGs in the
nationwide distribution of a huge budget for international affairs. MOHA in
particular directed financing to SNGs, through the LAT that SNGs are free to
distribute according to their own priorities. More SNGs began to allocate more
money to international cooperation from their own financial sources (that include
LAT) independent of central government control. Total SNG expenditure on
international affairs projects from their own independent sources was 40.2 billion
yen in 1989 and peaked at 120 billion yen (approximately US$1 billion) in
1995, roughly triple the 1989 level. Pressured by stagnation of the Japanese
economy, after 1995, SNGs reduced their funding to around 100 billion yen, with
107.8 billion yen in 2001 (see Figure 2.1). Yet even this reduced amount was
equivalent to about one-seventh of MOFA’s total budget for that year.46
Of all expenditures by SNGs on international affairs projects, the share spent
on international cooperation (kokusai kyoryoku) has hovered at around 7–8 billion
yen since 1994, which is about 7–8 per cent of SNGs’ full annual budget on inter-
national activities.47 The amount in 2001 was 7.1 billion yen which was roughly
1/150th of Japan’s official foreign-aid budget,48 but 1/10th of the Austrian
government’s aid budget and half that of the Luxembourg administration.
Comparatively, then, in a global context Japanese SNGs put considerable money
and effort into international cooperation as we discuss in Chapter 4. MOHA
policies on SNGs’ international cooperation give general direction, support and
coordination to this work, but SNGs have freedom in some aspects.
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For a start, SNGs choose the level of spending from their independent budgets
and as discussed earlier, SNGs are spending more than before on international
cooperation. Second, four types of international cooperation activities came to
dominate SNGs’ programmes by 2001: assistance to international organizations
(39.2 per cent), trainees from overseas (19.4 per cent), organizing and participat-
ing in international conferences (17.0 per cent) and exchange of local employees
(5.0 per cent).49 Third, the geographic preferences of SNGs are clear: China
accounted for 34–38 per cent and the US for 23–27 per cent – together 60 per cent –
of the SNGs’ total international cooperation budget for 2001. These figures are
indicative of the overall performance of SNGs. Yet we need to note that each SNG
has its own distinctive way of spending their international-cooperation budget.
We should also note a largely ignored change in the national taxation system
that influences what SNGs do as international actors, especially their ability to
facilitate grassroots exchanges with non-government bodies. From fiscal 1992,
donations to local associations involved in internationalization at the prefecture
and designated city level can be claimed as a financial loss for businesses and as
a tax deduction for individuals. Many who are involved in this area recognize the
tax change as instrumental in guaranteeing revenue for grassroots international
programmes that SNGs work with, and through, to cultivate international activities
within their local areas.50
Personnel
Secondment and transfer of personnel between national and subnational-government
offices has been practiced for some time. Its purpose is to cross-fertilize ideas and































Figure 2.1 Amount of spending on international projects funded independently by SNGs
(initial budget).
Source: Compiled from data provided by the SHA.
bodies to enhance capacity to coordinate overall bureaucratic performance.
Mostly it has involved central government employees transferred or seconded to
SNGs to work in various capacities, including many in high-ranking positions
such as directors, deputy mayors and vice-governors. Most are sent from Home
Affairs, although other ministries are also involved. The staff on loan from the
national government are paid by the subnational government.51
In recent years the very small flow of subnational staff back into the central
government and its agencies has increased. Most SNG staff are from prefectural
offices and most are sent to SHA and its agencies, although some now go to
MOFA. Sumita Kiyoshi, as Project Chief of the International Relations
Department in Sapporo City, advised that he was the first SNG employee
seconded to a Japanese diplomatic mission abroad in the early 1990s, serving for
three years as vice-consul in the Japanese Consulate in Boston. He later worked
as an SNG employee in the Economic Cooperation Bureau within MOFA, where
he gained valuable experience working with MOFA officials responsible for man-
aging ODA to PNG and Samoa, and East European and Central Asian nations.52
This gives us an example of how personnel serve to pass know-how, experience
and personal connections between levels of government and other institutions and
facilitate the involvement of SNGs in international action.
The flow of personnel does not stop there. In recent years, SNG employees are
seconded to work in various extra-ministerial and external organizations (gaikaku
dantai) that give SNGs and their staff valuable new opportunities to connect with
issues and people outside Japan. One outstanding example is CLAIR and its over-
seas offices. The directors of all of CLAIR’s seven overseas offices are high-ranking
SHA officials, but most other staff are from SNGs across Japan. Of the nine staff
from Japan in the CLAIR office in Seoul in 2003, two (including the Deputy
Director) were on secondment from Tottori Prefecture and one was from each of
the Saitama, Toyama, Shizuoka, Nagasaki, Miyazaki, Kagoshima and Okinawa
prefectural offices. This composition of staff appears to be typical of CLAIR
overseas offices.53 As I consider in Chapter 5, many SNGs have now opened their
own offices overseas for economic and other connections, staffed by their own
employees who act as economic ambassadors for their own locality. Opportunities
for staff to gain overseas experience such as in CLAIR overseas offices is therefore
invaluable for SNGs seeking to reach externally themselves.
Building SNGs’ international capacity
Some SNGs have a history of international activities across several decades, while
many others are new players in this area. Many have sought to build their interna-
tional capacity through institutionalization and putting in place strategic plans to
coordinate and further develop their international activities. International affairs
within SNG offices used to be administered by the General Affairs Division or the
chief executive’s office. Now, most of the larger SNGs and many others manage
international activities in independent offices with a number of full-time dedicated
staff. CIRs from the JET programme work in these offices.54 And it is not just the
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international divisions of SNGs that are involved in SNGs’ international affairs. In
the climate of globalization, many other departments within SNGs are drawn into
international matters. Departments that deal with economics and commerce, port
and airport management have long been involved in international affairs through
trade, commerce and international tourism. Nowadays, however, even the domes-
tically oriented city-planning, sewerage, water supply and environment depart-
ments are routinely part of international training programmes, in partnership with
JICA and independently through SNGs’ own programmes.
Some SNGs had formalized their approach to international relations through
specifically dedicated institutions long before the national government came to
acknowledge SNGs’ international roles. A high-ranking official in the Kobe City
office advised that a number of cities have been active at least since the early
1970s in initiating and managing relations with foreign countries. He explained
that international sections and departments (kokusai shitsu and kokusaibu) in
some SNG offices have their origins in shogai and gaiji, the protocol and liaison
offices set up within pre-war city administrations to deal with international trade
and other foreign issues.55
Today, many SNG employees in charge of international matters regard
themselves as fully trained and capable of dealing effectively with foreign affairs
issues without day-to-day guidance from the national government. Larger SNGs
with a long history of dealing with foreign issues appear to be more self-assured
than ‘newcomers’ in this area. For example, staff in the prefectural offices of
Hokkaido, Hyogo, Fukuoka and Kanagawa and in the city offices of Kobe,
Niigata, Sapporo and Yokohama are confident in their own ability to deal with
international matters. However staff in the offices of various inland prefectures
and of small SNGs that have little experience in international matters are still
reluctant to conduct international affairs on their own, and depend on or lean
towards larger, experienced SNGs or central agencies before venturing into even
a routine matter such as a sister-city agreement.56
Whether SNGs are newcomers or old hands in international affairs, most
have personnel who have now gained at least some exposure in this area
through explicit training or on-the-job experience. As discussed earlier, the
institutionalization process has involved establishment of JIAM to train SNG
personnel to deal with issues of globalization, intercultural understanding and
international affairs. Some receive training and work experience through liaising
with central agencies such as JETRO and JICA, or serving on secondment in
various ministries and Japanese missions overseas, including, importantly,
CLAIR offices inside and outside Japan.
Some SNGs claim a great deal of knowledge and skills concerning a particular
country or policy area. Niigata City administration is especially proud of its
knowledge of Russian and North Korean affairs and a significant share of its staff
in the International Affairs section are fluent in Russian and Korean language and
have frequently travelled to those countries. A former Head of the International
Affairs Section of Niigata City office is fluent in Russian and during his employ-
ment with Niigata City travelled to the Soviet Union more than 60 times on behalf
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of his employer.57 Similarly, Hokkaido Prefecture officials claim that they have
a better knowledge of the disputed Northern Territories issues than many of their
counterparts in the national government. Overall, SNG personnel acknowledge
that their capacity is surely limited and they do not have resources to deal with
every kind of foreign-affairs issue. But this is not their mandate or their intention.
As a number of SNG officials indicated to me during my fieldwork in SNGs
across Japan, SNG personnel now appear to be fairly confident of their ability to
deal with foreign people on specific issues.
SNG employees’ projection of their role in international affairs gives us useful
insight. The job titles printed on their business cards portray these personnel as
international actors. Business cards that I collected during my interviews for this
project between 2000 and 2004 gives one that general feel. They include Director
of Niigata City Foreign Affairs Division (kokusai bunkabu); Director International
Affairs Division, Niigata Prefecture (kokusai koryuka); Chief, International
Relations Section, Himeji City (kokusai kacho); Director, International Relations
Division, Hiroshima City (kokusai koryu tanto kacho); Manager, International
Affairs Division, Okayama Prefecture (kokusai-ka shuji); Director General,
International Department, Kobe City (kokusai bucho). All have some combina-
tion of ‘international’/‘foreign’ and ‘affairs’/‘relations’ in their official English
translation, symbolizing the jurisdictional authority of their offices beyond simply
‘international exchange’. Here, we also see signs of diversity among SNGs in their
administration of international affairs.
Keeping an account of how SNGs have institutionalized international affairs
has not been methodical. The Foreign Press Center’s 1996 survey of Japan’s 47
prefectures has a section on internationalization revealing that all prefecture
offices had in place a basic plan for international activities and/or a set of guide-
lines setting out strategic directions to promote international cooperation and
other aspects of internationalization throughout the prefecture, including in the
SNGs within their prefecture.58 A much more comprehensive survey of Japanese
prefectures published in English and focussing on the United States was
conducted at roughly the same time by the Japan Foundation Center for Global
Partnership. Findings from this survey confirm that SNGs are taking a more
strategic approach to their international programmes; they have moved beyond the
general feel-good ‘friendly relationship’ with international partners to a ‘strategy
for the future development of the area’.59 The point is illustrated by the focus of
Wakayama Prefecture on developing technology and a resort in association with
Florida, Oita Prefecture’s ‘One Village One Product’ (isson ippin) programme
for local diplomacy, and the efforts of Niigata, Fukui and Tottori prefectures in
developing the Sea of Japan Grouping. The survey also notes SNGs’ shift in
strategic direction around the mid-1990s from the earlier focus on ‘international
exchange’ to ‘international cooperation’, which I explore in Chapter 4.60
All up, we see many SNGs making serious moves to build their capacity for
productive international relationships, particularly through strategic planning and
policy, institutional arrangements, capable personnel and the lessons learned from
each others’ experiences. The national government has responded with institutional
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infrastructure to support, coordinate and guide SNGs in their international
activities and in some ways to form partnerships between players across the levels
of government. It provides much of the funds that SNGs use to develop their
international capacity. This is a nationwide effort at the local level, initiated and
embraced by SNGs in the name of internationalization and because SNGs recog-
nize the widespread benefits. It has been co-opted by the national level only with
recognition of the scale of these developments and their consequences for the
nation as well as for the localities. As SNGs have diversified their international
actions well beyond grassroots exchange programmes, they are developing more
than institutional and personal expertise. They are developing the political will
and the confidence to serve as ever more important international actors whose
contributions are recognized appropriately in the nation’s foreign policy.
Intellectual and political lobbying
The move into the international arena has not been plain sailing for many SNGs,
individually or collectively. The national government’s response is shaped not just by
the tussle between the generally supportive MOHA/SHA and sometimes-resistant
MOFA, but also by the overriding political will of the national level to retain close
control over the SNGs below it. There have been two primary sources of support
for SNGs as they reach beyond the national border: intellectual and political.
A strong tradition has prevailed among Japanese intellectuals to support SNGs in
their struggle for greater autonomy from the central government.61 A significant
cohort of the earlier progressive governors and mayors entered subnational politics
with a scholarly background and a will to push for greater autonomy for SNGs.62
This tradition of strong intellectual support for greater SNG autonomy has extended
into the arena of international relations. Supporters of a greater international role for
SNGs independent of the central government include university scholars, researchers
in think tanks and institutes, journalists, and others engaged in public debate.
Some progressive local chief executives such as Minobe Ryokichi of Tokyo
and Asukata Ichio of Yokohama made news headlines in the 1970s, with policy
decisions that affected Japan’s foreign relations. A more systematic intellectual
and political push for independent action by SNGs in foreign affairs has been at
work since the 1980s. The theoretical work of academics Matsushita Keiichi,
Sakamoto Yoshikazu and colleagues can be seen as pioneering in its contribution
to setting the broad agenda for internationalization at the SNG level.63 Other aca-
demics contributed conceptually with the notion of ‘cooperation’, which was later
adopted by MOHA, to supersede the earlier label of ‘exchange’, indicating the
broader international agenda of SNGs, the mutual give-and-take in these interna-
tional programmes and the capacity of SNGs for substantial policy initiatives in
international affairs.64 Works by Ebashi Takashi (Hosei University), Watado
Ichiro (Meisai University), Yoshida Shinichiro (Community Link International
Institute) and Eguchi Yujiro (Soka University) are especially noteworthy.65
Other contributions come from researchers in think-tanks and consultants
to SNGs and other organizations, who have produced a range of reports on the
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international role of SNGs. These people include Menju Toshihiro of the Japan
Center for International Exchange and Yoshida Hitoshi of the Economic Research
Institute of Northeast Asia (ERINA). Some contribute to advancing public knowl-
edge, interest and support for what SNGs are doing through columns in influen-
tial national newspapers.66 Highly ranked local officials have been at the forefront
of promoting the international role of their SNGs and have worked with
academics and think-tank staff preparing plans and strategies to implement SNG
international cooperation and exchange programmes. Sugioka Akiko (Sapporo
City), Ichioka Masao (Niigata City), Utsunomiya Hiroshi (Hyogo Prefecture)67
and others from Kobe and Hiroshima cities and Niigata, Hokkaido and Hiroshima
Prefectures come straight to mind in this context.
In the mid-1980s, influential public commentator Tanaka Naoki wrote a seminal
piece that argued strongly for greater autonomy for SNGs by offering new
rationales involving international pursuits. First, Tanaka argued that international
relationships are fruitful for enabling SNGs to resolve problems with overseas
counterparts that have similar experiences. He argued that this is much more
efficacious than taking instruction from a central government in the middle of
Tokyo that tries to enforce uniform standards and rules even though it is increasingly
out of touch with the distinctive needs of particular localities. Tanaka’s example
illustrates the ineptitude of the central government offices in Tokyo in planning
housing and energy issues for Hokkaido, based on false assumptions about
climate. Since Japan is diverse from north to south in climate, topography and
demography, uniform approaches nationwide are misguided and outcomes will be
maximized if SNGs develop overseas linkages for problem-solving and
other mutual benefits, especially as central funding diminishes.68 For Tanaka,
international exchanges based on citizens’ lives should be encouraged to assume
their full importance.69
Second, he claimed, the international actions of SNGs contribute to national
security by creating cooperative relations below the national level. Tanaka cast
grassroots SNG diplomacy as the most promising road to peace; not an adjunct
to international diplomacy but a completely different way to avoid or resolve
tensions between states and a preferable alternative by far.70 Writing not long
before the end of the Cold War when the Regan administration in the United
States had created phenomenal military build-up, Tanaka argued for connections
beyond state-to-state level so that international actors and their relationships
could be freed from military intimidation. SNG diplomacy would also particu-
larly benefit Japan’s relations with China and the then Soviet Union. In Tanaka’s
view, SNG diplomacy has the potential to transfigure state-level relations and
should be encouraged to do so.
Intellectual advocacy for SNG autonomy in general and for SNG autonomy in
international actions in particular has offered strong philosophical, ethical and
practical support. Final decisions on diplomatic matters are still made by the
central government, but SNGs have certainly made considerable headway in their
reach into the international arena. It appears that intellectual advocacy for greater
power to SNGs in international relations has been a potent force for many local
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leaders and officials as they struggle to make their case for official acceptance of
SNGs’ more autonomous and active role in international affairs.
SNG chief executives are themselves involved in political lobbying and have
been joined by practitioners, citizens’ groups and others who are interested prac-
tically or ethically in supporting this action. The late Nagasu Kazuji who served
as governor of Kanagawa from 1975 to 1995 could be regarded as a pioneer
in this field. He worked actively to promote the concept of citizen diplomacy
(minsai gaiko) involving ordinary citizens in international activities, and his
proposal was later put into practice through the Community Development
Initiative (CDI).71 Other SNG leaders have been compelled into action since their
international activities have explicit diplomatic ramifications that at times have
rankled the Foreign Ministry. Governor Katayama of Tottori has promoted his
prefecture’s links with North and South Korea and Hokkaido Prefecture officials
have made constant efforts to work as a bridge between Moscow and Tokyo to try
to resolve the Northern Territories dispute, while promoting Hokkaido’s economic
and trade interests with the Russian Far East (RFE). Many Japanese SNGs on the
Japan Sea have formed linkages with counterparts on the other side of the sea.
SNGs’ international actions are still on somewhat contested turf, even though
the national government has tried to incorporate them into national policy. The
central government is keen to maintain its strong hold over SNGs and the Foreign
Ministry in particular is keen to retain hold over what it considers to be the
Ministry’s ‘diplomatic turf’. Such is the nature of this development by Japanese
SNGs in the Japanese national context. Like in any complex, multi-party political
matter that moves outside the national border, all of the players here – government
ministries, SNGs, semi-government bodies, citizens groups and others – pursue
sets of interests that coexist, mutate, collide, adjust, are forced into accommoda-
tion or are abandoned. Advocates of this move by SNGs have achieved some
ground through their support and lobbying, but it appears there is more political
turf to be transfigured if SNGs are to achieve the autonomy to pursue international
actions that many of their overseas counterparts in the West and beyond,
now enjoy.
Conclusion
Today, nation states are no longer the primary actors in international relationships
and national governments do not hold a monopoly on international diplomacy. In
Japan, SNGs have joined the circle of international actors alongside the national
government, its extra-ministerial bodies, non-government bodies and others.
Japanese SNGs have reached into the international arena in their own capacity
particularly from the 1980s, largely to satisfy local needs and interests through
their own international policies. Four factors have made international relation-
ships particularly compelling for SNGs. One is opportunities for economic gain
outside Japan while SNGs have struggled to manage through domestic economic
recession. Another is opportunities for problem-solving and information-sharing
with counterparts overseas that have similar experience, while the one-size-fits-all
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policies of Japan’s national government fail to meet the needs of diverse SNGs
stretched across the national archipelago. Third is the capacity of SNGs to work
in international aid delivery for which they are much better equipped than the
central government. Fourth, international activities that SNGs conduct in their
own name help to increase SNG autonomy from the national government, still
a bastion of control over the nation’s many freedom-seeking SNGs.
Clearly, we do not have here one national policy and actors speaking in one
voice. The SNGs’ quest for international action especially from the late 1980s
gained momentum that the resisting Foreign Ministry failed to foresee and incor-
porate strategically into the nation’s foreign policy. The Home Affairs Ministry
saw the opportunity to expand its responsibility and responded with a compre-
hensive strategic policy that has provided philosophical guidance and practical
direction to SNGs through institutionalization, budgetary assistance and other
support. Old and new institutions at both the national and subnational levels have
enhanced the capacity of SNGs to undertake international activities. And the
Foreign Ministry has become more accommodating. Yet, as we have seen in this
chapter, neither the national nor the subnational levels of government are mono-
lithic. The different interests, responsibilities and capacities of their players divide
both levels. Here we find national–subnational partnerships alongside rivalries
between the two key ministerial players and between the SNGs themselves,
particularly for resources. We have also seen how the two levels are intersected
by intermediary institutions and other entities that facilitate connections and
networking but also complicate the flow of loyalties.
Japan retains its unitary system of government but SNGs are making further
headway in their quest for greater autonomy. Limited decentralization of foreign
policy enables SNGs to take some responsibility for practical implementation
while the centre, particularly MOFA, retains overall responsibility. In the 1970s,
SNGs challenged Japan’s tightly centralized policy structure through progressive
initiatives in domestic policies. Today, they continue the challenge in the interna-
tional policy arena. Ever more SNGs are initiating and administering international
policies for their own localities, moving further onto policy ground that was
formerly the sole prerogative of the central government. ‘Internationalizing’
SNGs and their localities has in this way drawn SNGs into the pluralization of
Japanese foreign policy. SNGs’ push into the international arena in their own
capacities has certainly impacted upon the management of Japan’s foreign policy
and on the relations between the national and subnational actors, as we explore
further in the following chapters.
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3 International exchanges
SNGs lead with a soft approach
International programmes involving cultural and trading links are some of the
earlier vehicles through which Japanese SNGs began to connect themselves
directly with the international community, bypassing the official involvement
of the central government. These international programmes, both formal and
informal, are generally labelled kokusai koryu or international exchanges.1 Post-
war, some subnational administrations in Japan began to pursue direct overseas
linkages in a quiet but increasingly systematic and institutionalized manner,
enabled by the newly established ‘autonomy’ for SNGs codified in the 1947
constitution and inspired by the precedents of their counterparts in post-war
America and Europe. Growing economic prosperity and international awareness
inside Japan encouraged some SNGs to extend and diversify their international
exchanges, while some also saw in these linkages a valuable opportunity to
strengthen their policy autonomy from the central government while yielding
benefits for both the Japanese and overseas participants.
Thus, while post-war national leaders and the central government focused their
attention specifically on a mercantilist international agenda for Japan – an eco-
nomic foreign policy – at the grassroots level, popular interest and political will
nudged some SNGs towards diverse international linkages through grassroots
cultural ties. These actions put SNGs well ahead of central government initiatives
in this area of international relations. Subsequent developments in the domestic
and international environments have propelled this trend, casting international
exchange as an important part of the mandate of increasing numbers of SNGs. In
the process, SNGs make significant contributions. Some accrue to the nation:
to the foreign relations that the national government seeks to manage formally, to
the nation’s international profile, and the bank of overseas goodwill towards Japan.
Others accrue to SNGs: to their own status as international actors, to their network
of international connections, and to their autonomy from the national government.
This chapter focuses on the two most egregious types of international exchange
programmes that Japanese SNGs pursue: (1) sister-city relationships and (2) the
JET programme. Both types of programmes involve flows of people between
Japan and other countries, engaging in local community life on both sides of
the national border. Both are conducted through institutional frameworks that
formalize specific purposes for the relationships and both involve public and
private participation. Both also generate contexts for developing other formal and
informal relations that are some mix of cultural, economic and politico-strategic.
So even while these programmes are implemented largely below the national
level, they have diplomatic and strategic consequences for national foreign policy,
whether explicit or implicit, and consequences for relations between SNGs and
the central government.
Because international linkages through sister cities and JET evolve beyond the
formal institutional framework as well as within it, we cannot know precisely
how, and how much, these two forms of international exchange contribute to
international relationships at the subnational and national levels. Both provide the
platform for different parties at grassroots level who share interests to come
together across national boundaries in ways that would have been unlikely or
impossible without these formalized institutional arrangements. The examples
discussed in this chapter reveal how these programmes generally stimulate con-
siderable international goodwill for Japan and sometimes lead to more explicitly
instrumental international linkages through the personal connections they culti-
vate. This is why the national and subnational governments share an interest in
promoting these programmes.
Yet there is a distinctive difference between these two programmes in how they
are administered. Sister-city programmes originate at the grassroots level and are
exclusively for local activities. They are administered independently by SNGs,
largely free from central intervention and oversight, and do not form part of a
centrally coordinated national programme. Other government and non-government
actors can become involved, but SNGs initiate and conduct programmes to suit
their local needs without following centrally prescribed national guidelines. The
JET programme, on the other hand, is administered through the national govern-
ment. It is the result of a prime ministerial initiative in the mid-1980s to address
the perceived need for a coordinated, nationwide cultural approach to interna-
tional relations, initially a cultural antidote to Japan’s relations with the United
States that were then soured by the US response to Japan’s mounting trade sur-
plus. SNGs have been the main agents in implementing the JET programme and
have used it to foster multifaceted international relationships that also serve SNG
interests and are economic and politico-strategic, as well as cultural. Even so,
SNGs have limited involvement in JET policy and responsibility is firmly in the
hands of the national government.
The similarities and differences between these programmes provide us with a
useful picture of SNGs’ involvement in what can be seen conceptually as a ‘soft’
approach to international relations.2 For sister programmes, SNGs run the show.
SNGs take the initiative to mount and formalize a relationship with the overseas
counterpart of their choice and independently finance and administer this rela-
tionship through their own resources, to serve what the SNGs perceive are their
local interests. For JET, the national government initiated and now runs the show.
SNGs engage in a cooperative arrangement with several national bodies and each
other, and are guided primarily by central government policy in recruiting and
placing JET participants. The central government ministries use the JET
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programme to pursue national interests but these generally coincide with the
interests of many SNGs that see JET as a valuable route for the type of inter-
nationalization they now pursue keenly. If the JET programme demonstrates
the national government’s ‘arms-length approach’ to soft diplomacy, we could
describe sister-city partnerships as the national government’s ‘hands-off
approach’. Compatibility of interests between the levels of government in
pursuing these programmes is therefore vital to this picture.
As the message of each chapter in this book conveys, we find here that SNGs’
pursuits as international actors run counter to the conventional wisdom that SNGs
are concerned narrowly with domestic issues and are constrained tightly by the
centre within Japan’s unitary system of government. From the post-war period,
SNGs have played a key role in the soft diplomacy of international exchanges
that the national level continued to overlook largely in favour of harder-nosed
diplomacy until the late 1980s. The central government was a latecomer to this
branch of international diplomacy in which SNGs have been involved since the
mid-1950s.3 Through sister relationships, SNGs have been leaders in soft diplo-
macy, and through the JET programme they have become crucial partners of the
central government. SNGs are not simply central government agents in interna-
tional exchange programmes. They are stakeholders that participate astutely to
serve the interests of their local communities and in the process usually generate
international goodwill and other positive outcomes for Japan.
The role of SNGs in these ‘soft’ programmes has particular significance for
SNG relations with the central government, since in these types of international
relationships SNGs can do what the central government cannot do. SNGs have
connections, ability, willingness and status that position them better than central
government actors to pursue grassroots international linkages. First, because
SNGs are closer to grassroots activities within their administration, SNGs have
better access to the people and community networks needed to build and sustain
international relationships at the local level. Second, SNGs are experienced in
addressing local concerns that they share with overseas counterparts at the local
level. They are generally better able to appreciate the position of their counter-
parts, respond effectively to local needs and identify innovative options.
The third factor has particular import for subnational–national relations because
it concerns something the centre can never have. Unlike central government actors,
SNGs can connect and operate at the local level abroad in part because they do not
act in the name of the nation. This status relieves SNGs of much of the diplomatic
baggage and official implication that usually attaches to national-government
actions abroad, which can become an enabling factor for SNGs internationally and
empowering for them domestically. It creates for the central government a limited
form of reverse dependence in its relations with the domestically subaltern SNGs.
In soft diplomacy, the national government needs the cooperation and in some
cases the initiative of SNGs precisely because SNGs are official – they are
government – but they are not national, with the diplomatic implications this
generates. We begin our examination of this soft approach to international diplomacy
with sister-city relationships and then move to the JET programme.
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Sister-city relationships
I use here the generic term ‘sister city’ (translated from shimai toshi) since it is
used most commonly in Japan.4 Different expressions are used in other countries,
such as ‘twin city’ in England and ‘partnerstadt’ in Germany. The Chinese prefer
that their formalized subnational relationships with Japanese SNGs are called
yuko toshi (friendship cities) or yuko koryu toshi (friendship exchange cities),
terms that are gender and hierarchy neutral.5 ‘City’ is also misleading since these
international relationships are not just between cities but at all levels of the sub-
national structure: in the Japanese case, prefectures, towns and villages as well.
Whatever their terminology, international relationships formalized between
SNG counterparts – ‘sister cities’ – are generally, as Cremer and Dupuis observed,
‘for a range of identifiable purposes and largely outside the auspices of any
central government involvement’.6 Usually partners are drawn together through
something they share: a geographic feature or geographic proximity; historical,
cultural or trade links; a migrant community from the home country; even a
problem that shared minds and experience can resolve. Benefits are expected to
be mutual though not necessarily in the same quantum for both partners. Usually
these involve mutual understanding and propitious disposition. They may also
include practical outcomes such as passage of knowledge or skills, commercial
development, or practical problem-solving. In the Japanese case, the desired out-
come has been primarily goodwill, although over time some SNGs are seeking
practical and diplomatically strategic ends as well. Sister relations lubricate the
channels for direct trans-border communication between people.
The Japanese concept of sister cities is based on the early post-war US model
aiming ‘to increase international understanding and foster peace by furthering inter-
national communication and exchange at the person-to-person level through city-
to-city affiliations’.7 Here we see a response to the Second World War, with hope
that international relationships between different types of people and organizations
at the grassroots level would nurture mutual understanding and goodwill between
countries to help prevent international conflict. The premise of this thinking is that
allowing the people to communicate directly with each other rather than through
their governments opens lines for less conflictual relationships.8
The roots of sister-city relations in Japan
Cities have historically played an important role in international affairs through
trade and cultural routes in many parts of the world. Japanese cities are no excep-
tion. Many of Japan’s SNGs take pride in their historical links with cities and
regions abroad and the historical connection sometimes serves as the main reason
for forging contemporary bilateral relations.
Fukuoka on the Japan Sea coast became the primary international exchange
centre for ancient Japan, with a government-run house that received and enter-
tained visitors from China and Korea during the Middle Ages. By the end of the
Warring States period (1467–1568) the city had grown to be a major centre for
trade.9 Nagasaki’s port of Deshima was the only Japanese port open to international
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trade and cultural contacts during the Tokugawa period when Japan’s feudal rulers
had shut Japan off to the outside world.10 Niigata, also on the Japan Sea coast, has
a long history of international contact with people from countries like China,
Korea and Russia.11 For these prefectures and cities, historical connections have
certainly served as the basis for forming sister linkages and other contacts.
Many, but by no means all, SNGs have responded enthusiastically to develop-
ing international partnerships formalized in sister-city agreements. These part-
nerships require SNGs to commit their expertise, efforts and limited resources
and so approach formalizing the relationship with necessary pragmatism. A few
times SNGs have proceeded in the face of opposition from the central govern-
ment. For example, the Foreign Affairs Ministry at times opposed Hokkaido
Prefecture’s contacts with nearby Sakhalin in Russia claiming these contacts
worked against the national interest, but this did not prevent Hokkaido from
establishing a friendship agreement with Sakhalin, where the national govern-
ment recognized Hokkaido’s formal link could serve as a vehicle for ongoing
connections in the absence of formal bilateral relations at the national level and
with tensions at various levels, including diplomatic.12
Nevertheless, the national government recognizes that overall, sister cities serve
national diplomatic interests as well as local interests, as informal city-to-city
connections have done for centuries. The sister-city framework has been used to
facilitate multiple relationships at multiple levels through personal connections, for
goodwill, economic linkages and chances to cultivate political and other diplomatic
connections. The national government thus continues its hands-off approach to sister
cities since this is one of the most effective ways for the nation to reap the benefits
of local-level arrangements that the centre itself is less able or unable to achieve.
Stages of development post-war
Yoshida’s study of Japan’s local-level international exchanges observes in sister
relationships a slow development during the first two decades from the mid-
1950s, noticeable growth in the 1980s, a great leap forward towards the end of
the 1980s and early 1990s, and a peak around 1992.13 Japan’s first sister-city
relationship was between Nagasaki and St Paul in 1955, in response to a US
initiative. Under the Eisenhower sister-city programme, American organizations
based in Japan initiated and facilitated sister ties, producing linkages between
Nagoya and Los Angeles, Kobe and Seattle, and Okayama and San Jose.14
In time, Japanese SNGs began to take their own initiatives, finding their own
partners, broadening geographic reach to other continents and diversifying the
shared interests that serve as the adhesive in these partnerships.
The earliest relationships were largely official and symbolic. Most of the action
in the first two decades was reciprocal visits by high-ranking officials and
politicians, producing the handshakes, public pronouncements and photo opportu-
nities of kanpai gaiko (‘three cheers’ diplomacy). At this time, national attention
was firmly on economic growth and most foreign-policy tools and actions were to
serve this aim. International engagement beyond economic linkages was peripheral.
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People-to-people links through more practical programmes were developed
from the mid-1970s after the emergence of progressive local leaders who were
keen to promote minsai gaiko (people’s diplomacy).15 The premise of minsai
gaiko is that participation of ordinary citizens in grassroots international pro-
grammes helps to create local conditions for effective international diplomacy
between national governments.16 From the late 1970s, more and more ordinary
citizens began to participate in diverse international programmes involving
education, sport and other cultural events. Some of these programmes were the
key means for establishing direct links with places such as the Soviet Union
where formal diplomacy was highly restricted under Cold War conditions.
The period of solid growth in sister relationships during the 1980s inspired grad-
ual establishment of formal bodies locally and nationally, as discussed in Chapter 2.
These bodies were to strengthen the institutional framework supporting SNGs’
international efforts including the sister-city scheme. CLAIR (Jichitai Kokusaika
Kyokai), established in 1988, serves as the main national-level organization sup-
porting the sister-city and other international programmes of SNGs through infor-
mation, contacts, domestic coordination and other advice and services. CLAIR is
the main institutional vehicle for coordinating the JET programme. Yet, SNGs
retain full control over their sister relationships and are under no obligation to
report to CLAIR about these relationships. SNGs generally choose to consult with
CLAIR because SNGs were major supporters behind the creation of CLAIR which
has the resources and information that SNGs find useful, and SNG officials have
a significant presence in CLAIR offices in Japan and overseas which allows
productive contacts to flourish vertically (between MOHA and SNG officials) and
horizontally (between SNG officials who work in CLAIR offices). CLAIR thus
serves to lubricate rather than collar SNGs’ actions in sister relationships.
Domestic developments at this time contributed to the eagerness of some SNGs
to pursue sister-city relationships vigorously. The slogan ‘chiho no jidai’ (the era
of localities) initiated by progressive local chief executives in major urban centres
caught on in many local administrations. ‘Kokusaika’ (internationalization) was
harnessed to the chiho no jidai movement and signs of stronger international con-
nections were clearly evident in local communities. More and more Japanese were
travelling abroad and more and more ‘foreigners’ came to Japan, partly in response
to the shortage of labour in a booming economy. The citizenry inside Japan generally
became more receptive to international connections and SNGs became more capa-
ble of developing and dealing with these connections. Many SNGs were now
engaging directly with people from other countries inside their administration.17
Developments in the international arena paralleled and intensified developments
in the domestic context. From the 1980s, overseas interest in Japan grew hugely.
Japan’s trading reach was worldwide, its economy had become the world’s second
largest, and its official aid programme had become the world’s largest. This
served to increase overseas receptivity to Japanese initiatives for forming sister
partnerships and through some of these partnerships ‘learning from Japan’.18
We see here a confluence of factors that promoted sister-city partnerships
from inside and outside Japan and encouraged SNGs to expand the form of
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these partnerships well beyond the initial aims of seeking peace through
cultural relations. Today programmes include technical, scientific and environ-
mental cooperation and commercial development, with participation by a broad
range of people in local communities across the country. An ideological shift
has further legitimized the institutional framework of sister cities. The currently
popular political philosophy that public policy will succeed only when ordinary
people see themselves as stakeholders applies to international policy through
sister-city programmes. Hence, many local leaders with diverse political back-
grounds now speak a language almost identical to that of their progressive prede-
cessors who pushed for minsai gaiko from the late 1970s. Sister-city relations
are important tools of soft diplomacy and some SNGs use these judiciously to
serve local ends.
How far have sister cities come?
CLAIR maintains the most comprehensive record of SNG international linkages,
which includes formalized sister-type relationships as well as sister cities.
According to CLAIR records,19 as of April 2003, 954 of Japan’s 3200 SNGs had
established affiliations with counterparts overseas, in 57 countries across North
and South America, Europe, Asia and Australasia, including just two in Africa.
The total number of formalized affiliations stood at 1475, as some SNGs have
multiple affiliations. In North America, there were 435 affiliations with American
SNGs and 70 with Canada; in Central and South America, Brazil dominated over-
whelmingly with 59 of 74 affiliations. In Europe, France, Germany and Russia
respectively accounted for 47, 46 and 40 of 298 affiliations. Australia had 105
and New Zealand had 43 of the 151 affiliations in Oceania. In Asia, of 445
affiliations, China accounted for 290 and Korea for 94.
Several noteworthy features are apparent from the CLAIR data. First, in three
continents, the vast bulk of these relationships is with one country; in North
America it is the United States, in Central and South America it is Brazil and in
Oceania it is Australia. In Asia, China and Korea together account for 384 of the
445 affiliations. Europe is exceptional since France, Germany and Russia are
virtually at par and Italy with 31 affiliations is not far behind, but the United
Kingdom with 13 is not particularly strong. Africa remains almost totally
neglected. Second, fewer than one third of all Japanese SNGs have institutional-
ized affiliations with a counterpart abroad, and 8 of the 47 prefectures have no for-
mal sister linkages as defined by CLAIR.20 Third, while large and medium-sized
cities in urban areas are generally more active than other types of SNGs in the
exchange process, some 475 towns and villages are also keenly pursuing exchange
programmes, including some very successful projects.21 With the current round
of municipal amalgamations these numbers are likely to reduce, although not
significantly.22 Fourth, exchanges and ties at SNG level are more pervasive
than these data indicate. Since CLAIR records include only officially established
affiliations, the extensive engagements between SNGs and overseas counterparts
that are not formalized in official agreements are not reflected in these data.23
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Geographic focus
Nations important in Japanese international diplomacy and to national/local
economic well-being are perhaps inevitably more popular among Japanese SNGs
for sister partners. The CLAIR data discussed earlier reflect not only local interests
but also the general orientation of Japan’s international interests, both economic
and strategic. Longitudinal data reflect shifts in this orientation. This of itself
indicates how sistering at the subnational level reflects and helps to reinforce
developments at the national level, with the rapid take-up rate with China in the
1990s and virtual absence in Africa – both clear examples. Until the late 1960s,
almost 70 per cent of all sister linkages formed by Japanese cities were with
American cities and states. No Japanese prefecture established a relationship with
a counterpart outside America until 1969, when Hyogo Prefecture formalized its
tie with Khabarovsk in what was then the Soviet Union.
Menju explains the early focus on American partners as the result of Japanese
people’s admiration for Western nations and America in particular, so it was seen
as an honour for a Japanese SNG to have a formal link with a counterpart in a
Western nation, especially the United States.24 However, the United States was
more than simply an emblem of prestige. It was Japan’s foremost security ally and
holder of Japan’s nuclear umbrella under Cold War conditions and it was also
Japan’s largest import market at a time when the nation’s economic growth
depended on a vigorous international trade programme. The opportunity to
cultivate mutual knowledge, interest and goodwill through valuable grassroots
connections was surely an attractive feature for the sistering partners on either
side of the Pacific and an avenue for soft diplomacy in which both national and
subnational governments shared interests.
Growth in the size and scope of the Japanese economy involving more
international contacts at all levels gave Japan’s SNGs opportunity and reason to
expand their programmes into other continents and regions. Statistical data in
CLAIR’s annual directories of Japanese government international affiliations and
in Japan Foundation surveys confirm broadening in the 1980s and 1990s from the
original focus on counterparts in the United States, to relationships with Asia and
Australia. A few links were forged with SNGs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal
and Mongolia, but most were made with counterparts in China and Korea, the
two closest Asian neighbours with strong historical links and rapidly growing
economies.25 Indeed, from the 1990s, we see a flourish of sister-style relationships
with counterparts in China as the economy of Japan’s neighbour began to surge
and SNGs responded to the need to accept greater responsibility for their local-
ity’s economic well-being as recession tightened public purse strings at all levels
of government in Japan. Japan’s special relationship with Brazil because of its
history of strong migration from Japan is also reflected in the significant number
of sister-city relations between Japanese and Brazilian counterparts.
At the start of this section, I noted that nations important in Japanese interna-
tional diplomacy attract Japanese SNGs as sister partners. This observation
applies not just to nations with which Japan has friendly alliance. Indeed, it has
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had special significance for nations that are important to Japan, but with which
the national government has had other than friendly relations, or no official diplo-
matic relationship at all. SNG ties through sister partnerships have provided the
valuable lines of communication bilaterally that the central government did not
have. The strongest examples are the SNGs that in the 1960s and 1970s began to
partner with counterparts in what were then socialist neighbours across the Sea of
Japan: the Soviet Union and China. Some progressive SNGs, particularly on the
Japan Sea coast, were keen to develop these ties that the national level would not
or could not pursue for diplomatic reasons. Niigata, Hyogo and Hokkaido in par-
ticular established formal sister ties in the 1960s with SNGs of the then Soviet
Union when Cold War tensions kept the national governments in Tokyo and
Moscow formally apart.26 Similarly, the progressive administrations of Kobe and
Yokohama were the first to link with Chinese cities (Tianjin and Shanghai respec-
tively, both in 1973) when relations at the national level were still strained by
failure to reach a peace treaty (signed in 1978) despite Japan’s diplomatic recog-
nition of the PRC in 1972.
Geography is an important factor in the sistering process, both inside and
outside Japan. There is now a concentration of active sister relationships in coun-
tries geographically closest to Japan, especially where there are economic and
diplomatic opportunities to share, as the westward reach of Japan Sea coastal
cities and Hokkaido’s reach into the RFE indicate. We also see the significance of
the official but ‘non-national’ status of SNGs for opening and maintaining vital
international relations that the central government with its diplomatic considera-
tions is unwilling or unable to conduct. The Russian and Chinese examples of
sister-type relationships are very revealing of Japanese SNGs’ interests, capacities,
motivations and ultimately their relations with the central government. We therefore
consider both examples in some detail later in this chapter.
Motivations
Over time SNGs’ interest in pursuing sister relationships has diversified, as the
broader purpose and geographic reach of these relationships suggest. The state of
Japan’s international relationships and the national prestige factor – of other
nations and of Japan – inevitably influence the motivation for partnering on both
sides of the relationship. For example, the 1950s trophy connections with cities in
the United States were unlikely to have the same cachet in 2003 when newspapers
reported that the majority of Japanese citizens were aggrieved at the US admin-
istration for the unilateral invasion of Iraq. And what is claimed to be the primary
motivation for forming sister relationships – developing mutual knowledge,
understanding and friendship to promote international peace – is not destination-
specific.27 This may be a primary interest of the national government that is keen
to have international goodwill towards Japan, but SNGs have reasons that
concern their own local interests. So what does motivate Japanese SNGs to link
formally with SNGs overseas, and what determines their choice of partner,
especially when the central government does not control these choices?
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Discussion earlier indicates the variety of shared interests or features that form
the basis of these connections, ranging from geographic features and geographic
proximity, to shared history and culture. A 1994 survey carried out in Australia by
the Sydney office of CLAIR found that industry compatibility (fishing, wine or
pearling, e.g.) and interest in private visits for leisure, business and education also
motivated the formalising of local-level linkages as sister relationships.28 Two
particular aspects of SNGs’ motivation to partner deserve discussion here: eco-
nomic and geo-strategic. Both reveal how the changing place of SNGs in domes-
tic politics has motivated SNGs to pursue mutually beneficial relations outside
Japan independently of the central government, and how in reaching outside
Japan through sister relationships, SNGs are influencing national–subnational
relations inside Japan.
First is economic motivation. The boom in sister partnerships from the 1980s
was motivated partly by SNGs’ search for economic opportunities independently
of the national government. Financially stretched while their limited budgets
from the national public purse needed to finance ever more ‘local’ responsibilities,
SNGs began to explore how they could develop economic opportunities for their
locality, including through sources abroad. Some SNG officials have come to
regard the sister linkage as a launching pad for commercial as well other grass-
roots activities. They appear to be savvy on the soft diplomacy of cultural
exchange, the pragmatism of SNG-promoted mutually productive economic
relations, and the capacity of sister partnerships to effectively deliver both of these.
While he was governor of Kumamoto from 1983 to 1991, former Prime
Minister Hosokawa Morihiro actively promoted trade and other economic ties
through Kumamoto Prefecture’s sister linkage with Montana in the United States.
In his view, about 200 companies from Montana were successfully exporting their
products to Japan partly as a result of long-term cultural exchanges between
Kumamoto and Montana, and Kumamoto opened its trade office in Montana to
facilitate this bilateral trade.29 The examples discussed later and in Chapter 5
illustrate the types of commercial and other economic arrangements that are now
part of some Japanese sister-city relationships, particularly in some destinations
such as in China. Japanese SNGs are by no means alone in this strategy, which is
now virtually de rigueur for SNGs in many countries.30
Even so, authorities at the national level in Japan tend to deny that SNGs have
a direct role in forging commercial ties through sister partnerships and some
national-government representatives involved in developing sister-city links (e.g.
through CLAIR) do not endorse the economic dimension of sister-city relation-
ships.31 The national government has long seen international trade as a national,
not local, policy concern and since international trade has produced such con-
tentious issues over the past two decades, as well as huge rewards throughout
post-war, the national government is keen to maintain its centralized coordinating
capacity and control. Here we see how the national government responds in an
area where it shares with SNGs a great interest in the outcome – economic benefit
not just for the SNG locality but also for the nation. The national government uses
careful posturing to balance its desire to maintain control over SNGs, while
not resisting their efforts at economic stimulation through international sources.
It therefore neither endorses the economic dimension of sister-city relationships
nor does it actively hold back SNG involvement.
The second aspect of SNGs’ motivation concerns geo-strategic dimensions,
which in some cases have prompted SNGs to flex diplomatic muscle. When
progressive SNGs developed sister-type ties with counterparts in communist or
socialist countries from the 1960s, they were motivated partly by ideological
reasons. Their actions were therefore of great consequence for the national gov-
ernment, which was of a different ideological persuasion and saw the national
level as fully responsible for international relations, especially with those on the
Soviet side of the US–Soviet Cold War divide.
This meant that the SNGs acted against the national government’s resistance in
forming external ties that the national level would not develop, but with the cen-
tre’s approbation in forming ties that the national level could see as potentially
helpful but could not develop for strategic reasons. It demonstrated to both SNGs
and the central government that SNGs could take important policy initiatives in
the international arena with or without the centre’s support, and in cultivating
relations with some of Japan’s most important neighbours, SNGs were more
capable than, and ahead of, the central government.
Some 16 SNGs established sister relations with Soviet cities and regions during
the Cold War period, from as far back as in 1961 when Maizuru City in Kyoto
established a formal link with Nakhodka. Japanese SNGs are not exceptional in
this regard since there are many examples worldwide of formal subnational ties
below national-level tensions.32 Nevertheless, given Japan’s centralized govern-
ment structure, the actions by SNGs to establish friendly ties with counterparts in
countries not on ‘friendly’ terms at the national level is significant, particularly
since it demonstrates SNGs’ capacity to independently conduct their own
international relationships.
From here let us turn to comparative analysis of the sister and sister-type rela-
tionships between Japanese SNGs and their counterparts in different national
contexts. A variety of stories reveal different parts of the larger ‘SNG sistering’
picture. We will consider relationships with SNGs in China, Australia, Russia and
North Korea. These examples show how relations at the national level influence
but do not determine the diverse relationships that SNGs develop at the
subnational level. National strategic considerations have a variety of policy
implications when they meet with local interests and concerns at the subnational
level and SNG interests are usually, but not always, in alignment with those of the
national government.
China as number two33
China is a latecomer as a destination for ties with Japanese SNGs through
‘friendship’ (sister-type) relationships.34 But with a flourish of partnerships
formed in the 1990s, alongside stagnation in some of the earlier fast-growth
destinations, by the turn of the century China had the second most SNG sister
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relationships with Japan, after the United States.35 This surge of interest reflects
Japanese acknowledgement that as a neighbour at Japan’s backdoor, China has
rapidly become strategically and economically very powerful. Cultural and edu-
cational links head the agenda of these sister relationships, although one reason
for the growth of the SNGs’ interest in China is their desire to expand commerce
within their localities while economic opportunities are abundant, a pursuit that
coincides very much with what the central government perceives to be in Japan’s
national interest. Hence it is not surprising that about half of Japanese SNG sister
relationships in China are with SNGs in coastal provinces such as Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Hebei, Shandong and Liaoning, which have all experienced phenomenal
economic growth and are geographically close to Japan.
After bilateral relations were ‘normalized’ officially in 1972, Kobe City was
the first to establish a formal sister-city link in China with Tianjin in May 1973,
followed six months later by Yokohama City with Shanghai. Both Japanese cities
were then headed by progressive mayors who were committed, like many others
in Japan, to quickly setting bilateral relations on a firmer footing through a peace
treaty. They believed that formal links at the local level would facilitate the sign-
ing of a peace treaty at the national level, which eventually came through in 1978.
The Japanese SNGs had broken new diplomatic ground since these relationships
were the first to officially link Chinese cities with any foreign counterpart since
China became a communist state in 1949. SNGs had wide-ranging agendas that
included political connections, revival of historical links and genuine cultural
exchange.36 However, then as now, commercial opportunities were a major moti-
vation so it is not surprising that Japan’s two most internationalized, commercial
cities were the first to forge these relationships.
Official ties were developed remarkably quickly during the 1990s, from just over
100 in 1989 to 290 by April 2003. The 256 municipal relationships accounted for
almost 20 per cent of Japan’s total number. And in prefecture–province relation-
ships, China was clearly the front-runner (34, or about one-third of Japan’s 117 offi-
cial SNG ties at prefectural level), well ahead of relations with US states (23
prefecture–state ties). These 290 official sister relationships with Chinese counter-
parts accounted for 65 per cent of Japan’s 445 sister relationships in Asia.37
Japanese SNGs’ budgetary allocations also confirm the recent strong focus on
China. Over 25 per cent of Japanese SNGs’ total budget allocation on sister pro-
grammes in 1998–2000 was for programmes in China, well ahead of expenditure
on programmes with the United States even though Japan has more sister relations
with US counterparts. The proportion of expenditure becomes even greater when
narrowed to just the prefectures. Of about 2.5 billion yen that prefectures spent on
sister ties in 1998, more than half (1.3 billion yen) was spent on ties with Chinese
SNGs.38 The Japanese SNGs are likely to see expenditure on their Chinese pro-
grammes as an investment for the future, which may yield economic as well as other
potential benefits as China ascends further as a great power.
Larger cities on both sides have been most proactive, with prefectural and
provincial governments sometimes following their lead. For example, Niigata
City linked with Harbin (Heilongjiang) in 1979 and Niigata Prefecture linked
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with Heilongjiang Province in 1983; Naha City in Okinawa linked with Fuzhou
(Fujian) in 1981 and Okinawa Prefecture linked with Fujian Province in 1997.
But follow-up with higher level administrative linkage is not always the case.
Hokkaido’s capital city Sapporo linked with Liaoning’s capital Shenyang in 1980,
but in 1986 Hokkaido Prefecture linked with Heilongjiang province three years
after Niigata Prefecture linked with this province; in Fukuoka Prefecture,
Kitakyushu and Fukuoka cities signed agreements with Dalian (Liaoning) and
Guangzhou (Guangdong) respectively in 1979 and Fukuoka Prefecture signed an
agreement with Jiangsu Province in 1992. Kobe City in Hyogo Prefecture linked
with Tianjin Province in 1973, but a decade later Hyogo linked with Guangdong
Province. In the Kobe–Tianjin example, we see the Chinese province linking for-
mally with a large, cosmopolitan Japanese port city rather than a prefecture.
Generally there is no close coordination between cities and prefectures, which act
mostly independently of each other in forming ties overseas. Smaller SNGs some-
times seek advice, but this is from national bodies such as JAMLIF and CLAIR
rather than from higher level SNGs.
What are the motivations on both sides for these linkages? For the vast major-
ity, both sides seek cultural, economic and other opportunities for mutual benefit
through grassroots cooperation, based on economic complementarity, geographic
proximity, historical connections or some other shared feature. Much of the work
is by private-sector bodies whose own commercial interests coincide with the
interests of their SNG and vice versa. The Chinese side has also been keen for
technological spin-offs from these contacts. Japanese survey findings revealed
that although education was the most favoured purpose for Japanese sister con-
nections worldwide, with Chinese SNGs ‘administrative exchange’ topped the list,
indicating the priority of Chinese local leaders to learn about local administration
and local economic management from their Japanese counterparts.39 The desire
to foster mutual goodwill, interest and knowledge – soft strategic cachet that is
usually sought from this type of official linkage – is pursued through programmes
involving shared interests in culture, sport and education.
The example of Nagasaki Prefecture illustrates the significance of these
official subnational arrangements with China for Japanese SNGs and their
subnational–national relations. Nagasaki is close to the Chinese mainland on
Japan’s western edge, has a long history as an international trade centre through
its ports, and has for years maintained close official and unofficial links with
Fujian Province on China’s east coast. In 1980, the port cities of Nagasaki (capital
of Nagasaki Prefecture) and Fuzhou (capital of Fujian Province) established
an official friendship tie. In 1982, Nagasaki Prefecture formed an official tie with
Fujian Province and in 1983 the prefecture’s second port city, Sasebo, signed an
official linkage agreement with Xiamen, a major port city in Fujian.40
Nagasaki’s post-war interests in China well precede these official link-ups
developed in the 1980s. Fishing disputes required the prefecture to interact with
China even in early post-war years and in 1955 a Japan–China Citizens’ Fisheries
Agreement was arranged through Nagasaki in the absence of Japan–China
diplomatic relations. The Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce formed a China Trade
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Promotion Society in 1952 and Nagasaki sent a City Assembly member to a trade
fair in Shanghai in 1956. The Nagasaki Flag Incident in 1958, in which a right-
wing youth dragged down a Chinese flag at a Chinese products fair held in a
department store in Nagasaki, caused a major diplomatic row between the two
national governments, but had very little impact on the local communities and
Nagasaki’s plans to develop relations with Chinese counterparts and bilateral rela-
tions at the subnational level.41 Indeed, the Nagasaki City administration worked
for years with prefectural governments across Japan lobbying the central govern-
ment to resume diplomatic relations. Until diplomatic relations were normalized
in 1972, most exports from Nagasaki to China were food since Coordinating
Committee for Export Control (COCOM) restrictions on exports to socialist
nations debarred exports of the machinery that China particularly wanted.
Relations between SNGs in Nagasaki Prefecture and Fujian Province continued
to strengthen in the 1980s. The early 1980s formalizing of three key local rela-
tionships – Nagasaki City with Fuzhou City, Nagasaki Prefecture with Fujian
Province, and Sasebo City with Xiamen City – has provided the partners with both
institutional framework and motivation to focus mutually on their shared interests
and complementary opportunities. Mutual exhibitions, trade promotion offices
and economic survey teams have helped to build economic relations between the
prefecture and province. Trade in marine products is especially strong and includes
used fishing vessels. Department stores in the sister cities have formed special ties,
with Japanese stores receiving Chinese trainees and selling Chinese goods.
A Chinese Consulate was opened in Nagasaki in 1985 as a result of lobbying by
Nagasaki, and a direct cargo-shipping route from Nagasaki to Fuzhou was opened
in 1990. Air services between Tokyo and Shanghai and Tokyo and Beijing fly via
Nagasaki and link it to the political and commercial capitals of China.
The formal relationships that Nagasaki SNGs have with Fujian and other SNGs
in China including Omura City’s ties with Minhang in Shanghai appear to provide
Nagasaki with a useful stepping stone into the economic powerhouse of China’s
southern coastal strip up to Shanghai, which is almost parallel with Nagasaki.
Some in Nagasaki worked hard to reopen the route to Shanghai, with local banks
and industry forming a ‘Shanghai Club’. Nagasaki Prefecture opened its office
in Shanghai in 1991 and does not have a formal sister-type relationship with
Shanghai since the prefecture already has an official tie with nearby Fujian and
there is the connection between Omura and Minhang into Shanghai. This exam-
ple illustrates the utility of the sister-styled ‘friendship’ programme in providing
the opportunity to make connections in one part of a country to open the door for
developing connections in another part.
Nagasaki SNGs may be exceptional in the range and depth of their linkages with
counterparts in China. The prefecture’s historical connections since the Edo period
when Chinese traders came to Nagasaki port and its geographical perch on Japan’s
western seaboard make China’s coastal strip an obvious target for bilateral rela-
tions, especially when the opportunities for mutual reward are strong. But beyond
the strong economic ties, a diverse range of ‘cultural exchanges’ – academic, sports,
artistic and medical programmes – have been developed to cultivate and extend
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these relations. And there is another reason for these firm connections since
Fujian province, according to the Nagasaki website, is the main source of Chinese
nationals living in Nagasaki.42 However, like Nagasaki, all of Japan is close to
China. It is not surprising, then, that with the Chinese economy booming and with
shared cultural and historical interests, there is a groundswell of interest among
Japanese for cultural exchange with Asian neighbours, particularly China.43 This
makes fertile soil for development of sister-styled friendship linkages between
Japanese and Chinese SNGs as attested by the boom through the 1990s.
Australia: an asymmetrical relationship
Australia is very distinct culturally and historically from China. Yet from the
1980s, it became a major destination for Japan’s sister-city programmes in the
Asia–Pacific region. Japan’s twinning arrangements with Australia began in 1963
between Yamatotakada City in Nara Prefecture and Lismore in New South Wales.
Following the general trend in Japan’s sister-city relationships, there were few in
Australia in the 1960s and 1970s, with only 11 municipal-level agreements and
none at the prefecture–state level. But the 1980s saw a huge rise in these numbers.
Of the six state–prefecture agreements in place by 1993, five were signed in
the 1980s, and the other (Okayama–South Australia) in 1993. At levels below
prefecture–state, the pace was even faster; some 50 agreements were signed in the
1990s, about double the number signed in the 1980s, and 12 agreements were
signed between February 2000 and October 2002. These data indicate Australia’s
popularity as a destination for sister-city relationships with Japanese counterparts.
Japan is Australia’s number one trading partner and the source of a vast flow of
inbound tourists and study of Japan and Japanese language is strong at all levels of
education in Australia. When we compare Australia with Canada, both middle-
power nations and important exporters to Japan, we see Australia has many more
sister relationships with Japan than has Canada. Canada had 69 while Australia had
105 in April 2003. All Australian states have an official link with a Japanese pre-
fecture, but in 2003 only one of Canada’s 10 provinces, Alberta, had such a link.44
Recognizing Australia’s population and the size of its economy, Australia has
proportionally many more sister relationships with Japanese SNGs than any other
country does. The relatively high level of SNG sistering with Australian counter-
parts indicates that more than in any other bilateral context, both the Japanese and
Australian sides seek diverse partnerships with an institutional basis. We see how
diverse the purposes of the partnerships can be when we compare the Australian
and Chinese examples since both nations are very popular among Japanese SNGs
but are very different from each other in many respects, including their relations
with China. Yet one similarity here appears to be quite significant: both Australia
and China were booming in their economic relations with Japan when the boom
in SNG partnerings was at its strongest.
The results of a survey in the late 1990s found the Japanese and Australian sides
have rather different motivations for these relationships. O’Toole’s study of this
survey divides sister-city relationships into three interlinking categories: associative
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activities that include international understanding and culture, reciprocal activities
such as educational and other exchanges and commercial activities that focus
on tourism, trade and investment. He found that for the Japanese side, sister-city
relationships are directed primarily at the first two categories, whereas the
Australian side was more inclined towards the third category.45
Many policy-makers at state and city levels in Australia believe that sister-city
ties should try to introduce local business communities to each other to forge
business links and joint commercial activities.46 A visiting official from the inter-
national division of Okayama Prefecture was surprised to find that the South
Australian side of its sister agreement was more interested in exploring business
and commercial opportunities than cultural and educational exchange activities.47
When this author questioned a range of local officials in Japan, including some
in CLAIR, about sister partnerships for commercial purposes, the consistent
response was that these officials felt SNGs might serve as facilitators but not as
initiators of business links and that business people exclusively should deal with
business issues. Yet despite this apparent difference in the expectations of each
side, the number of relationships rose in the 1990s and new ties continue to be
established. This is especially surprising when the overall trend of SNGs is
towards consolidation and in some cases even stagnation as the most recent
CLAIR data suggest.
It appears that in the case of sister relationships with Australian counterparts,
the institutional framework satisfies both sides since their interests, even if
slightly different, are easily reconciled. Both sides recognize the long-term invis-
ible gains from this soft form of diplomacy with spillover effects on political and
economic relations and on both public and private participants.48
‘Cold War’ neighbours
Two of Japan’s closest neighbours, Russia and North Korea, offer examples that
contrast with the Chinese and Australian examples, to some extent because the
Japanese national government still views both neighbours largely through a Cold
War lens even in a post-Cold War global environment. Here, sensitivity abounds.
With Russia, Japan has diplomatic relations but the two have still not signed
a peace agreement after the Second World War since they cannot resolve a terri-
torial dispute.49 The Japanese government sticks to the principle of seikei
fukabun, insisting that politics and economics are inseparable, so at the national
level Japan will not fully cooperate with Russia economically while political
issues remain unresolved. The bilateral relationship in 2004 is far less tense than
it was during the Cold War period, but very little progress has been achieved since
dismantling of the Soviet Union, despite a number of summit meetings between
the two sides. With North Korea, Japan does not have diplomatic relations and the
former remains a closed communist state. The bilateral relationship has soured
badly while unresolved issues have festered, including North Korea’s abductions
of Japanese nationals and its clandestine nuclear programme. The launching of
missiles towards Japan in 1998 particularly disturbed the Japanese people.
78 International exchanges: a soft approach
International exchanges: a soft approach 79
The approaches of Japanese national and subnational governments towards
these two nations appear to be vastly different particularly on the part of the larger
SNGs that are geographically closest to these nations. The national government
has maintained an inflexible attitude driven by hard-nosed strategic thinking
towards these nations, while some SNGs have for decades taken a more pragmatic
‘soft’ approach, initiating a range of cultural and economic programmes to
engage their neighbours. Sister-city programmes are a formalized part of this
approach, which SNGs believe will help to open doors to other activities and
eventually lead to improved relations at the national level. We can observe three
fundamental differences between the two levels of government in their relations
with northern neighbours, which is why the national government has at times
resisted SNGs’ actions. The first concerns interests; SNGs are aiming to satisfy
local interests, which during the Cold War diverged from what the central
government perceived to be national interests, although the inconsistency is now
less so. The second is approach – soft diplomacy for the SNGs and hard diplo-
macy for the national government. The third is capacity. I have noted earlier in
this chapter how SNGs can act as they do because of their status – they do not
represent or act in the name of the nation – and because they have better access
to grassroots connections than the central government does.
Russia
Six prefectures and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (with Moscow) have
affiliations with Russian counterparts. Japan’s largest northern island Hokkaido has
half of all Japanese sister-city links at municipal level with Russia – 17 of 33 in
April 2003 – and Hokkaido Prefecture is linked with Sakhalin, so Hokkaido is our
focus here.50 The central government’s rather rigid views on the bilateral territorial
dispute during the Cold War period could not prevent SNGs in Hokkaido attempt-
ing to develop what SNGs saw as ‘good neighbour’ relations with their neighbours
in the Soviet Far East, establishing sister ties even when diplomatic relations at the
national level remained tense. Governor Yokomichi Takahiro of Hokkaido provided
a classic example in 1990 when he signed an agreement on partnership between
Hokkaido Prefecture and the Soviet Union, an ‘extraordinary’ move by the head of
a provincial government in Japan to enter into an agreement with the Chairman of
the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers.51 Hokkaido has reasons for seeking these
friendships. It is geographically very close to Sakhalin and the four disputed terri-
tories, and has a long post-war history of progressive local leaders keen to develop
relations with socialist neighbours.52 As Steiner noted, ‘Japan’s “frontier” may also
have been receptive to progressive appeals, or less receptive to conservative mobi-
lization methods, because of its distinct social and political history’.53
Williams has discussed various types of exchanges of people between
Hokkaido and the RFE within the ambit of ‘soft’ diplomacy that includes sister
or sister-type linkages. Some of these linkages were surely not just a soft cultural
approach and carried clear political overtones. For example, both of the ‘joint
declarations’ signed in 1972 for the affiliations between Kitami and Polonaisk
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cities and between Wakkanai and Nevesk cities included a clause aimed at
‘promoting the conclusion of a Japan–Soviet Peace Treaty’, and came just before
the first round of peace-treaty negotiations between the foreign ministers of Japan
and the Soviet Union in October 1972. Williams observed, ‘One can surmise that
these “joint declarations” were timed to pressure both the Japanese and Soviet
governments to conclude a peace treaty successfully’.54 We may question whether
the SNGs’ declarations could actually pressure their national governments to shift
position, but surely these sent unambiguous signals about SNGs’ aspirations
to all who observed. Exchanges and cultural visits with political significance
have also taken place outside the sister-type framework. For instance, in October
1967, a delegation from Sapporo, Otaru, Asahikawa and Nemuro, comprising
municipal officials and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and labour
groups, visited Sakhalin to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution. Their counterparts in Sakhalin made similar visits to Hokkaido for
the Sapporo Winter Olympics in 1972.55 Hokkaido maintained sports exchanges
with Khabarovsk, Primorye and Sakhalin in the early 1970s while Cold War
tensions soured relations at the national level. In the 1980s, initiatives included
the ‘Journey to Sakhalin’ programme (1981) and the ‘Peace Boat’ (1985).
However, in early 1989, the Japanese government vetoed an invitation from
Takinoue Town to the Russian inhabitants of the Northern Territory to participate
in a popular springtime Japanese cultural event. The national government feared
that this type of activity might be seen as legitimizing the Soviet occupation of the
islands. Here, we see an example of conflict between what the central government
perceived as national interest and what an SNG perceived as subnational interest
and tried to pursue through soft cultural programmes. Although the central gov-
ernment does not control the SNGs in their sistering and cultural programmes, it
can do as it did with the four disputed islands, construing any SNG exchanges
with the islands as potentially signalling Japan’s recognition that the Northern
Territories are part of Russia. Indeed, any action within sister-type relations that
works against what the national government perceives to be the national interest
could draw regulatory control or at least admonition by the national government.
But with the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Japanese government
mitigated its resistance to the soft approach of the progressive leader and agreed
to support grassroots exchanges as a way to help create an environment that might
lead to resolving the Northern Territories dispute.56
North Korea
Whereas Hokkaido SNGs have been active in the RFE, other SNGs have taken
initiatives to develop cordial grassroots relations with North Korea. Progressive
local chief executives tried to engage the socialist countries in Japan’s neighbour-
hood during the 1970s and 1980s and more recently newer local chief executives
have followed this approach. Governor Minobe Ryokichi of Tokyo, for example,
was instrumental in engaging North Korea through a number of initiatives that
included visiting the country in 1971.
Niigata City also maintains relatively close relations with North Korea. Since
1959, it has served as the main port for the ferry service for returning North
Korean emigrants. Mayor Watanabe Kotaro of Niigata City officially visited
North Korea in 1972, while serving as President of the National Mayors
Association of Japan (Zenkoku Shichokai). He held extensive discussion with
North Korean President Kim Il-Sung for more than three hours, making a rare
event in international affairs with a local government leader conducting diplo-
macy with an extremely inaccessible national leader. Niigata has also sent a num-
ber of delegations to North Korea and relations are close to the extent that
residents in Niigata report proudly that children in North Korea who do not know
the location of Tokyo can point to Niigata on a map.57
But neither Hokkaido nor Niigata featured in the landmark development on
14 May 1992 when two port cities, Sakaiminato in Tottori Prefecture and Wonsan
in Kangwon Province signed a ‘friendly city’ agreement. A number of SNGs in
Niigata and elsewhere have relations with North Korea, but for Sakaiminato the
compulsion for a formal linkage was especially strong. Other cities on the Japan
Sea coastline have deep-sea ports that enable them to trade with a number of
countries, but Sakaiminato’s shallow waters enable only smaller ships such as
those from Wonsan to enter port without difficulty. Sakaiminato’s economy
depends very much on this trade so it not surprising that the city’s mayor and
assembly members have actively promoted trade with Wonsan, under way even
before the Second World War.58 The central authorities in North Korea also
endorsed Sakaiminato as their preferred choice of affiliated city.59
The entire local assembly of Tottori was behind this diplomatic initiative
and generations of Sakaiminato people have been active in promoting relations
with Wonsan.60 As far back as in December 1971, the local assembly passed a
resolution to promote friendly cooperation between Japan and North Korea, and
in 1979 established the League of Councillors to Promote Friendship Relations
between Sakaiminato City and North Korea, the first of its kind in Japan.
In September 1990, the assembly issued a proposal for Japan to normalize
relations with North Korea and in March 1992 passed a resolution to establish the
friendly relationship with Wonsan, the only one between a Japanese SNG and
a North Korean counterpart.61
Although the local level was keen, the Foreign Affairs Ministry apparently
opposed the formal agreement.62 According to a retired Foreign Affairs official
who was a senior diplomat at the time, the Home Affairs Ministry intervened and
persuaded the Foreign Ministry to allow the agreement to go ahead. As discussed
in Chapter 2, Home Affairs resents interference by Foreign Affairs in SNG mat-
ters, as this example illustrates. In the event, while the official position of Foreign
Affairs opposed the agreement, some Foreign Affairs officials privately regarded
establishment of the friendship link as a pragmatic idea. They also recognize that
whatever the Ministry’s official position, Foreign Affairs has little institutional
capacity to regulate SNGs.63
Perhaps ironically, it is Tottori’s dependence on the central government that has
helped to inspire its leaders to seek opportunities outside Japan. Tottori Prefecture
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has Japan’s smallest prefectural population, and with geophysical features that
afford it very limited means for economic activity, Tottori depends heavily on
subsidies from the national government. Especially since Katayama Yoshihiro
became governor in 1999, Tottori has paid special attention to pursuing opportu-
nities in neighbouring countries including North Korea. During Katayama’s trip
to North Korea in 2000, officials of Sakaiminato supported the governor, sharing
their local knowledge and connections derived largely through the ‘friendly city’
affiliation with Wonsan to help build further contacts in North Korea. Governor
Katayama avows that he is not acting on behalf of Japan or the national govern-
ment and that he tries to serve the interests of Tottori in pursuing links at the
regional level in North Korea.64 Yet, he recognizes that what happens at the sub-
national level can significantly influence the national level and he believes that
the friendly tie between Sakaiminato and Wonsan helps to build trust between the
two nations from the grassroots level upward.65 He and other SNG officials have
worked strenuously to overcome sporadic difficulties, trying to make the ‘friendly
cities’ relationship an anchor for higher-level diplomatic relations. This friendship
tie clearly has both symbolic and practical diplomatic value.66
Here we see how Tottori has carved out for itself – by design, default or some
mix of both – what can be recognized as a strategic kitty of potentially great value
to the central government. It has used grassroots actions to develop relations with
North Korea (at both grassroots and national levels) partly formalized through the
friendly city agreement. It also seeks to develop knowledge, personal connections
and experience, especially relating to the Japan Sea Rim. The SNGs of Tottori
hope to make a valuable contribution to the Japan Sea region, to national diplo-
macy and to the nation. They would like the national government to respond with
interest and willingness to support their endeavours.
This would be a reversal in the flow of influence between the national and sub-
national levels since in Japan’s unitary structure of government, policy has gen-
erally been developed by the centre and passed down to the SNGs, encouraging
the national level to have little will and to believe it had little reason to learn from
SNGs. However, as we see in the case of Tottori, some SNGs are gaining influ-
ence and diplomatic leverage in international relations through their autonomous
decision-making and action. This challenges the top-down decision-making
structure of Japan’s political system. And as revealed in the examples of sister and
sister-type relationships with China, Australia and the ‘Cold War’ neighbours
examined here, some SNGs have been able to strengthen their position in relation
to the national government through the potential for greater economic indepen-
dence and diplomatic leverage that these international linkages can provide.
The JET programme
The JET programme is by any measure an extremely successful network of
international exchange, promoting internationalization in Japan’s local communi-
ties by helping to improve foreign-language education and developing interna-
tional connections at the community level. JET was launched by the national
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government in 1987 mainly as a counter-response to US criticism of Japan’s
growing international economic prowess but low international profile in political
and cultural realms. JET has mushroomed into one of the world’s largest educa-
tional and cultural programmes that connects Japan with one quarter of the
world’s nations, initially through young people at grassroots level.67 SNGs imple-
ment the programme in cooperation with three ministries – Home Affairs, Foreign
Affairs and Education – and CLAIR, as discussed in Chapter 2. Under the JET
programme, young participants come to Japan mostly to work in either of two
capacities for at least a year: (1) CIRs who work with the international divisions
of SNGs, experience the inside workings of Japan’s political and administrative
systems and may facilitate formal or informal connections to the CIR’s home
country; or (2) ALTs who work in high schools helping Japanese teachers to teach
the ALT’s native language.
The programme has expanded enormously in almost all respects. Its 847
participants from four English-speaking countries in 1987 multiplied into 6226
participants (speaking French, German, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, Italian,
Korean and many other languages) from 47 countries in 2003.68 Despite financial
stringencies in most areas of public spending in Japan, the budget for the JET
programme has ballooned from about $100 million in initial years to about $400
million in the late 1990s.69 A new category of Sports Exchange Advisors (SEAs)
was added in 1994 to promote international contact through sports, but this has
not been institutionalized or expanded greatly as with the other two categories,
and SEAs are request-based. In 2004, around 2000 SNGs, close to two-thirds of
Japan’s 3200 SNGs, accepted JET participants.
CLAIR materials and even some academic publications about the JET
programme suggest that it operates through a top-down decision-making process
run by the three main ministries and CLAIR.70 Yet, there are indications that
SNGs have relatively independent involvement. First, SNGs are not bound to
participate; they do not have to accept JET participants in their localities and
do so only of their own choice. As noted earlier, about two thirds of all SNGs
accept JET participants. Second, as CLAIR brochures advise, ‘Each participant’s
assignment (including placement and duties) within each Contracting
Organization [the SNG] is determined in accordance with the assignment plan
that is prepared autonomously [emphasis added] by each governor or mayor’.71
SNGs have considerable room in designing the involvement of JET participants
to meet the distinctive needs of SNGs. The national government does not impose
rigid rules or a one-size-fits-all formula on SNGs since successful implementa-
tion of the programme requires flexibility so that local needs can be taken into
account most effectively. Third, SNGs are financially responsible for their
involvement. They receive special grants from the national government through
the LAT mechanism, but they pay for participants’ remuneration and travel
expenses through their own budgetary process. Fourth, SNGs indicate their pref-
erences for the countries from which they want to draw their participants and the
programme’s central administration tries to accommodate these requests as far as
possible. SNGs are not directly involved in recruiting their own participants but
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SNG staff work in CLAIR offices in the seven countries where the bulk of JET
participants originate and their representatives sit on the selection panel
representing SNGs’ interests. Arase’s study found that SNGs on the Japan Sea
side that pursue cooperation with counterparts across the Japan Sea draw a size-
able number of their JET participants from China, Russia, or South Korea and
many of these participants work in the international divisions of prefectural and
city offices to facilitate the Japan Sea cooperation process.72
Literature about the JET programme generally acclaims the role of CLAIR, the
ministries and the JET participants. The instrumental role of SNGs in imple-
menting, financing and contributing enormously to the programme’s success is
often not acknowledged. Neither is another element that is crucial to the JET
programme’s rapid expansion – recognition by many SNGs of the programme’s
real utility while SNGs seek to manage their own internationalization under con-
ditions of globalization inside and outside Japan. Increasing numbers of SNGs
see that the JET programme can serve their local interests well by providing direct
support for both foreign-language teaching and development of international con-
nections at various levels, which SNGs use to help manage and further develop
their international engagement. This is a core reason why SNGs have come
on board with JET and have contributed hugely to the triumph of this programme
in grassroots cultural diplomacy.
Effectively, the participating SNGs see their involvement in JET as getting
value for money. After 16 years and over 40,000 people from across the world
sojourning (in a few cases remaining long-term) in local communities in Japan,
there are loads of examples of the broad range of cultural, economic, diplomatic,
strategic and other benefits that SNGs derive from the JET programme. One of
many examples from McConnell’s book illustrates how the JET programme can
lead to valuable international linkages for SNGs and others involved. McConnell
explains how the JET programme was at the forefront of reviving historical and cul-
tural links and establishing friendship ties between two cities in Japan and China.
The arrival in Kagawa Prefecture of a JET Coordinator for International Relations
from Shaanxi Province in China in 1992 symbolized a 1200-year history
of exchanges between Kagawa and Shaanxi. The Kagawa governor and high-
ranking officials in the prefecture maintained interest in the CIR during his stay,
and after returning to China, the former CIR became closely involved in preparing
a friendship agreement between the two SNGs, signed in 1994. Since then,
Shaanxi and Kagawa have sponsored at least ten exchange events annually.73
Not every experience in such a vast international flow of people will deliver
great, or even any, benefit at all to both sides of the exchange. But overall, the
impact of the JET programme on developing goodwill, international understand-
ing and human cooperation is huge and immeasurable, especially when we take
into account the ripple effect of JET alumni. Many return to their home country
well-placed to cultivate grassroots interest and bilateral connections, especially
through working in Japan-related jobs, teaching Japanese language or about
Japan, or studying Japan-related subjects in graduate school. Some have stayed
in Japan working in various capacities and there have been many cross-cultural
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marriages.74 The JET Alumni Association (JETAA) with already more than
15,000 members serves to sustain the interest and linkages formed through
participation in the programme, thus extending the benefits that all parties may
achieve in the longer term.75
Just as SNGs have been instrumental in the success of the JET programme, the
JET programme has to some extent been instrumental in developing SNGs’
capacity and motivation to pursue productive international relationships. JET
contributes to Japan’s local and national diplomacy far beyond all initial expecta-
tions. For SNGs, it opens valuable channels to develop formal and informal rela-
tionships outside Japan. It provides human connections that can reach well
beyond the socio-cultural and into the economic and geo-strategic arenas. These
channels are two-way, bringing in practical expertise to help equip SNGs and
their local communities with the language skills and cultural knowledge needed
for beneficial international engagements, and sending back similar expertise on
Japan into local communities overseas when the JET participants return home.
Crucially, the JET programme is also designed to try to maximize mutual good-
will, an essential ‘soft’ ancillary to the practical capacity. And there is institutional
follow-up to maximize long-term connections. The JET programme therefore
prepares the way not only for SNGs and their local communities to international-
ize, but also for SNGs to develop further as capable, concerned and confident
international actors.
Conclusion
For the last half-century, Japanese SNGs have taken a pioneering role in devel-
oping various types of international exchanges with counterparts in other coun-
tries. They have worked on these programmes quietly, without national fanfare
and largely outside national foreign policy. Here, SNGs have led the way with a
soft approach to international affairs. They have used international exchanges to
undertake ever more diverse grassroots activities in pursuit of local interests,
while the national government has focused on the formal diplomacy of foreign
policy to achieve the economic, political and strategic objectives that it recognizes
as national interests. SNG leaders have shown audacity as well as foresight and
innovation in heading out on an international route. They have judiciously used
legal and constitutional silence on SNGs’ international engagements to bypass
restrictive controls that the national government exercises over SNGs through
Japan’s centralized government structure.
Progressive leaders at the local level in the 1960s and 1970s began to link their
communities to others outside Japan through people-to-people diplomacy, largely
via sister-city relationships. More SNGs responded to propitious international
and domestic circumstances from the 1980s, with a strong flourish of sister
relationships to make grassroots international connections for various types of
mutual benefit. The national level responded with a soft approach by default – but
in what has become a class act of cultural diplomacy – in 1987, with establish-
ment of the JET programme. The JET programme has continued to balloon only
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with the close cooperation and major contributions from a large bulk of SNGs,
which recognize opportunities for local as well as national benefit from this
programme.
Discussion here of sister/sister-type linkages and the JET programme has
revealed how the two main types of SNGs’ international exchanges are rooted in
a similar philosophy concerning the value of international linkages at the grass-
roots level, but these two programmes are administered differently. Sister cities
are independent operations, initiated and managed by individual SNGs through
their own resources. These relationships are generally with tacit oversight but
without intervention by the national government, although as we have seen in
SNGs’ sister-type relationships with ‘Cold War’ neighbours, the national govern-
ment attempts to lay a firmer hand on these operations when it perceives that they
are out of alignment with national interests or articulated national policy. Even
then, the national government does not speak with one voice; the Home Affairs
Ministry has supported SNGs at times when the Foreign Ministry has preferred
SNG withdrawal from what the Foreign Ministry sees as contentious ‘inter-
national diplomacy’ that is its exclusive bureaucratic sphere. The ‘friendly city’
linkage between Sakaiminato in Tottori Prefecture and Wonsan in North Korea
offers a clear illustration. The JET programme, on the other hand, is centrally
managed and coordinated by three national-government ministries with coopera-
tion from, and administration by, CLAIR. The now two-thirds of Japanese SNGs
that participate in the JET programme also contribute administratively and finan-
cially. They act with some independence, particularly in determining how the
JET participants will be involved on the ground in their locality to best support
local needs.
In both the sister-city and JET programmes, SNGs have been able to do what
the national-government bodies sometimes cannot do. Inside Japan they work
at the local level closer to the people and so have experience and access to
resources that the national level does not have. They also act without the official
diplomatic baggage that is attached to national-level actors in an international
context, which has enabled SNGs to achieve in some instances – such as connec-
tions with the RFE and in 1970s Communist China – what the national govern-
ment could not. More and more SNGs have not just the capacity but also the
political will to make international connections for a variety of benefits to both
sides. They have taken international exchange well beyond symbolism into prag-
matic engagements that involve cultural, economic and geo-strategic connections
and influence national and local policies. Many SNGs have responded with
vigour to the call for ‘internationalization’ and have harnessed it creatively to the
concept of international exchange. In this spirit SNGs have pursued sister ties,
JET and other informal programmes, to meet local needs, create opportunities for
their localities and establish their own role as international actors that contribute
positively both to the Japanese nation as well as to their local constituency.
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Chapter 3 explored the pioneering role of Japanese SNGs as international actors in
their own right through a soft approach to international affairs, known as interna-
tional exchange. This chapter turns to a type of SNG international engagement
that has a harder strategic edge. It has drawn SNGs more actively into the inter-
national arena, parallel with and occasionally lubricated by, the sister-city
arrangements. This type of international engagement is generally labelled kokusai
kyoryoku or international cooperation. Generally programmes and projects
emerging from these engagements have a more strategic edge than most of the
sister-city arrangements since they involve practical, hands-on, and much-needed
contributions by SNGs to the national foreign-policy effort.
International cooperation by SNGs evolved with the emergence of a new set of
ideas, policies and institutions particularly through the late 1980s and 1990s.
Developments were formalized and propelled from the early 1990s by MOHA
that introduced a new slogan in the local government lexicography, ‘Koryu kara
kyoryoku e’ (from exchange to cooperation). At this time, uncertainty about
Japan’s new international role as a regional and global power in a multilateral
post-Cold War world challenged the Foreign Ministry in managing the nation’s
foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry had put forward the term kokusai koken
(international contributions) to encompass succinctly and in a politically palatable
way, Japan’s more diverse international participation, carried out by a more diverse
array of Japanese actors outside the Foreign Ministry.
The growing involvement of SNGs in international-cooperation programmes
therefore has a double edge of symbolism. First, as an assertion by SNGs and their
central-government body MOHA, it symbolized the push by some SNGs to gain
greater autonomy from the central government in their role as international actors.
The slogan ‘Koryu kara kyoryoku e’ signalled to unyielding policy-makers of the
central government outside the Home Affairs Ministry, particularly in the Foreign
Ministry, that some SNGs had the wherewithal – both political will and practical
capacity – to operate as legitimate international actors. Timing was important here
since the central government needed ‘contributions’ from SNGs to make Japan’s
‘international contributions’ to an evolving, post-Cold War international order.
Second, the development signals a strategic shift in the nature of SNGs’ interna-
tional engagements beyond the soft approach of international exchange. What was
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initially the diplomatic symbolism of sister-city programmes for some SNGs has
evolved to include the instrumental contribution of many SNGs to the national
foreign-policy effort through their own cooperative arrangements and through
their part in the nation’s ODA communities. The latter role makes SNGs ever more
important partners to the central government in Japan’s international diplomacy,
since ODA is a vital part of Japan’s international engagements.
The national government has established an institutional framework so that it can
to some extent manage SNG involvement in international cooperation and the
Foreign Ministry can maintain a firm hand on the nation’s foreign-policy rudder.
Nevertheless, for many SNGs, international-cooperation programmes have been
a vital part of building their international experience, identity and political autonomy,
while they take a more active and independent role in international relations.
Funding for SNGs to participate in or undertake international-cooperation
programmes comes generally from three sources: the national-government budget
through the LAT mechanism, allocations from the budgets of the Foreign Ministry,
JICA and JBIC, and allocations from SNGs’ own budgets for wide-ranging cooper-
ative activities. Significantly, many SNGs take creative initiatives that draw on their
distinctive capacity and experience at the local level and on the valuable coalitions
they have built with a range of actors locally, nationally and internationally.
This type of international involvement has developed the domestic profile of
SNGs as irreplaceable contributors to Japan’s national programme of international
cooperation. SNGs use their involvement in these programmes to portray them-
selves as international actors in their own right, not just as subaltern lower levels
of a national government whose interests may not necessarily coincide with SNGs’
local interests. By early 2002, a leading newspaper, the Daily Yomiuri reported that
‘An increasing number of local governments – from tiny villages to major cities –
are becoming involved in international activities and projects comparable to those
assisted by the central government’s official development program’.1 Media,
business, government and the Japanese people have come to acknowledge and
accept the expanding roles of SNGs in international cooperation and by extension
the significant roles of SNGs as international actors in their own right.2
In many ways the role of Japanese SNGs in international-cooperation
programmes resembles the roles that some of their European and North American
counterparts have been performing from the post-war period, in conjunction with,
and independent from, their central governments. European SNGs have pursued
with increasing vigour a programme of international cooperation that the
international cooperation of Japanese SNGs now resembles.3 We should not be
surprised by this development since in virtually all countries where SNGs are
involved in international activities, the SNGs have begun to move into these types
of international-cooperation programmes. The examples of SNGs outside Japan
provide both useful precedents and valuable SNG networks that facilitate the
work of Japanese SNGs in international cooperation.
I present two arguments. First, involvement in international-cooperation
programmes has stretched the international role of Japanese SNGs well beyond
soft cultural activities into a strategic realm that was previously the exclusive
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domain of national government. This has brought SNGs more firmly and visibly
into the formal fold of Japan’s international diplomacy and has helped to legit-
imize SNGs’ domestic status as international actors. Push and pull factors are
both at work here while the forces of globalization and its consequences reshape
the local, national and international political landscapes. SNGs seek to pursue
local interests, policy autonomy and their conviction that they can take on signif-
icant, innovative roles in international affairs and help their counterparts in other
countries. The Foreign Ministry, in response to the dramatic changes driven by
globalization and the financial squeeze from prolonged national recession, has
been forced to move beyond its exclusive approach to foreign-policy management
towards a pluralistic approach to policy and actors, and thus a reallocation 
of foreign-policy roles. The Ministry accepts increased SNG involvement in
international-cooperation programmes since unlike most other possible actors,
SNGs not only have resources, expertise and valuable connections, but are also
likely to comply with the directions given by the national government. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, SNGs are themselves ‘government’ actors (even though
MOFA claims it does not regard them as ‘government’) below the national level
and to some extent are financially beholden to their central paymaster.
My second argument takes us to a core concern of this book, that is, the
consequences of this work reallocation for SNGs’ relations with the central
government. The involvement of SNGs in international-cooperation programmes,
especially in selected ODA projects, has served to connect the central government
with SNGs as partners in an important area of Japan’s foreign policy. The central
government needs SNG contributions at a time of increasing interdependence
between most actors in the international arena. Thus, formal allocation to SNGs
of some responsibility for conducting these official aid programmes enhances the
position of SNGs in their relations with the central government, as indicated by
some of the examples I discuss in this chapter.
First, I examine briefly the slippery concept of international cooperation and
SNGs’ interests and motivations for participating. I then consider the growth of
SNG involvement in international cooperation and how this has been institution-
alized in various stages from the 1970s. Next, I look at the types of international-
cooperation programmes that SNGs pursue, with examples engaging Japan’s
immediate neighbours in Northeast Asia and Russia. These are Japanese SNGs’
most common partners because of their geographic proximity and because they
present as natural destinations for the types of cooperation programmes that
Japan’s SNGs are keen to pursue.4 I then turn to recent developments in national
ODA policy that formally recognize SNGs’ role in Japan’s ODA programme,5
exploring how complex changes have forced both better coordination between
local and national actors and a greater role for SNGs and other grassroots actors
working cooperatively in this area of foreign policy. I conclude by relating the
two arguments mentioned above that I develop throughout this chapter to the two
central questions pursued in this book: what does this development mean for
the conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs and what are its implications for the
national–subnational relationship?
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Conceptualizing kokusai kyoryoku
Inside Japan there is considerable ambiguity, among those who work in this area
and in the writings on this subject, about the language referring to these interna-
tional programmes.6 Two terms in particular are used, sometimes interchangeably:
kokusai koryu (international exchange) and kokusai kyoryoku (international coop-
eration). The meanings of these terms share much. Koryu and kyoryoku both sug-
gest symmetry between partners, here the SNGs in Japan and partners overseas,
and mutual agreement; there is no hint of imposition in these actions. Both terms
can refer to movements of hardware and software – material goods, information,
people and ideas – in this case across national borders and the benefits are seen to
be mutual: mutual understanding and knowledge and enhanced economic and
social development. Both terms are therefore relatively politically benign.
However, there is an important distinction between these terms, as conveyed by
the apposite Japanese literature and during my interviews with SNG officials and
MOHA advisers who generated the slogan ‘Koryu kara kyoryoku e’. Koryu tends
to imply something symbolic, whereas kyoryoku has a more pragmatic edge. It
appears that koryu was put forward in the early days of sister-city programmes to
highlight their symbolic goodwill. We can therefore understand MOHA’s support
for use of ‘Koryu kara kyoryoku e’ from the mid-1980s, since SNGs had extended
their sister-city and other international programmes far beyond diplomatic symbol-
ism and internationalist ‘feel good’. The slogan was to help propel this shift by
SNGs from symbolic, mutually rewarding activities with international partners to
actions that signify a ‘cooperative’, supportive, and by implication more strategic,
engagement on the Japanese side. The slogan thus signalled a new stage in SNGs’
international activities as they began to think strategically of their own aims as inter-
national actors and their contributions to the nation’s international diplomacy.
Another aspect of ‘kyoryoku’ (cooperation) also needs explanation. Whereas
the term can convey mutuality of sharing and benefit, it can also have the con-
notation of ‘enjo’ (assistance) that responds to others’ needs, as in foreign-aid
programmes where the primary purpose is a unilateral flow of aid from donor
to recipient. Particularly from the late 1980s, SNGs’ involvement in kokusai
kyoryoku has been expressly to provide assistance to others outside Japan,
through their own resources and increasingly through their involvement in
national ODA projects that SNGs now help the central government to deliver.
Considerations of symbolism/pragmatism, mutuality/unilateral flow and sharing/
giving inevitably create confusion for identifying and talking about the interna-
tional programmes of SNGs. There are no hard-and-fast rules of language in this
domain and some SNG officials explained to me that often officials in charge of
a specific project decide on the most appropriate label after considering the
project’s overall picture, including monetary value, aims, partner and format.7
These nuances in the language highlight how SNGs carry out international
cooperation in two distinct realms. One is the cooperative framework between
SNGs for mutual learning and problem-solving with foreign counterparts. Some
SNGs have found collaborative arrangements with their foreign counterparts very
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productive while they struggle to stretch tighter budgets to fulfil their administrative
responsibilities to citizens, perform more administrative tasks that the central
government hands down to them and manage their local economies efficiently –
all the while trying to maintain their hold on government. Many Japanese
SNGs increasingly rely less on the national government to address specific
problems and instead seek resolution through transnational coalitions of SNGs
that share their concerns. These collaborative arrangements for problem-solving
and information-sharing involve SNGs in a range of nations regardless of their
level of economic development.
The second realm of SNGs’ international-cooperation programmes usually
involves more explicitly unilateral assistance by Japanese SNGs and has two
forms. One is the various types of ‘assistance’ such as technical cooperation, that
are initiated and funded by SNGs independently of the national government, and
are often referred to as local ODA ( jichitai ODA).8 The second is SNG involve-
ment in delivery of the national ODA programmes where SNGs work in partner-
ship with the national government. Responsibility for international cooperation
through technical assistance and foreign aid still rests with the national govern-
ment, but SNGs are assuming more comprehensive roles as the national system
for delivering ODA is reformed.9
With ‘local ODA’ international cooperation, SNGs provide largely independent
assistance, outside the national ODA programme and sometimes outside formal
partnerships such as sister-city arrangements. Some SNGs use local ODA to pro-
vide support for counterparts in nations that are not officially eligible to receive
Japan’s national ODA, demonstrating these SNGs’ practical and strategic capac-
ity to act independently of the Foreign Ministry and the national foreign policy.10
Carrying out independent programmes places SNGs in a better position to be
part of national ODA when opportunities arise. In recent years, many SNGs have
made some of these independent cooperation programmes mutually beneficial
rather than narrowly outward assistance, as we consider later in this chapter.
Increasingly, however, SNGs provide assistance through the national ODA
programme. They work in cooperation with the central aid agencies such as JICA
and JBIC, or simultaneously with central and other levels of government,11 or in
association with local community groups such as NGOs, educational institutions
and other citizen groups.12
The first realm of international cooperation – collaborative problem solving – is
particularly useful for SNGs to carry out effective administration at the subnational
level. It also helps to strengthen SNGs’ autonomy from the national government,
since here SNGs are acting in a largely independent and self-designed capacity.
But it is in the second realm of international cooperation – aid-giving – that much
of our discussion will focus since it is here that SNGs are trying to carve a new
role for themselves in an area that was earlier the exclusive domain of national-
government actors. SNGs’ involvement in foreign-aid giving has profound
consequences for the SNGs and for their relations with the national government,
since it can generate not only international goodwill and international connections,
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but also economic cooperation and commercial spin-offs. These programmes
raise the profile of SNGs within the community by dispatching people from local
communities in Japan to assist with training in communities abroad, and bringing
trainees from different parts of the world into local communities in Japan. These
human flows give the programmes a visible and palpable form. Recent pluralism
in ODA policy now offers opportunities for local organizations such as NGOs,
educational institutions and individuals also to be involved.
As with sister-city relations, some prefectures and cities are more active than
others in international-cooperation programmes. Influences upon the extent and the
nature of SNG involvement in these programmes are complex. They include the
preferences and capacities of local leaders, the localities’ historical links and
geographical location, local interests, capacities and needs and the willingness of the
local administration and ultimately the local constituency to help people in other
countries by providing local know-how, experience and resources. Influences on the
choice of partners for these programmes are also complex, but especially in the
realm of enjo through local ODA, partners are predominantly in neighbouring coun-
tries. This is quite significant for what it suggests about distribution of geographic
responsibility in aiding Asian countries, between the national and subnational levels
of government that to some extent work cooperatively here. Japan’s national ODA
programme has a bulk of projects in South Asia and in 2003, India became the
number one recipient of Japanese ODA. But South Asia is beyond the strategic
framework of SNGs’ involvement in local ODA as SNGs focus on supporting their
counterparts in the immediate neighbourhood in the Asia–Pacific region.
SNG motivations for international cooperation
A mix of factors ranging through altruism, idealism and enlightened self-interest
motivates SNGs to participate in international cooperation. Some of these pro-
grammes are undertaken in a spirit of giving and sharing to help people in other parts
of the world using local strengths and expertise. Some programmes are explicitly to
gain economic, political or strategic advantage for the SNG and those it represents,
and deliberately or otherwise, for the Japanese nation at large as well. Usually both
motivations are involved. We cannot be surprised that SNGs pursue international
cooperation to gain for their own locality since they finance these programmes from
the public purse, whether through the SNG’s own budget or the national budget.
Some cooperative arrangements result from sister-city or other official ties
where both parties feel they have lessons to learn from each other’s experiences, in
fields ranging from agricultural production, manufacturing, and city management,
to human resource development and environmental protection. For example,
Kumamoto City and Heidelberg in Germany both rely on groundwater as their
sole source of water and the two cities have worked together on water conserva-
tion programmes since 1995. Their sister-city tie was established in 1992 on the
basis of this shared concern.13
A few SNGs with specialized knowledge and skills have established institutions
to share their strengths with others, although large-scale institutional arrangements
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are fairly exceptional. In 1980, Kitakyushu City formed the Kitakyushu
International Techno-cooperative Association (KITA) to promote the city’s
capacity to provide international assistance in environmental management14 and
Yokkaichi City in Mie Prefecture established the International Centre for
Environmental Technology Transfer (ICETT) to promote environmentally sound
international passage of technology.15 Both cities have strong banks of expertise
in managing industrial pollution after suffering severe environmental degradation
from heavy industry during Japan’s early post-war industrialization. These insti-
tutions conduct their own research projects funded by a range of government and
private bodies, and provide international training and technical cooperation on
behalf of both their SNGs and national aid agencies such as JICA. Commercial
spinoffs for the locality are not a stated purpose of these institutions, but in inter-
views with me, SNG officials observed that technical training and cooperation
programmes can have commercial value for their locality since recipient SNGs
are likely to order products from local suppliers within the institutions’ locality.
Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City have valuable experience in city reconstruction
following one of the largest earthquakes ever experienced in the prefecture in
1995. Both SNGs have extended help to overseas destinations that experienced
similar destruction, including Sakhalin (Russia), Turkey, India and Taiwan.
Hyogo and Kobe provide training programmes in disaster prevention and other
activities in disaster management throughout Asia–Pacific nations, both as part
of the JICA training programme and in their independent capacity.16 Similarly,
Minamata City in Kumamoto Prefecture in southern Japan has been willing to
share with similarly afflicted overseas SNGs the lessons learned from its experi-
ence of residents who suffered mercury poisoning from factory wastes flowing
into Minamata Bay in the 1970s. In 2000, the city received nine trainees from
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia who spent three
months in Minamata City learning about environmental management and
protection.17 A JICA official opined that the altruism behind Minamata’s
programmes of sharing its lessons with other Asian SNGs to prevent a repeat of
Minamata’s misfortune is similar to that of Nagasaki and Hiroshima cities as
they aim to spread the message of peace internationally through the anti-nuclear
movement.18
Undoubtedly, there is genuine altruism and idealism as SNGs mount these
programmes. Yet clearly self-interest is at work here too, as we must expect while
SNGs draw from the public purse for these programmes. SNGs are political players.
They recognize that some citizens in their locality do not favour giving selflessly
to others outside Japan, especially when financially, times are relatively tougher
under economic recession at home. SNGs also recognize that some citizens do
not fully appreciate the unvalorized benevolence that these programmes generate
as an investment in goodwill in the future when it might be of great value to the
donor SNG. Therefore pragmatism inclines SNGs to pursue these programmes
for some economic gain for their locality and for some political gain for SNGs
themselves. This is particularly so as these programmes have become much more
instrumental than symbolic.
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Various types of international-cooperation programmes yield economic gain
over time for the SNG’s locality, and SNGs pursue such programmes precisely for
this reason. The examples I mentioned above of Kitakyushu’s KITA that promotes
environmentally-sound international passage of technology, and Yokkaichi’s
ICETT for international cooperation in environmental management, both open
opportunities for commercial gain within these localities through commercial
spin-offs. Indeed, there are many examples of programmes that have led to valu-
able commercial opportunities for SNGs to develop. The abacus project between
Yokota in rural Shimane Prefecture and Roiet Province in Thailand, helped by the
Minsai Center in Tokyo, began as a simple educational programme to enhance
reading, writing and arithmetic ( yomi, kaki, soroban) using Japanese abacus in
some local Thai schools. It resulted in a national ODA project supported by JICA,
which brought economic and other benefits to Yokota whose abacus industry was
on the verge of extinction.19 Misumi Town, which is also in rural Shimane and
specializes in traditional paper-making technology, cooperated with the Kingdom
of Bhutan by passing on this technology, a move that resulted in reviving the
traditional industry in Misumi.20 These two examples of economic spin-offs
for SNGs in rural Japan point to the potential value of these programmes in the
national context of attempts at rural revival as the consequences of globalization
diminish the economic and social livelihood of many rural areas.21
Political gains are less noticeable but they are surely important for the SNGs.
These gains are largely concerned with empowering SNGs vis-à-vis the central
government, and are thus particularly valuable for SNGs seeking to strengthen their
autonomy. Participation in international-cooperation programmes gives SNGs new
roles and channels for influence within the domestic power structure via the
connections they make in the international arena. First, international-cooperation
programmes create or lubricate practical international linkages that can also have
diplomatic value for SNGs, especially when the centre needs to draw on SNGs to
access these connections. Second, through these programmes SNGs have built
domestic coalitions that include not only other Japanese SNGs but also some of the
central agencies such as JICA and JBIC that now work closely with SNGs. We see
here how SNGs’ participation in international cooperation gives them new oppor-
tunities for alliance building within and outside Japan, which SNGs can use for
leverage in their relations with the national government.
A third political consequence of these programmes concerns their symbolic
impact on SNGs’ domestic political profile. SNGs recognize that participating in
international cooperation helps to build the image of SNGs as capable and inde-
pendent actors in Japan’s foreign relations. This is an area of national political life
that some SNG leaders claim should not and cannot be the exclusive domain of
the central government, especially while the Foreign Ministry is pressured to
manage diplomatic affairs while the nation takes on more, and more complex,
roles in the international arena and SNGs are well placed for greater involve-
ment.22 Thus a mix of motivations ranging across the pragmatic and the practical,
the symbolic and the instrumental, the pursuit of mutual benefit and of altruistic
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unilateral giving, work alongside self-serving political and economic interests in
shaping SNG involvement in international cooperation activities.
The post-war evolution of subnational international 
cooperation in Japan
Like sister-city arrangements, the post-war history of international cooperation
at the subnational level in Japan can be divided roughly into three decade-long
stages. Generally we find that in the first two decades, the 1970s and the 1980s,
much of this cooperation was for SNG problem solving. The concern here was
for sharing and resolving local problems collaboratively, with benefit for all
participant SNGs. This was not cooperation for providing unilateral assistance or
enjo, nor really for expanding the role of SNGs in Japan’s foreign policy. These
motivations gained real momentum only from the late 1980s, when SNGs began
to realize that they could offer valuable support to other SNGs outside Japan
through their independent programmes of assistance. SNGs were also drawn
further into delivery of the national ODA package and into coalitions with other
domestic and international actors that strengthen the SNGs’ position in relation to
the national government.
The first stage is the 1970s, marked by the aftermath of intense industrialization
with Japan’s transition from high to stable economic growth. SNGs were then try-
ing to cope with the socio-environmental consequences of particularly vigorous
economic growth. Their initial moves towards international cooperation were there-
fore motivated by their need to address local problems that they saw their counter-
parts in other countries also trying to address. Progressive leaders headed a number
of local government administrations and could see that the central government was
unwilling and unable to work seriously to resolve these problems at the local level.
Their lead was followed by other local chief executives in subsequent years.
Some Japanese cities hosted international conferences to facilitate exchange of
ideas and policy approaches in specific fields. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government
set the ball rolling in 1972 with the ‘World Big City Convention’ in Tokyo focusing
discussion on participants’ shared concerns about environmental pollution, housing
problems and transportation. In 1984, Shiga Prefecture hosted an international
conference on water quality and lake management to further develop bilateral and
multilateral networks with overseas counterparts,23 in 1985 Tokyo held the World
Major City summit, and in 1987 Kyoto held the World Historical City summit.24
Some international meetings for cooperation had significant diplomatic import,
providing channels for communication and trade that for diplomatic reasons could
not be carried out at the national level. For example, the Japan–Soviet Coastal
Mayors’ Association (since 1992, the Japan–Russia Association of Mayors of
Japan Sea Coastal Cities) was established in 1970 at the initiative of Niigata City,
with 20 member cities. Its aim was international exchange and cooperation
between these Japan Sea SNGs and local administrations in socialist bloc
countries. Cooperation through this association demonstrated how governments
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below the national level could establish productive international ties even while
Cold War animosities had ruptured ‘official’ contacts at the national level. In
2004, 26 Japanese cities were members of this association. Its counterpart on the
Russian side is the RFE Siberia–Japan Association comprising 18 cities. Similarly,
the Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan–North Korea Friendship
and Trade Promotion was held in 1972 at the initiative of Niigata, and now some
20 Japanese cities participate in this process as cities around the Sea of Japan aim
to engage North Korea.25
The 1980s saw expansion of this international collaboration concept. Efforts
were still practical, instrumental and in pursuit of shared problem-solving, under-
scored by the notion of mutuality. The distinctive trend at this time was towards
institutionalizing collaborative linkages inside Japan. One clear manifestation was
the ‘Local Exchange Group Concept’ (kyokuchi koryuken kozo), initiated by
a group of opinion leaders (chishikijin) from a number of SNGs and later incor-
porated in both SNG policy and national policy concerning SNGs. This concept
melded national and local interests in a policy approach aimed at establishing
geographic blocs such as the Japan Sea Rim, to revitalize and promote Japanese
localities through international exchange and cooperation at the SNG level.26 Here
was the understanding that these international linkages would generate economic
opportunities that groupings within Japan could help to maximize.
From the 1990s, SNGs’ involvement in international cooperation activities has
expanded in a direction different from the earlier periods. Some of the catalysts
have been the national government’s reports on reform of ODA policy, which
recognize and formally incorporate the capacity of SNGs and other actors. These
policy moves have legitimized the involvement of SNGs and other actors in inter-
national aid delivery at a time when the national government has needed their
contributions in delivering the ODA programme. The policy changes have not
made SNGs major players in ODA delivery and do not preclude SNGs from pur-
suing their own international-cooperation programme for collaborative problem-
solving or enjo outside the national ODA programme. However, drawing SNGs
more closely under the regulatory framework of national ODA policy has allowed
the national government to adopt a more comprehensive approach to institution-
alizing and coordinating the work of SNGs within the national ODA programme.
Most SNGs have been at least willing, and some very eager, to diversify their
international roles in this direction. Above, we considered how the early 1990s
slogan ‘Koryu kara kyoryoku e’, ‘from exchange to cooperation’, encapsulated
this philosophical and practical shift in SNGs’ international activities and their
readiness to move into strategically oriented action. Indeed MOHA affirmed the
new role of SNGs and its ministerial support for their international-cooperation
programmes by proclaiming 1995 as the foundation year of international cooper-
ation (kokusai kyoryoku gannen). These conceptual and institutional shifts in the
third phase have therefore generally been consistent with the will of both national
and subnational levels of government.
The shifts have significant implications for relations between the two levels of
government and for relations within each level of government, especially since
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the third party, the aid recipient, is outside Japan, which increases the diplomatic
import of these arrangements. Although the involvement of SNGs in the ODA
programme is limited, it nevertheless increases the central government’s dependence
on, and capacity to oversee, SNGs in this area of work.
In the first two phases, SNGs initiated and conducted most of their own
international-cooperation programmes involving international assistance with some
support from central agencies such as JICA. In the third phase, where technical
and other types of assistance and participation in aid delivery have become a key
element of SNGs’ activities in the international arena, the central government
supports much of the SNG actions. It provides stronger budgetary and institu-
tional support, including through international cooperation centres established in
municipalities across Japan. SNGs’ inclusion within the formal institutional
framework for aid delivery, labelled as ‘international cooperation’, has helped to
make these programmes much more common in most Japanese localities.27
Institutional framework to support alliances or networks has been established
for SNGs’ involvement in all three types of international cooperation: problem-
solving, ‘local ODA’, and the national ODA programme. Some institutional
arrangements effectively serve the objectives of all three since they provide the
space in which actors with shared interests can meet, discuss and garner useful
ideas for implementation.
Problem-solving as international cooperation
Some SNGs have formed their own bilateral or multilateral alliances to share
ideas and information and exchange technological know-how best suited to their
own local needs. The Sapporo City Office in Hokkaido serves as the secretariat
for the International Association of Mayors of Northern Cities, whose main task
is forging cooperation among member-cities on shared problems arising from
their cold locations. Issues include city planning, housing, winter transportation,
winter tourism, snow clearing, pollution and countermeasures for natural disas-
ters. As of November 2001, 19 cities in 10 countries belonged to this associa-
tion.28 The Association’s genesis is a network formed in 1981 by then Mayor of
Sapporo, Itagaki Takeshi. As Sapporo City officials explained, finding solutions
to local problems through overseas contacts has helped to increase the local
autonomy of Sapporo City by decreasing its dependence on the national govern-
ment for solving problems that are anyway relevant only to the colder northern
part of the nation. These officials opined that their colleagues’ comments suggest
that elsewhere in Japan, too, transnational coalitions of SNGs that share similar
concerns have enabled SNGs to rely less on the national government and more
effectively address local issues.29
Tanaka Naoki, a high-profile public commentator, reveals a similar view in
his claim that the central government housed in Kasumigaseki in Tokyo is
inevitably divorced from environmental and social systems best suited to partic-
ular localities that are distant and different from the national capital. He illustrates
his argument with the example of how the central government has been inept in
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dealing with housing and energy issues in Hokkaido since its plans are based
on wrong assumptions about climate. Tanaka discusses the Northern Region
concept (Hoppoken koso) initiated by the Hokkaido Prefecture through its third
Comprehensive Development Plan in 1971 as one arrangement enabling SNGs and
local groups to develop new knowledge through exchange of information overseas.30
Another example of a transnational coalition of SNGs successfully addressing
shared concerns through information sharing and joint research is Takasaki City
in regional Gunma Prefecture. In 1995, Takasaki City established a multinational
study group on global environmental problems, in association with partner cities
in the United States, Brazil, China and the Czech Republic. Project results were
posted on the Internet for wide accessibility. This initiative led to several cooper-
ative multilateral research programmes, and has been used as a precedent by other
Japanese cities. In Okinawa, for example, several island SNGs from South Korea,
China and Indonesia came together to consider tourism in their island settings and
embarked on cooperative arrangements such as joint marketing and exchange
between tourism operators of each of these islands.31 These examples illustrate
Japanese SNGs’ initiative and productive involvement in international-cooperation
programmes with counterparts in both economically developed and economically
developing nations for problem solving and mutual benefit through sharing infor-
mation and experience. They also indicate how the transnational coalitions serve
to enhance Japanese SNGs’ independence from the central government and give
the SNGs a valuable diplomatic reward – an extensive network of international
connections and international goodwill – that can also serve the SNGs in their
relations with the national government.
SNGs’ local ODA and national ODA as 
international cooperation
We noted above that SNGs are now involved in two types of international aid
delivery: (1) local ODA, funded from the SNGs’ own budgets and resources and
initiated and implemented independently by SNGs; and (2) the national ODA
programme funded through the national budget, where SNGs work in partnership
with the national government’s agencies and other actors. A few SNGs have been
involved in small-scale technical cooperation or assistance programmes for many
years.32 However, involvement of all types of SNGs in national ODA delivery has
grown enormously from the 1990s. This was inspired by the central government’s
efforts to reallocate practical implementation of the nation’s huge ODA programme
as efficiently and effectively as it can, drawing on a diverse range of domestic actors
that the central government administers, regulates and coordinates while maintain-
ing overall responsibility through its agencies. ODA has been one of the principal
grounds for the Foreign Ministry and its agencies’ decentralization efforts.
According to one informed estimate, in the early 2000s, each prefecture carries
out about 10 projects annually, either through their own resources or in cooperation
with central government ODA projects. This means that each year prefectures alone
implement about 500 international cooperation projects that deliver international
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aid. Municipalities also carry out at least this number of projects, making the
number of aid projects implemented by SNGs each year more than 1000, at
a moderate estimate.33 Such extensive SNG involvement has seen SNGs coming
to be regarded as a valuable part of Japan’s foreign-aid delivery community.
The central government has included SNGs in national ODA delivery largely
because they have the expertise and experience most needed for these projects
and which the national government does not possess. The types of ODA projects
involving SNGs are those that draw on this local expertise and experience, includ-
ing environmental conservation and protection, health care, education, agricul-
ture, disaster relief and protection of cultural assets. These are all part of the
SNGs’ routine functions. The national government allocates most projects
according to the SNGs’ ability to mobilize specialized expertise and personnel
and make use of distinctive regional characteristics that suit the needs of the
partner region as recipient.34
From here let us turn to see how this discussion of the SNGs’ expanding role
in ODA plays out in practice. I have chosen as illustration examples of interna-
tional cooperation with China, Russia, South Korea and North Korea. Many
Japanese SNGs favour China and South Korea for conducting local ODA because
of their geographical proximity and the rich opportunities they present for bene-
fit on both sides of the cooperation. North Korea provides instructive example of
SNGs taking international action where the Foreign Ministry and national foreign
policy are limited in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two national
governments. Russia is Japan’s closest neighbour geographically and very close
to the localities of the Japanese SNGs surrounding the Sea of Japan – SNGs
that have actively sought to improve relations with Russia, despite the national
government’s rigid attitude towards Russia. We mainly consider the work of
SNGs in prefectures adjacent to the Japan Sea since these SNGs particularly
favour an eastward reach to Northeast Asia in their international activities.
The People’s Republic of China
As a very powerful nation on Japan’s geographic doorstep, China occupies 
a special place with Japanese SNGs. China has a burgeoning national economy
and shares cultural and historical links with Japan, as well as strategic interests.
About half of the international-cooperation programmes that involve Japanese
SNGs are with the PRC.
One of the most popular programmes conducted with cities and provinces in
China is caring for the physical environment.35 A particular concern of Japanese
SNGs has been to assist Chinese counterparts in pollution control and other
environmental management. Self-interest is clearly part of the motivation here
since pollution in China can have serious damaging effects on the physical envi-
ronment of Japan. A 1995 report by Energy Information Administration Japan
claimed that pollution from China was adversely affecting certain areas of Japan
and noted that for Kyushu, ‘In 1992, a reported 30 per cent of the total amount of
acid compounds released into the air by Chinese industries fell on the region.’36
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Kitakyushu City is linked to Dalian City through a friendship programme
established in 1979. Kitakyushu is renowned internationally for improving local
water and air quality after severe pollution problems in the 1960s. When rapidly
industrializing Dalian faced similar environmental degradation in the early 1990s,
the Kitakyushu SNG helped the Dalian SNG to develop an environmental protec-
tion plan that included passing on technological know-how for water-quality
improvement, waste-disposal management and other areas of concern. In 2000, the
Japanese national government chose Dalian as one of three Chinese cities (with
Chongqing and Guiyang) for the Japan–China Model City Plan.37 Here a coopera-
tive local aid relationship in environmental protection led to a larger grant through
Japan’s national ODA programme, establishing a precedent in Japanese ODA
history for bottom-up rather than top-down policy-making.38 The SNG project was
so successful that Dalian received a UN Environment Programme award in 2001.
Mutual interest in environmental cooperation is also evident in the flow of
Chinese SNG employees to learn from Japanese SNGs (42 per cent of the total
inflow of Chinese trainees in 2000 were for environmental programmes). Japanese
SNGs are generally keen to help train their Chinese counterparts, recognizing
their own vested interest in environmental clean-up in China. Japanese SNGs are
well placed to assist with this type of cooperation as they have considerable
expertise in dealing with pollution problems after their own experience following
high economic growth in the 1960s.
Industrial technology cooperation programmes with China take increasingly
diverse and creative forms, such as preservation of cultural assets in the Xixia
Wang Imperial Mausoleum project between Matsue City in Shimane Prefecture
and Yinchuan City in Ningxia Province. Medical programmes are also popular,
such as the donation of medical equipment by Toyama City in Toyama Prefecture
to Qinhuangdao City in Hebei Province. Town planning is also a valued area for
cooperation programmes, such as the preliminary survey for the ‘Dongjiang River
Information System’ carried out by Hyogo Prefecture for Guandong Province.
Training programmes are particularly popular, with Japanese SNGs receiving
trainees and dispatching technical staff to provide training in a range of educa-
tional programmes, mainly through JICA. China dominates as recipient of
the SNGs’ training programmes. In 1994, Japanese SNGs received some 3250
trainees (41 per cent from China) and dispatched around 440 technical person-
nel to developing countries (53 per cent to China).39 China also dominates the
local-government officials training programme: in 1996, 14 of 50 officials from
10 countries; in 1997, 21 of 67 officials from 11 countries and in 1999, 37 of 80
trainees from 17 countries.40 Many personnel training programmes are funded via
SHA’s LAT mechanism and form part of the ODA training programmes funded
from the national budget via JICA and directly from the MOFA.
China has strongest representation in the SNGs’ self-funded cooperation
programmes to support development in their overseas counterparts. A 2001 JBIC
survey of all Japanese prefectures identified 19 that were using their own
resources for development projects in developing countries including Nepal,
Indonesia, Thailand, Ghana and Brazil. Seventeen prefectures had one or multiple
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projects in China, concerning health, environment, agriculture, revitalization of
local economies, tourism, or ‘one village, one product’ movements.41 Many of
these cooperation programmes can be regarded as enjo, involving one-way flow
of technology and other assistance from Japan. Yet other self-funded programmes
by SNGs involve cooperation for explicitly mutual benefit, such as learning by a
range of local actors on both sides. This is in response to a new concern to secure
public approval from local constituents for the SNGs’ considerable expenditure
on these cooperation programmes outside rather than within their localities.
These expenditures are, after all, from the public purse and could be spent where
local constituents see more visible benefits.
The cooperation programmes by Niigata City and Niigata Prefecture in China
offer useful examples. With its finances shrinking due to Japan’s severe economic
recession, Niigata Prefecture explicitly supports projects that enable SNG prefec-
tural administrators to explain clearly to local citizens why the SNG is spending
their taxes to benefit people abroad and not on directly improving citizens’
livelihoods in Niigata at a time of greater financial stringency for many Japanese.
The focus of some international cooperation projects is shifting from purely
assistance (unilateral benefits for the recipient) to cooperation (mutual benefits for
donor and recipient) and partnership (e.g. with JICA). In collaboration with the
government of Heilongjiang Province, Niigata Prefecture has begun to impose
specific considerations on projects funded from either from the national budget or
from the prefecture’s own budget. These projects must now (1) have the approval of
local citizens; (2) be mutually beneficial; (3) generate new value; (4) be in the field
of social development; and (5) involve local citizens and groups as participants.
Two salient examples of these cooperation projects are the Heilongjiang
Province and Harbin City Medical Technology Cooperation Project (Kokuryuko-
sho Harubin-shi iryo gijutsu kyoryoku jigyo) and the Road Paving Technology
Cooperation Project for Cold Areas of Heilongjiang Province (Kokuryuko-sho
kanreichi doro hoso gijutsu kyoryoku jigyo). Both were carried out in 2001–04
under JICA’s grassroots technical cooperation projects, with funding from the
ODA budget, Niigata Prefecture SNG and Niigata City SNG.
The aim of the Heilongjiang Province and Harbin City Medical Technology
Cooperation Project is the two-way passage of medical technology through equal
partnership between Niigata Prefecture and Heilongjiang Province via its capital
Harbin City. Hospitals in Niigata, which are advanced in Western medicine,
provide the Heilongjiang medical centres with the technology to treat malignant
blood diseases such as leukaemia. Niigata receives information about new
medical technology using traditional Chinese medicine, in which the Chinese side
excels. The project therefore has potential to improve medical technology in both
Heilongjiang and Niigata – and by extension in China and Japan – thereby
improving the welfare of local citizens initially and at a national level in the
longer term as the modern and traditional technologies are passed on in their new
national settings.42
A group from the Niigata Prefectural Cancer Centre visited Heilongjiang
Provincial Hospital in October 2001 to conduct studies and academic exchange.
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During the visit, an expert from Niigata gave a lecture on the use of chemotherapy
for treating malignant blood diseases, which was well received by the many
Chinese who attended. This became an important catalyst for the cooperation to
take off. The Niigata Prefectural administration became the coordinator for the
project and the cooperation group was reconfigured to include non-government
actors in the locality with capacity to contribute effectively: representatives from
Niigata Prefecture’s major medical institutions such as Niigata Prefectural Cancer
Centre, Niigata University Faculty of Medicine and Niigata Citizens’ Hospital.
The prefectural government applied to the national government, which accepted
this proposal as a national ODA project.
The medical benefits of these projects between Niigata Prefecture and
Heilongjiang Province are primarily, or at least initially, for Chinese and Japanese
citizens. However there are other mutual benefits from international cooperation
like this that are not immediately obvious but may reasonably be expected to
result from the ‘local’ cooperation. These benefits include the positive connection
and personal linkages fostered between governments at both the local and the
national levels. And what may be priceless for both governments is the mutual
goodwill among citizens and opportunities for developing other connections that
these programmes tend to create. These potential outcomes are further reasons
why the central government is interested in involving SNGs in ODA-funded
international cooperation.
Russia
A territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over four islands north of
Hokkaido has stopped both sides from signing a peace treaty after the end of
the Second World War. The four disputed islands are under the jurisdiction
of Sakhalin under the Russian government, which opposes the Japanese govern-
ment’s claim to their sovereignty. Because of this dispute, Japan does not promote
economic cooperation with the Russian Federation (Russia), which in some ways
serves as an incentive for international cooperation at the SNG level. Postel-
Vinay notes that here ‘interlocal diplomacy has been building up at a notably
faster pace than state-to-state diplomacy: from 1989, officials of local govern-
ments in western Japan were visiting their counterparts several times per year,
whereas Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic visit to Tokyo – the first by a Soviet head
of state to Japan – only took place in April 1991’.43
Here we see significant diplomatic implications from cooperation at the SNG
level because of rupture between the national governments. With Russia, as with
China, these programmes are diverse. A distinctive feature is the enormous scale
of several of these projects and their explicitly commercial nature, particularly
where the SNGs are of Japanese prefectures and Russian regions. This feature
suggests that SNGs are taking up the lucrative development projects that the
national governments or private sector interests would likely take up if the bilat-
eral relationship were fully restored, pointing to how SNGs provide a valuable
surrogate role for the national government.
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The best known example of Japanese–Russian international cooperation
at subnational level is the huge cooperation programme drawn up by the Joint
Standing Committee on Economic Cooperation between Hokkaido Prefecture
and the Russian Federation Far East Region, involving a number of large, inte-
grated projects. Another is the ‘Cooperation to Develop the Sakhalin Continental
Shelf Oil and Natural Gas Project’, which includes training business managers,
providing transport for access, joint development of forestry, fisheries, natural
resource industries and economic information systems. The programme
comprises projects across far-eastern Russia, including 23 in Siberia, 22 in
Khabarovsk and 25 in Sakhalin. Hokkaido Prefecture has also created the ‘Plan to
Promote Economic Exchange between Hokkaido and Sakhalin’ and is promoting
cooperation in economics, transport, marine and forestry.44 Akaha notes the
willingness of the prefecture and provinces to cooperate ‘despite the bleak
prospects for a breakthrough’ in the territorial dispute between Japan and
Russia.45 The interests of local actors in economic and commercial benefits
dominate the cooperation agenda, rather than the national diplomatic–political
concerns that restrain Tokyo and Moscow. Postel-Vinay has observed that the
strong role played by SNGs is especially significant since here grassroots diplo-
matic relations help to compensate for very weak bilateral relations. The national
governments see the disputed territories as an insurmountable obstacle, whereas
the SNGs recognize their central governments’ intransigence as compulsion to
overcome the obstacles and work to promote their local cooperation.46
Niigata Prefecture, like Hokkaido, is close to Russia’s far-east coast. Niigata
drew up cooperation project plans with the Russian coastal areas and with the
Khabarovsk region in 1993 and with Irkutsk in 1994. This prefecture has for years
engaged in joint research into marine processing technology and exchanges of
public servants.47 Niigata is also playing a key role in developing port facilities in
the coastal region of the RFE. Hook speaks of this cooperation by Niigata as
‘ “Official Development Assistance” in all but name’.48 Toyama Prefecture
entered into an official friendship tie with the Primorsky region in Russia in 1992
and has since been expanding into economic, environmental conservation,
cultural and other cooperation projects such as holding ‘Seminars to Support the
Transition to a Market Economy’. The aim here is to prepare northern Russian
regions for future economic ties with Toyama Prefecture.
At a municipal level, the Mayor of Niigata served as secretary in the 1970
establishment of the Japan–Soviet Coastal Mayors’ Association. The Association
(now the Japan–Russia Coastal Mayors’ Association) has a membership of
26 Japanese cities and 18 Russian cities. The Association was formed to expand
goodwill and economic cooperation between the cities of the Japan Sea coast and
those of the RFE and Siberia.49 It has promoted exchange and cooperation between
the SNGs on environmental, urban and some commercial issues. Themes of the
Association’s international conferences have included mutual cooperation in tourism
and other economic projects and environmental concerns such as migratory birds.
Akaha and Vassilieva have observed a clear geographic division of labour
between Niigata and Hokkaido as the two prefectures most active in developing
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cooperation with the RFE. Whereas Niigata focuses on the continental Far East,
Hokkaido focuses on Sakhalin, as evident in their sister-city linkages and the
transportation links they have developed.50
Republic of Korea
With its remarkable economic development from the 1970s, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), graduated some years ago from eligibility to receive ODA.
There is, however, a strong programme of international cooperation that is not
enjo at the SNG level. Some Japanese observers from CLAIR notice as a distinc-
tive feature of cooperation programmes with South Korea, a strong motivation on
the South Korean side to develop multilateral cooperation to satisfy shared inter-
ests.51 The SNGs in South Korea have followed trends set by the Japanese side.
For example, the Korean Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations
(KLAFIR) was established in 1994, modelled after CLAIR. KLAFIR has an
office in Tokyo and liases closely with CLAIR in increasing numbers of joint
cooperative projects between SNGs of the two sides. There is also strong institu-
tional framework to support cooperative programmes through bilateral and
multilateral memberships that join different types of SNGs (e.g. provinces/
prefectures with cities) and join Japanese and South Korean SNGs with counter-
parts in the Northeast Asian region.
The Japan–Korea Strait Exchange Association of Governors of Coastal
Prefectures, Cities and Provinces is a well-known institutional arrangement for pro-
moting these programmes. It joins the prefectures of Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki and
Yamaguchi with the South Korean provinces of Chollanam, Kyongsangnam and
Cheju and the city of Pusan. Exchange and cooperation programmes are being devel-
oped in a variety of sectors including environmental technology, marine science,
tourism and other commercial areas of mutual interest.52 Exchanges of trainees
include the Toyama Prefecture–Kangwon Province ‘Cutting Edge Biological
Agricultural Chemicals Technology Traineeship’ (2002) and the Kitakyushu
City–Inchon City ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Technical Traineeship’ (2002).53
Another bilateral institutional arrangement promoting diverse practical
exchanges and cooperation in economic, environmental and other fields is the
Japan Sea Group Subnational Governments International Exchange and
Cooperation Summit, which was established at the initiative of Tottori Prefecture
and Kangwon Province. Both of these SNGs are also involved in creating the East
Asia Subnational Government Tourism Forum with eight other SNGs that include
Jilin Province in China, and counterparts in the RFE, Siberia and Central
Mongolia.54
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
The Japanese government and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North
Korea) do not have formal diplomatic relations. The absence of official diplo-
matic channels with North Korea adds an imperative to linkages at the SNG level
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and gives them a strong diplomatic edge, in some ways a substitute for national
relations. In 1972, Niigata City led the process to establish the Japan Sea Coastal
Cities Council for Japan–North Korea Friendship and Trade Promotion (Nitcho
Yuko Boeki Sokushin Nihon Kai Engan Toshikaigi), a group of 20 port cities
on the Japan Sea coast. The Niigata mayor serves as the Secretary General and
the Council office is based in Niigata.55 North Korea does not have a separate
organized presence in relation to this group but works through the Korean Society
for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Chosen Taigai Bunka Renraku
Kyokai).56 The Council has held General Meetings annually with the aim of devel-
oping goodwill, trade promotion and information exchange. It has provided a
vital venue for communication in the absence of official diplomatic relations.
Nevertheless, suspension of the meeting in recent years highlights how the SNGs’
initiatives are vulnerable to diplomatic developments at the national level.57
Sakaiminato City, which is a member of this Council, has the only formal
sister-city relationship with a North Korean counterpart, Wonsan City.
Sakaiminato City has developed soft cooperation through citizen-to-citizen
exchanges and cultural events such as the trilateral Children’s Pictures of Fish
Joint Art Exhibition, held in conjunction with Sakaiminato’s Chinese sister-city,
Hunchun. It is also promoting harder-edged economic cooperation in marine
products such as the first imports of Matsuba crabs to Japan. In 2002,
Sakaiminato received the Order of Goodwill Second Class Award (Shinzen
Kunsho Dainikyu) from the North Korean government as an official gesture of
appreciation for the city’s efforts. Tottori Prefecture, where Sakaiminato is located,
is also increasing its efforts towards formal cooperation with Hamgyongbuk
Province and Rason city through a multilateral forum. The Prefectural SNG
wanted to invite a North Korean representative to the Summit for International
Exchange and Cooperation between Regional Governments in the Northeast
Asian region. However, participation by North Korea did not eventuate given
the concern of many other Japanese members over North Korea’s clandestine
nuclear programme and abductions of Japanese nationals. Undeterred, Tottori
Governor Katayama frankly claimed that even without normalizing government-
to-government relations at the national level, exchange and cooperation between
local governments should be promoted.58
Northeast Asian multilateralism
Before leaving this discussion of instructive examples, let us turn finally to a
multilateral institutional arrangement with a membership of 39 SNGs from Japan,
China, Mongolia, South Korea, North Korea and Russia. This is the Association
of Northeast Asia Regional Governments (NEAR), which originated from several
informal conferences held between 1993 and 1996.59 The Association aims to
promote exchange and cooperation between the member countries in Northeast
Asia and mechanisms were set in place to encourage and sustain SNG coopera-
tion programmes.60 The Association has held a biennial conference since its
launch in 1996, and at the conference in Khabarovsk in September 2002, a
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Charter of NEAR was approved to provide the Association with a firmer
institutional basis to strengthen cooperation.61 Cooperative projects undertaken
by this multilateral sub-regional grouping involve information exchange, joint
research and education, the environment and sustainable development and
challenges facing small and medium-sized enterprises.62
Formalizing SNG involvement in international 
cooperation through ODA policy
For approximately a decade, Japan was the world’s largest foreign-aid donor.63
The central government administered the ODA programme, including economic
cooperation, through a highly centralized system relying heavily on its agencies
and quasi-government bodies.64 Yet, as we have seen in this chapter, during the
1990s an evolutionary change took place in Japan’s international cooperation at
both national and subnational levels. The central government needed to address
external concerns about its aid philosophy and internal criticisms about ineffi-
cient practice, especially while fiscal problems forced leaner budgets. At a time
when national-government policy-makers recognized the need to involve other
domestic actors as partners in aid delivery, SNGs were developing a keener
interest in becoming involved in these programmes.
Incorporating SNGs into the national ODA process therefore dovetailed SNGs’
pressure from below for a greater role in international cooperation, with the
national government’s pragmatic response from above to streamlining ODA
policy. Both levels of government have interests in developing partnerships for
delivering ODA through international-cooperation programmes. The central gov-
ernment still largely funds and seeks to direct aid programmes, but the SNGs are
gaining ever more capacity to shape the course of these policies and programmes
as they pursue the interests of their locality and their own more influential inter-
national role. Many have expertise, experience and local connections within and
outside Japan and recognize that they can now flex a collective SNG muscle to
influence the ODA programme.
Developments in ODA policy
Changes in ODA policy through the 1990s reflect the results of this pull from
below and push from above, creating an environment increasingly conducive
to the SNGs’ involvement in delivery of ODA as international cooperation.
More SNGs than ever before now seek a greater role in the nation’s ODA
projects through international cooperation. The nature of ODA programmes
has also shifted from mainly a heavy emphasis on large-scale traditional infra-
structure projects such as dams, power and transportation facilities, to provi-
sion of social infrastructure such as poverty-reduction programmes, human
security, human-resource development and environmental improvement. These
are precisely the areas where SNGs are well placed to contribute with expertise
and experience.
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Policy statements and reports through the 1990s, gave the official nod to SNG
involvement in ODA delivery as part of the new pluralization of this policy. The
1992 ODA Charter and the 1994 ODA White Paper noted the valuable role
of SNGs in ODA delivery alongside government and non-government bodies.
Yet, since the Foreign Ministry sees that the SNGs are, as the Japanese term sets
out literally ‘local authorities’ and not part of ‘government’, the Ministry casts
their status in aid administration as that of private bodies and treats them as 
‘non-government’. It also articulates that their role in the ODA programme is
ancillary. The Ministry sees SNGs as bodies helping to implement (ninaite) ODA
programmes, but not as principal actors (shutai).65 Statements from the Cabinet
Office (formerly the Economic Planning Agency) Committee on Economic
Cooperation Policy, Towards Sustainable Economic Cooperation in 1997 and
Towards Further Reforms of Economic Cooperation in 1998, recommended
greater involvement for SNGs.66 The Final Report of the MOFA Council on ODA
Reforms for the twenty-first century, released in January 1998, is largely consis-
tent with the Cabinet Office reports, proposing ‘contracting out’ international
cooperation where the central government allocates responsibility for certain
aspects of this work. SNGs are thus one of various types of contractors in deliv-
ering Japan’s ODA. A Cabinet resolution accepted the policy on ODA that
incorporated these reports, and subsequent trends in ODA delivery reveal this
policy is now in practice.
SNG partnerships with organizations involved in 
international cooperation
Japan International Cooperation Agency
JICA is one of the principal government agencies for managing and delivering the
technical cooperation or ‘soft component’ of Japanese ODA. In 1999, JICA
established a Domestic Projects Department to help strengthen the involvement
of SNGs and non-government actors through the ‘contracting out’ method.67
Particular types of international-cooperation projects have been targeted for
collaboration with SNGs, including those noted earlier where the SNGs have
particular capacity: environmental protection, medical care, agriculture, disaster
management and training of education and administrative personnel.
JICA surveys conducted through its regional offices across Japan identify
SNGs’ strengths and where they have a ‘competitive edge’ to run programmes for
trainees from developing countries.68 For example, the JICA office in Sapporo in
association with the Hokkaido International Center produced a comprehensive
report based on their surveys of localities in Hokkaido to identify which SNGs’
expertise could be used for programmes described as ‘capacity-building’ in devel-
oping countries.69 JICA has been increasingly willing to involve SNGs, with many
of its training programmes and projects for small-scale development partnerships
responding to local proposals.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, in October 2003, JICA was given a new status as an
‘independent administrative institution’ (dokuritsu gyosei hojin). Its new structure
and new leadership for the first time by a non-Foreign Ministry bureaucrat are
likely to give JICA more flexibility and willingness to work with a range of actors
including SNGs. The focus of JICA projects has been broadened to include
conflict prevention and peace building through development assistance and post-
conflict reconstruction to provide infrastructure, governance, economic recovery
and support for the socially vulnerable and those disabled by conflict.70 Many of
these are areas where the SNGs have shown great interest and capacity in their
international cooperation programmes. Assistance is offered not just to SNGs
overseas; Japanese SNGs have also carried out aid programmes at the national
level in recipient countries. JICA programmes under way in 2004 with support
from SNGs include mother-and-child health projects between Saitama Prefecture
and Indonesia and Chiba Prefecture and Mongolia, primary health-care projects
between Kochi Prefecture and China, and projects to prepare school textbooks
between Hyogo, Oita and Hiroshima prefectures and Ghana.71
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Where JICA is responsible for the technical training provided through ‘soft
ODA’, JBIC is responsible for yen loans, the ‘harder’ side of ODA. JBIC too has
shown considerable interest in involving SNGs in its cooperation programmes
and since 2001 has conducted survey research to inform its plans for collabora-
tion.72 JBIC loans are for constructing infrastructure in recipient countries.
Proper management of facilities after construction requires administrative skills
and procedures for which SNGs are well equipped to provide training. SNGs are
providing valuable support under the ‘contracting out’ system by encouraging
businesses in their localities to bid for projects funded by JBIC yen loans in their
overseas partner localities. Under the new JBIC–SNG partnership framework,
Kitakyushu is providing technical assistance to Chongqing (China) and Surabaya
(Indonesia) for waste management and is examining ways to pass on know-how
and technology to these countries.73 Similarly Gifu Prefecture is passing on
local knowledge for economic revitalization through ‘drive-ins to promote local
products’ (michi no eki-chiiki tokusanbutsu o hanbai suru doraibuin) with loans
through JBIC.74 Because of its expertise, Nara Prefecture is involved in a JBIC
‘road stations’ project at Buddhist sites in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, and
Akita Prefecture has been engaged to set up road stations in China’s Gansu
Province with which it has a sister relationship.75
National–subnational interface
The SNGs’ increasing involvement in international-aid delivery is not unique to
Japan. International organizations and national governments of most developed
nations now draw on the capacity of SNGs to assist in international-cooperation
programmes. This proceeds from an understanding that balanced development at
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the local level is crucial for successful aid programmes and the SNGs have the
expertise, personnel and experience to make major contributions to projects for
effective development of local-level communities.
Japan’s national government therefore has strong reasons for expanding the
role of the SNGs in international-cooperation programmes. First, SNGs have
considerable capacity to contribute to effective implementation of these pro-
grammes. This has particular significance at a time of budget cutbacks and
criticisms about inefficiency. Second, the SNGs have relevant expertise and are
well placed to help with coordinating these programmes and mobilizing support
from a range of actors on the ground including local NGOs, businesses, educa-
tional institutions and individuals. Third, SNGs are generally willing – or eager –
to take on these roles when the central government has allocated the necessary
funds and central government bodies are generally willing to have the valuable
contribution that SNGs can make towards collaborative international cooperation.
Here the national and subnational levels share interest in SNGs’ international
activity. Fourth, after several decades of collaboration with counterparts abroad,
Japanese SNGs are now well connected internationally and domestically in SNG
networks, which can also enhance their capacity to contribute to international-
cooperation programmes with developing countries. Nevertheless, although the
SNGs have certainly assumed a greater international role through involvement
in ODA as cooperation, the national government and particularly the Foreign
Ministry maintains the final and overall responsibility.
Challenges for SNGs in international cooperation
Even while SNGs’ involvement in international cooperation is further institution-
alized within the framework of central-government policy, there is greater space
for them to initiate and administer their own policies – for some, to specialize or
even lead in an area of cooperation – in response to changes in policy environ-
ments inside and outside Japan. Hyogo Prefecture, for example, is keen to become
a leading SNG in Human Security.76 Cultural, economic and political challenges
continue to confront SNGs as they extend their involvement in international
cooperation. Here we take up two that are particularly consequential: the place of
SNGs within the central government’s move to expand and coordinate contribu-
tions, and the public accountability required of SNGs when using public funds for
this endeavour.
Coordination and expansion of community contributions 
to international cooperation
Policy statements from both levels of government underscore calls particularly
for two new approaches to international cooperation. One is to extend participa-
tion in these programmes right across local communities. The other is to better
coordinate actors and their actions by coordinating programmes not just within
the administrative domains of SNGs but nationwide. Both approaches require
International cooperation: a strategic edge 109
a clearer division of labour and responsibility among those who are immediately
involved in policy coordination. They give SNGs a considerably more important
role in coordination and initiation of programmes, while still under the national
government’s direction and control.
Recent policy papers propose the ‘community-participation model’ of interna-
tional cooperation,77 with a clear role for SNGs in both generating and coordi-
nating participation at the local level and in, effectively, popularizing these
cooperation programmes inside Japan. The model sets out strategies that some
SNGs are already implementing to conduct their new role effectively. One is for
SNGs to carry out community-wide public relations to keep citizens informed
about the international cooperation projects under way in their local communities,
to develop broad-based community understanding, support and public partici-
pation. Second, SNGs themselves identify projects that can be delegated to
purpose-specific institutions – research bodies, universities, NGOs and business
groups – and to members of the public within the locality. Third, SNGs clarify the
selection criteria and review methods for projects in line with local conditions.
Fourth, SNGs explore new ways to strengthen both compensated and voluntary
involvement of a broad array of participants in cooperation projects.78 Better
coordination by SNGs requires local assemblies to hold regular public hearings
so that community members have a sense of participation, inclusiveness and
ownership. The attempts by Niigata SNG administrators, particularly in
programmes with the Chinese SNGs discussed earlier in this chapter, provide 
a useful example of how some SNGs are responding to the challenge.
Public accountability
Public accountability has a new urgency in this picture for two primary reasons.
First, as noted earlier, poor performance of the national economy has forced
continued domestic economic stringency, compelling actors at both levels of
government to satisfy public concern that their spending of public funds is well
managed and efficacious. Second, public concern must be satisfied in order to
achieve the broader community participation in the cooperation programmes that
both the government levels now have responsibility for creating. Members of the
public who accept altruism may want to see benefit at least to communities in
the receiving country; those with concerns closer to home, especially when their
own financial times are tough, will want programmes to deliver some benefit to
their own community and/or to their nation. With funding set to become a major
problem for international cooperation, both levels of government are keen to
incorporate financial and other input from a range of non-government bodies and
individuals.79
SNGs are aware that to increase public accountability for their involvement in
international-cooperation projects they need to establish systems to review pro-
jects thoroughly and enable free public access to information about the projects.
Some SNGs have considered forming public committees that include representa-
tives of local groups and the local community, and have input into SNG policy
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decision-making to reflect public opinion. Here we see the relevance of the
‘community participation model’ for reforming Japan’s international-cooperation
programmes and the role of SNGs in establishing new directions. The SNGs are
testing the potential fluidity of their position in this environment as they try to
best position themselves for strong roles in an international policy area where
they now have the proven capacity.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored the emergence of Japan’s SNGs in a new policy
arena that builds and diversifies international relationships at the local level. The
international cooperation that Japanese SNGs initiated in the 1970s for shared
problem-solving with international counterparts seeking mutual benefit took a
different direction in the 1990s, yielding a more structured and institutionalized
role for SNGs in national policy on international cooperation, particularly the
ODA, with support from MOHA and other national agencies such as JICA and
JBIC. Alongside the cooperative framework for mutual problem solving, in the
twenty-first century international cooperation also presents SNGs with a way to
help resolve international development problems, through programmes support-
ing environmental protection, human-resource management, education, agriculture,
technology, medicine and maintenance of what can be broadly defined as global
public goods. It is the major means by which SNGs make valuable contributions
to national foreign policy and forge their identity as capable international actors
in their own right. Clearly these developments have implications for the
national–subnational relationship and for the conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs,
even if these are largely unrecognized.
The central government has become ever more reliant on a range of domestic
actors that include SNGs for delivering international cooperation effectively and
efficiently, as part of its move to improve the national ODA programme. SNGs
have capacity and experience of working on the ground at the local level, which
the central government does not have. Again we see that SNGs are able to extend
their international roles because their work locates them closer to the people
than the more removed position of the central government, its agencies and
bureaucracies. SNGs are also without much of the diplomatic baggage that
constrains central government, a status that has enabled them to undertake some
extremely significant programmes in places where the central government is
unwilling to operate, such as we have noted between Niigata and a number of
SNGs across the Japan Sea, between Hokkaido and the RFE and between Tottori
and North Korea. Some SNGs also have an international network of local-level
connections that can be essential for initiating and implementing international-
cooperation programmes effectively.
SNGs’ involvement in a range of cooperative arrangements with their partners,
pursuing mutuality and reciprocity as well as enjo or assistance, has therefore
helped to position some SNGs with greater leverage in their relations with the
central government. SNG officials know that in this policy area they have what
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the central actors need and they can use this to try to gain advantages for their
locality. They can work to attract training projects in their locality through JICA
and to secure yen-loan projects for local businesses through JBIC by involving in
cooperative programmes a range of institutions and people from their locality, to
generate some financial benefit and usually substantial mutual goodwill.
The valuable role of Japanese SNGs in international cooperation for the
national ODA programme has both symbolic and practical consequences for the
conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs. It has brought many SNGs more visibly into
Japan’s official international diplomacy and has helped to legitimize the domes-
tic status of SNGs as international actors. Small SNGs like Yokota and Misumi
have come under the national limelight through their international-cooperation
programmes in abacus and papermaking. The national government, especially the
Foreign Affairs Ministry, has been forced to recognize and incorporate the role
of SNGs in this area of foreign policy after years of reluctance to share policy
territory with actors outside its own supervisory jurisdiction.
As the role of the SNGs in this area is recognized more widely in the interna-
tional community, particularly among potential ODA recipients, it is likely that
SNGs will also become a more important point of contact for ODA-related
projects rather than just the Foreign Ministry. The number of bottom-up ODA
projects such as in the Kitakyushu–Dalian example is likely to increase in the
future. Thus, unlike the top-down mode of the past, designing and implementing
ODA projects will not simply flow from the central government bodies down
to SNGs. Already there are signs of an emerging reverse-flow where some
projects are generated at the SNG level and worked up to the national level for
inclusion in the national ODA programme. The reverse flow of operations here
has major implications for national–subnational relations in this field of Japan’s
foreign affairs, and indeed, perhaps also for the conduct of the national ODA
programme.
The early 1990s slogan, ‘Koryu kara kyoryoku e’ symbolized a new era for
SNGs as international actors. Through international-cooperation programmes,
‘kyoryoku’ has pulled SNGs well beyond ‘soft’ cultural-exchange activities into
the realm of more substantive and wide-ranging cooperative programmes. These
also involve SNGs in the nation’s official aid delivery, and in ‘local ODA’, with
diplomatic and strategic implications. This interfacing between the levels of
government has come over time, and with little fanfare for SNGs. But it is a highly
significant step in the evolutionary change under way in the management of
Japan’s international relations overall, not simply in international cooperation. It
is also highly significant in expanding the capacity and the international role
of Japanese SNGs, since it has helped them to become instrumental as well as
symbolic players in one of Japan’s most significant foreign-policy domains.
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Trade and commerce are the international activities that many Japanese SNGs
facilitate most vigorously, both independently of central authorities and in conjunc-
tion with them. These are economic activities generally without major diplomatic
or strategic consequences for national policy, which de-sensitizes and legitimizes
this type of international involvement by SNGs in the eyes of the national gov-
ernment. Indeed, national-government actors share an interest in SNGs pursuing
economic ventures abroad since these ventures provide opportunities for local
and regional economic benefit that all levels of government are keen to develop.
In a climate where globalization of capital and markets has forced the market
imperative into most layers of government, many SNGs see that they have little
choice. Here is an opportunity for SNGs to address their need to create vibrant
local/regional economies while the central government has limited resources and
cannot micro-manage local economies.
Here we explore Japanese SNGs as international economic actors in their own
right, operating independently or in conjunction with actors from the central gov-
ernment and the corporate sector. We begin with examining why SNGs have
taken on this role, recognizing developments that have induced less restrictive
economic regimes inside and outside Japan and have oriented SNGs to pursue
overseas economic opportunities in this freer market environment to maximize
the interests of their locality. Case studies of individual SNGs and of geographic
regions comprising groups of SNGs illustrate distinctive international economic
strategies, both independently of the national government and in cooperation with
it. Our focus is mainly on SNGs on the periphery of national economic growth
that even now are less developed than the prosperous economic centres around
the Tokyo–Nagoya–Osaka Pacific belt on the archipelago’s main island.
These case studies illustrate the use of bilateral and multilateral arrangements
that, where the SNGs see the need, may bypass the central government. Bilateral
arrangements are naturally diverse given the diversity of the SNGs, their locations
and conditions. Hokkaido’s focus on the RFE is driven by considerations quite
different from those of Okinawa seeking economic opportunities through the
Pacific. Multilaterally, some SNGs form regional groupings to collectively pur-
sue their shared interests that are specific to regional needs, such as those of the
SNGs around the Sea of Japan.
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SNGs pursue various types of strategies to create conditions for more extensive
international economic engagements, through high-level trade missions, overseas
offices to develop and maintain economic connections, incentives for foreign
corporations to establish business in their locality and exploring possibilities
for economic links through official sister or partner agreements. The national
government’s moves to deregulate the national economy help to lubricate the
international economic path for some SNGs, as does the work of the quasi-
government body JETRO which has this mandate for the nation. In particular, we
turn to JETRO’s recently developed ‘Local-to-Local Initiative’ programme that
supports SNGs and regional businesses in developing economic opportunities
with international partners to secure local economic advantage.
Overall, the interests of SNGs pursuing local economic objectives abroad are
usually in alignment with the interests of the national government pursuing
national economic strength. However, some of the case studies reveal resistance
by central government actors where they perceive that SNG economic relation-
ships with partners in certain overseas destinations have the potential to harm the
national interest strategically, or intrude on what national bureaucrats perceive to
be their exclusive ministerial turf. Here the national-level actors try to bring
SNGs in line with national goals and objectives, but where the SNGs’ indepen-
dent policy orientations have conflicted with national policy directions, the SNGs
have determinedly pursued their local agendas to satisfy local economic interests.
SNGs as economic actors
The economic condition of their locality is a crucial matter to SNGs in Japan.
As SNGs elsewhere, Japanese SNGs seek to maximize their financial capacity to
run their administration effectively and to sustain a strong economic base that
provides economic growth, employment and prosperity for the well-being of
residents. These imperatives motivate SNGs to encourage profit-maximizing
commercial activities to prosper in their area, even while the SNGs are not them-
selves commercial organizations driven by the profit motive. To this end SNGs
now take up economic strategies that facilitate trade, investment and other com-
mercial activities. This move has new life – and a much broader, more competi-
tive reach into international markets – in response to the recession slowing
Japan’s national economy and the opportunities and pressures opened up by the
end of the Cold War and the globalization of markets and capital. Global compe-
tition has ‘hollowed out’ many Japanese industries, which has eaten into SNGs’
local tax bases and created unemployment, while the national government has
passed on further administrative responsibilities to SNGs without parallel funding
for this work.
Yet we must bear in mind here what each chapter of this book reminds us:
from post-war, the centralized nature of Japan’s unitary political system has
continued to limit the freedom of SNGs to take independent action. It long
compelled the SNGs to act largely as subservient units following directives from
the national government to serve what the central leadership in Tokyo determined
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as national interests. The SNGs were financially largely beholden to the central
government while it remained the major source of their annual budgets from the
public purse and regulator of their capacity to generate their own income through
local taxes and other local sources. Until approximately the late 1980s, only a few
SNGs acted stridently to pursue their own economic interests domestically or
through international markets.
SNGs have therefore long been competitors for their share of the national
economic pie that the centre is responsible for handing out. This ‘national economic
pie’ comprises not just budgetary allocations from the national public purse but
also the policies that endow a locality with opportunities to build economic
benefit. From post-war, SNGs across Japan have competed vigorously to attract
economic infrastructure and industries to their locality and draw the necessary
support from the national government through subsidies and policy decisions that
favour their localities.
Over time, other factors have fed into this competition among SNGs and
among the regions where they are located. One factor is preferential treatment by
the central government; some regions have thrived economically whereas others
have achieved comparatively much slower economic growth. Historical, political,
geographic and other considerations have worked in conjunction with SNGs’
capacity to compete for the national economic pie, producing regionally uneven
economic development across Japan. This has served to intensify inter-regional
competition: Kanto (Tokyo-centred) versus Kansai (Osaka-centred); the Pacific
growth corridor (Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka) versus the Japan Sea side (including
Kyushu, Niigata, Hokkaido); mainland Japan (principally Honshu) versus ‘outlying’
areas (including Hokkaido in the north and Okinawa in the south); and metropolitan/
urban versus rural/semi-rural areas.
Yabuno depicts the influence of central policy on regional development in the
‘umbrella’ and ‘rocket’ models, which explain the difference in regional experi-
ence. In the umbrella model, economic development through Tokyo has a positive
impact on some, generally nearby regional economies, pulling them into eco-
nomic strength of central prosperity under the umbrella. The rocket model
accounts for a very different experience of regional development where central pros-
perity enables Tokyo to rocket ahead without flow-on to regional centres, leaving
these regions behind to ‘eat the dust’ of the progress experienced in Tokyo.1 This was
evident when, despite various programmes through the 1960s to the 1980s purport-
edly to decentralize economic well-being, the centralization of government functions
drove many private enterprises to abandon headquarters in Osaka, Nagoya or
Sapporo and move to the capital region, creating ‘the Tokyo phenomenon’.2
The unequal distribution of wealth that the rocket model highlights is important
to the present discussion. Unequal distribution of wealth became the cause of
deep tensions between the have-most SNGs and the have-less SNGs, and
ultimately has influenced how and where the SNGs in both camps have pursued
economic opportunity outside Japan as actors in their own right. Some SNGs,
especially in peripheral areas, began to actively challenge the ‘over concentration’
of economic strength in Tokyo and demanded allocation of more resources for
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their areas.3 Hokkaido in the far north and Okinawa in the far south are within this
economic periphery; distinctive historical, political and geo-strategic circumstances
have served to hold these islands outside the main orbit of the nation’s Tokyo-centric
post-war economic growth. Yet, the most glaring economic disparity is between
the economically prosperous Pacific side of Japan and the areas surrounding the
Sea of Japan, pejoratively labelled ura Nihon (hidden or backdoor Japan) that by
comparison are relatively undeveloped. Under Cold War conditions, national
post-war policies favouring trade outward across the Pacific brought great oppor-
tunity and prosperity to the major centres on the Pacific side, while on the side of
the Sea of Japan, the closest trade partners were the then economically poor and
diplomatically disfavoured China, Russia and the Koreas.
However, post-Cold War conditions have dramatically shifted the strategic,
political and economic ground on which SNGs act, within and increasingly out-
side Japan. Domestic circumstances have pushed SNGs beyond their dependence
on the national government for financial support and policy directions. Pressures
have come from multiple sources including the domestic consequences of glob-
alization with demands for deregulation and liberalization and the ‘post-bubble’
national recession that has left localities in economic difficulties and prompted
the central government to reduce its subsidies, leaving SNGs financially strapped.
As Hook observed, ‘No longer able to rely upon the national government to
revitalize the local economy on a long-term basis, prefectural and other subna-
tional political authorities throughout Japan are being forced to develop their own
economic strategies.’4
International circumstances have facilitated moves by SNGs to stimulate local
economic growth by pursuing markets overseas, without the firm hand and
national policy directives of the central government. Post-Cold War geo-strategic
conditions have opened the way for Japanese economic actors to pursue economic
engagements in nations that were previously ‘off bounds’ within the Soviet/
communist blocs or their alliances in Asia and Eastern Europe. International con-
sequences of globalization have forced easier access into overseas markets for all
economic actors and opened the field to new types of economic actors that
include the SNGs. Another compulsion was virtually ‘knocking at the door’. The
Chinese economy has continued to boom from the 1990s in particular, presenting
what commercial operators including Japanese SNGs recognize as tremendous
opportunities for mutual economic gain with their Chinese counterparts. This is
particularly so while China’s economic takeoff is still in fairly early stages, with
potential for Japanese SNGs to cultivate longer-term benefit through helping to
shape the markets and other economic architecture that deliver rewards at a later
stage of development.
Another part of the international picture is also important. This is the precedents
of SNGs in Western nations, especially in Europe and the United States, that
showed Japanese SNGs how some of their economically strongest overseas
counterparts have successfully taken an international route to building the economic
strength of their locality, some since the 1970s, as noted in Chapter 1. Japanese
SNGs could see from these examples how operating directly in international
markets as economic actors in their own right, with international counterparts or
other economic actors as their partners, could serve the economic interests of
their localities very well. These actions could also serve the SNGs’ own political
interests.
The strategy would enable SNGs themselves to maximize opportunities for
local economic development in their locality through trade, investment and other
commercial arrangements with partners outside Japan, rather than deferring to
central government direction. SNGs have better working knowledge of the capac-
ity and needs of their localities and the central government’s policy directives are
sometimes clearly not in the localities’ best interests whether the centre’s policies
serve ‘the nation’ at large or indeed at all. The do-it-yourself strategy demon-
strated by overseas counterparts would therefore enable Japanese SNGs to develop
some financial and policy independence from the central government and their
own international connections that could offer the SNGs some useful leverage in
their relations with central government actors.
SNGs as international economic actors
The discussion above reveals why the Japanese SNGs have taken up strategies to
revitalize local economies through economic relationships outside Japan. But
what do these strategies involve? Cases discussed in this chapter reveal the broad
range of approaches, initiatives and institutional arrangements that SNGs use for
maximizing the capacity of their international efforts to build the economic
strength of their locality. Choices are shaped largely by the abilities and prefer-
ences of the people living in that location, who the SNGs represent and work to
support, as well as by economic capacities and geo-strategic concerns.
SNGs pursue these opportunities independently or through various types of
strategic alliances. They may form formal or informal ties with overseas counterparts
through multilateral regional groups, bilateral regional arrangements, sister-city and
other linkages. They may also form ties with domestic counterparts through
industry-specific or geo-strategically prudent linkages and other arrangements
that may or may not be formally institutionalized. To illustrate, I present case
studies of a major region (Kansai), a multilateral arrangement, the Japan Sea
Economic Group (JSEG), a bilateral arrangement (Hokkaido and the Soviet Far
East) and an individual prefecture (Okinawa).
Kansai: a region in search of its past glory
Most regions outside Tokyo deeply resent uneven economic development across the
Japanese archipelago and Tokyo’s stronghold on the nation’s high-profile facilities.5
Since post-war, the strongest regional rivalry has concentrated in the Kansai
region. Kansai was at the centre of Japan’s commercial activities through much of
the Edo period (1600–1868) and in the early twentieth century. Although post-war
it became one of the main beneficiaries of the umbrella model of economic growth
on the Pacific belt of Japan, Kansai never recovered its prime commercial status.
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One major strategy explicitly to restore the region’s lost commercial glory as
the national centre of international trade was to push mega public-works projects.
These were intended to make the region more commercially attractive to national
and international firms than the Tokyo metropolitan area.6 Projects included the
Kansai Science City and Osaka Bay Area Development Programmes and the
Kansai International Airport (opened in 1994 as Japan’s first round-the-clock 
airport) in a package of 882 projects under way in the early 1990s with a budget
of more than 42 trillion yen (US$400 billion).7 The region’s primary goal was
to restore Kansai as Japan’s main gate to global economic and commercial
activities. Kansai’s global approach contrasts with the regional strategies of
the SNGs left behind under the rocket model, such as those along the Japan Sea
Rim that have focused their economic attention on nearest neighbours like China
and Korea.
Within Kansai, Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City have been at the forefront
of economic and commercial activities.8 Economically huge with a GDP of
US$355.8 million in 1999, the size of Osaka’s economy ranked parallel with the
thirteenth among the countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Once Japan acquired the world’s largest trade surplus
and the national trade-policy emphasis was shifted from exports to imports, here
too, Osaka City took the lead. Osaka City in association with locally raised
capital built Japan’s World Trade Centre (WTC), the Osaka Building and the
Asia Pacific Trade Centre in the Osaka Bay area in the 1990s. In the recessed
national economy of the 1990s and beyond, when domestic capital was drying up,
Osaka attracted foreign investment by large foreign-affiliated companies
like Bayer AG, Universal Studios Japan and Carrefour that now operate in Osaka.
The Osaka Business and Investment Centre (O-BIC) established in 2001 by
Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, is the main organization promoting Osaka worldwide. Those in Osaka
promote the region as an alternative to Tokyo with comparative advantages in
office rental and other corporate expenses, tax cuts offered by the prefectural
government (business tax reduction for up to five years) subsidies offered by
the Osaka municipal government for market research, feasibility studies and
so forth.9
Kobe City in Hyogo Prefecture, which is also in Kansai, has been another
major player in the region’s economic revitalization. Famous for its entrepreneurial
initiatives that earned the city its sobriquet ‘Kobe Inc.’ (Kobe kabushiki kaisha),
Kobe has been at the forefront of plans to internationalize through international
trade and investment and has drawn high-profile international organizations such
as the regional offices of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to locate their
offices in Kobe.10 Kobe has limited its focus so narrowly that it has competed
vigorously not just against Tokyo overconcentration but also against ‘Osaka over-
concentration’ within Kansai.11 Kobe’s economic self-preoccupation has drawn
criticism and the ire of a number of anti-development movements. It amplifies the
response of cities that are aggrieved by the national government’s centralization
of resources and functions in Tokyo.12
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SNGs of large cities such as Osaka and Kobe that are within the geopolitical
orbit of Tokyo have been able to secure multi-billion dollar facilities and connect
themselves successfully to the global economy by using their political clout,
economic wherewithal and ability to mobilize local corporate support. They are
also well supported by the national government and fit neatly within the umbrella
model of development. However, SNGs of smaller or less powerful administra-
tions, especially small and rural prefectures and those far from Tokyo or beyond
the nation’s main stage on the Pacific side have been less fortunate, as we see
later. They have resented Tokyo’s neglect that they see as having produced eco-
nomic and other disparities. Some powerful national-level politicians helped with
additional subsidies to some of the neglected localities, such as then Prime
Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s political pork to his native prefecture of Niigata in the
early 1970s,13 but overall these SNGs remain relatively disadvantaged economi-
cally. New domestic and international conditions under the post-Cold War
regional order, marked by globalization, deregulation and decentralization, have
presented opportunities that some SNGs have responded to prudently, to serve
explicitly local interests. These SNGs have moved to connect themselves to the
global and particularly regional communities to revitalize their economies largely
under their own steam, through bilateral and multilateral routes.
Multilateral structures
One trend is for SNGs in a particular geographical region to work together, across
political lines and in conjunction with the private sector, to form a multilateral
structure that fosters ties with foreign counterparts to enhance commercial and
other economic opportunities. Scalapino calls these natural economic territories
(NET).14 Here I explore one of the most consequential of these territories: JSEG
(kan Nihonkai keizaiken) in which Japanese SNGs have been the key players.
Breslin, Hook and others refer to these groupings as micro-regionalism to dis-
tinguish groups of subnational actors from the higher level ‘regionalism’ that
comprises national actors across several continents such as APEC and from 
‘sub-regionalism’ comprising neighbouring nations such as the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).15 Hook clarifies micro-regionalism as a
project ‘seeking to build links across national boundaries, but without necessar-
ily involving the total sovereign territory of the states involved’.16 Micro-regional
groupings in Japan are formed through the initiatives of the SNGs, local business
and other groups as part of their increasing role in international affairs without
necessarily involving national-level actors. Input from central players is minimal
and the entire initiative is conducted at the subnational level.
Left behind in the race to economic 
pre-eminence: ura Nihon
The Japan Sea Economic Group
The Sea of Japan area has remained relatively neglected since post-war, even
though historically it was a central route for Japan’s trade, commerce and rich
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cultural and human flows with mainland Asia. During the Edo period
(1600–1868) when Japan’s feudal rulers closed the nation to almost all contact
with the West, the Sea of Japan coastline was economically vibrant. Yet, during
the Cold War, the region’s geo-strategic location adjacent to Soviet territory
served to truncate most of the region’s pre-Cold War contacts across the Japan Sea
and thus much of this region’s potential for post-war economic growth. The post-
war history of the Japan Sea area is marked by struggle at the national level
between notions of capitalist democracy and socialist totalitarianism while
Japan’s strategic and economic orientation was towards its principal ally the
United States and other Pacific nations. Tokyo’s public works programmes and
other pledges to redress the regional imbalance did not significantly improve the
local economies of this area. As Arase notes, ‘without exception the Japan Sea
prefectures have seen their position relative to Tokyo significantly decline in per
capita terms in the period 1980–92’.17
Decades before the end of the Cold War, SNGs along the Sea of Japan
began to take independent initiatives to link themselves directly with counterparts
in the Soviet Far East and Northeast China. With the Cold War ending and under
the slogan ‘Sea of Japan: Sea of Peace’ (Nihonkai o heiwaikai ni), these SNGs
stressed multilateral cooperation between regions around the Sea of Japan,
initiated by subnational rather than national governments. This was to be primar-
ily for mutual economic development, although educational and other cultural
ties developed as well.18 Much of SNGs’ motivation for promoting their own
economic development is their lack of faith in the proposals coming from Tokyo,
with its established neglect of ura Nihon and apparent failure to recognize
potentially valuable opportunities. Even post-Cold War, Tokyo’s role in trans-
border economic-community building around the Sea of Japan has remained
peripheral.
JSEG is a vital part of the Japan Sea revival. This institutional arrangement
draws together as a loose regional community with shared interests, the diverse
regional and city SNGs along or near its periphery – in Japan, RFE, South Korea
and China’s northeast region. North Korea and Mongolia are involved marginally
via their national governments, as here SNGs have almost no autonomy. The
Japanese presence is significant since 16 of the 47 Japanese prefectures are JSEG
members.
The idea of JSEG stretches back to the 1960s, but it was not until the mid-
1980s that prefectures such as Niigata embraced the concept with alacrity and
began to promote it widely within Japan and in the region. Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascendancy and his 1986 speech that introduced a dis-
cernible thaw in the Soviet–Japan relationship presented a real chance for
progress.19 Hook has noted the potential strategic consequences of responses
inside Japan, recognizing how the end of the Cold War gave rise to ‘a reconceptu-
alization of Japan’s spatial location in the region, with the Japan Sea coastal side
of the nation now exerting a powerful pull away from the subjective representation
of Japan as a “Pacific power” ’.20 This reconceptualizing has great strategic signif-
icance for Japanese and other nations’ SNGs in the Japan Sea area and for their
respective national governments, since greater cooperation and economic activity
has the potential to redirect at least some of Japan’s national economic and strategic
focus from the Pacific to the Eurasian side of the archipelago.
Various factors underscore the importance and potential of the Japan Sea region.
It is the central meeting place for the diverse cultures of Japan, Russia, China,
Mongolia and the Korean Peninsula. The land area of subnational regions along
the Japan Sea Rim is more than 25 times the land area of Japan and their total
population in the late 1990s was some 290 million or 2.4 times that of Japan.21 The
combination of Japan’s highly developed technology, South Korea’s production
and manufacturing strengths, China and North Korea’s abundance of labour
and the unexplored natural resources of the RFE and Mongolia offer this region
potential for economic growth, rarely available in micro-regional groupings.
Yet despite this apparent importance, the East Asian national governments have
maintained that the payoff is still too small to prompt them to push economic
cooperation here. Existing multilateral initiatives at the national level in
Northeast Asia may be proving their point; projects such as the Tumen River Area
Development Programme (TRADP) have achieved little, despite their high-profile
publicity.22 The ‘high politics’ of territorial dispute between Russia and Japan,
Japan’s intransigence towards North Korea and distrust of Japan by China and
both Koreas appear to eclipse the prospects of region-wide reward from a multi-
lateral economic framework in Northeast Asia, which could deliver not only great
economic gain but potentially an invaluable flow on of regional inter-dependence
and stability. Another contentious issue for all players at the national level concerns
the very naming of the Sea. Regional actors outside Japan want the present name
changed, recognizing its capacity to imply that Japan owns the Sea.
Here is the space, then, for trade and investment initiatives at the subnational
level, producing JSEG through a bottom-up process with minimal top-down
guidance.23 Indeed, the distinctive feature of this multilateral economic group is
that subnational rather than national governments are its driving force. Most of
the initiatives have come from SNGs of Japan, China and Russia; Mongolia and
North Korea are involved as followers rather than leaders.24 SNGs and other local
actors proceed from the understanding that promoting economic integration in
the region, however small-scale initially, is precisely what can work to develop the
region’s political stability and economic strength. Here, SNG moves to stimulate
regional integration through the micro-regional level have unmistakable implica-
tions for the national government and its international affairs. Arase observes of
JSEG that even though central government ministries, business groups, interna-
tional organizations and citizens’ groups are involved, ‘the subnational authorities
are the ones signing the exchange agreements, funding the bulk of activity and
building the required physical infrastructure that is the backbone of regional
development’.25
Governors of all 16 prefectures along the Japan Sea coast have met in multilateral
and bilateral forums to endorse the multilateral framework and arrange how to
pressure Tokyo for more support to develop their trade potential. Niigata City has
been the key player in pushing the JSEG framework and its large-scale projects
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have enhanced trade and other commercial activities across the Sea.26 Niigata has
long seen itself as a strategic operator for ura Nihon, especially through shipping
with the RFE and trade links with Harbin, a local economic hub in northern
China.27 Here we see how geographical proximity, historical connections, contem-
porary ties and future prospects orient SNGs towards a particular area within the
JSEG process. Hokkaido, for example, is interested in the RFE, especially
Sakhalin. Southern prefectures like Yamaguchi and Fukuoka are keenly involved
in promoting mutual economic interests between China and the two Koreas for
another multilateral group called the Yellow Sea Economic Zone (kan kokai
keizaiken).28
Efforts at grassroots level are lubricating the JSEG process, with new trade
routes through sea and air connections. But political and economic factors are
also at work to restrain economic developments in the micro-regional sphere.
Political factors are not simply between nations but also within them. For Japan,
one is the continuous struggle for autonomy between the national and subnational
governments. Arase has noted how the national bureaucracies in Tokyo view
SNGs’ initiatives with some ambivalence, and even though they do not oppose the
notion of greater initiative in principle, ‘in practice decentralization is resisted
because bureaucratic authority in Tokyo opposes any loss of power and status’.29
For example, although Japanese subnational officials have sporadically visited
RFE and Siberia to negotiate air services and other facilities, the Ministry of
Transport objected to negotiations concerning air routes, claiming that the SNGs
had wrongly bypassed the central government by entering into direct negotia-
tions. Otsu’s analysis refutes the Ministry’s claim, explaining that the Japan Sea
SNGs had already divided responsibility (bunkatsu toji) among themselves and
were working together to avoid excessive competition for one air route, so
demand for flights was not part of this tension. Otsu also rebuts the Defence
Agency’s objection that the air routes would interfere with its flight zones.30 The
unfounded objections of both parties shed light on how the national-government
bureaucracies claimed that negotiating air routes is the exclusive prerogative of
the Japanese government, not the SNGs and how their opposition was narrowly
self-serving rather than to serve the interests of the nation or the locality.
Other problems concern economics as well as politics. Foremost, the different
nations and SNG localities in the micro-region are in different stages of economic
development. Most Japanese SNGs are frustrated by Russia’s regulatory regimes
and failure to institutionalize fair trading principles. And even within Japan, there
is competition between prefectures to maximize economic opportunities for
themselves, even as the Japanese players are trying to work collaboratively for the
higher-level success of the JSEG grouping. Nevertheless, progress with JSEG
indicates that SNGs in Northeast Asia are committed to their own local and sub-
regional interests and despite national-level resistance are willing to pursue these
through a loose but purposeful multilateral structure operating mainly through
subnational networks to promote cooperation around the Japan Sea.
Assessments of JSEG by various observers differ widely. Rozman is extremely
sceptical on the grounds that far too many challenges face SNGs for them to
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achieve real progress with regionalism.31 Arase is more optimistic, recognizing
that even though difficulties at the state-to-state level have hindered steady devel-
opment of the group, SNGs have prepared the ground for rapid progress if
national-level problems can be resolved. Arase perceives that the JSEG process
may not by itself resolve issues of high politics, ‘but it is a tension-reducing,
trade-centred strategy of engagement designed and implemented by subnational
authorities that builds both habits of cooperation and mutual interests within
Northeast Asia’.32 Mochizuki is more confident, viewing the various projects
under way in this region as a valid sign that JSEG is now moving down the path
of development.33 The national government is certainly focused on national pri-
orities such that bilateral and regional tensions subvert the steady formation of a
Northeast Asian economic grouping at SNG level. Nevertheless, the commitment
of SNGs like Niigata, Toyama, Tottori and Hokkaido in particular is building
momentum for increasingly closer economic links with counterparts across the
Japan Sea, quietly building the networks, interdependence and trust that are
essential for a micro-regional institution such as JSEG to operate.
JSEG is typical of several multilateral structures that were established to
promote economic cooperation between SNGs internationally but are yet
to achieve great success. These arrangements show that SNGs in Northeast Asia
recognize that they share economic interests with each other and are willing to
at least explore ways of working together to achieve their own local and sub-
regional interests. A flourish of bilateral and submicro-regional activities has
been recorded across the Japan Sea under the broad JSEG concept,34 as we see
below in Hokkaido’s effort to pursue its interests in the RFE.
Hokkaido: Japan’s northern gateway to the world
Tension in the relationship between the Russian and Japanese governments has
shaped, although not determined, the economic relationships that Hokkaido
has developed in Russia, particularly in the resource-rich RFE. Meetings at the
national level produced some encouraging signs but have not resolved the dispute
between the two national governments over the ‘Northern Territories’, the four
islands between Hokkaido and Sakhalin that Russia has held since the end of the
Second World War, over which Japan claims sovereignty. The Japanese govern-
ment has refused to negotiate any major economic cooperation unless the Russian
government signs a peace treaty and returns the islands to Japan. It has also tried
to curtail the efforts of both the SNGs and the private sector in fostering
commercial links with their Russian counterparts, under a national policy that
insists on the inseparability of politics and economics vis-à-vis Russia. The
national government has maintained its concern that the activities of these actors
could have symbolic and legal implications for the territorial dispute.
Japanese SNGs closer to the RFE do not share this view. Their position gives them
a lens that is quite different from the lens on Russia held by national bureaucrats in
Tokyo – geographically, strategically and economically. Hokkaido has a distinctive
geographic position, closest not just to Russia but also to the disputed territory.
Hokkaido in particular has tried to pursue economic and other opportunities, even
during the Cold War and certainly since its end in the early 1990s.35 Hokkaido is the
main centre within the JSEG for all matters concerning the RFE.
During the Cold War, the national government’s opposition made it very difficult
for Hokkaido to have close contact with the resource-rich RFE. Even so, the quiet
and persistent efforts of Hokkaido SNGs have prepared the ground for closer
cooperation when the political climate is less restrictive. The Northern Regions
Centre (Hoppo-ken Sentaa) was opened in 1978 to undertake a range of research
projects related to the Soviet Union and to serve as a centre for cultivating con-
tacts and future cooperation with Hokkaido’s SNG counterparts in the countries
of the northern regions, but mainly the RFE.36
Local attitudes in Hokkaido reflect geographical proximity. Surveys have
shown that policy-makers and residents attach special importance to the RFE and
take pride in their understanding of Russian affairs. Importantly, most see the
dispute over the Northern Territories as an obstacle to national-level relations that
should not seriously impede contacts at the local and regional levels.37
Geographical proximity also produces an economic dynamic of its own and
gives companies in some lines of business in Hokkaido an advantage over their
counterparts in other parts of Japan. But it is not just geographical proximity that
facilitates trade. A similar climate means that some products developed in
Hokkaido can be very attractive to people in other countries with severe winters,
including Russia. Firms that manufacture furniture and heating systems in
Hokkaido have special expertise well suited for living in extremely cold condi-
tions. Housing companies in Hokkaido are well equipped to supply to the hous-
ing demand in Sakhalin and opportunities are likely to expand when the Russian
economy improves. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries also present economic
opportunities to businesses in Hokkaido with local experience, knowledge and
capacity. Sakhalin’s low self-sufficiency in food and Hokkaido’s strong food
industry also make them natural partners.38 Hokkaido also has a clear interest
vested in other projects, especially large-scale energy development that could
well serve the prefecture and the Japanese nation. SNGs in Hokkaido are keen
to become the major support and logistics base for the Sakhalin oil and gas
development projects.
The more positive attitude of the Russian government to both marketization
and political decentralization since the break-up of the Soviet Union has also
enabled closer relationships to form between the Hokkaido SNGs and their
Russian counterparts. Moscow now generally supports Sakhalin’s attempts to
foster closer economic relations with Hokkaido since these help to integrate
Russia economically as well as in other ways with the Asia–Pacific, which is an
important objective of the Russian leadership.39 These circumstances suggest that
conditions are ripe for SNGs in Hokkaido, independent of Tokyo, to push for
more extensive economic links with the RFE.
Yet the Japanese government still maintains a restrictive stance, claiming that
the actions of Hokkaido and other SNGs have legal and symbolic implications for
the territorial dispute. One clear example is Hokkaido’s attempt after the Soviet
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break-up to open a trade office in Yuzhno–Sakhalinsk in July 1994 to promote
economic relations with the RFE. The Foreign Ministry thwarted the move claim-
ing that establishing the office could be seen as acknowledging Russian control
of the disputed territories. Yet Hokkaido persisted and eventually formed an extra-
governmental organization – the Hokkaido International Trade and Industry
Promotion Association (Hokkaido Boeki Bussan Shinkokai) – with an office in
Sakhalin that was a prefectural office in all but name. With diplomatic relations
between Tokyo and Moscow improving, the Japanese government established
a branch consulate in Yuzhno–Sakhalinsk in 1998 and subsequently upgraded it
to a full-fledged consulate in March 2001. This finally paved the way for the
Hokkaido prefectural government to upgrade the status of its Trade and Industry
Association office in Sakhalin and officially assume full control.40 In May 2001,
the city of Wakkanai in Hokkaido opened its own representative office in
Yuzhno–Sakhalinsk primarily to promote trade and investment ties, the first
Japanese municipal government to establish an office in the RFE.41
Local political leadership has been essential to improving these economic ties.
Hokkaido’s Socialist governor Yokomichi Takahiro, elected in April 1983, was a
great supporter of forging links with Sakhalin, despite Tokyo’s active resistance.
His initiatives include a February 1984 agreement facilitating periodic economic
exchanges between SNG officials in Hokkaido and five regions in the Soviet Far
East, and he was instrumental in establishing the Japan–Soviet Far East–Hokkaido
Friendship Exchange Conference held in Khabrovsk in April 1984. In August 1987,
the governor led a delegation of Hokkaido officials to Khabarovsk, Nakhodka and
Yuzhno–Sakhalinsk to discuss ways to expand barter trade in Japanese agriculture
and Soviet marine products. The initiative produced some tangible results particu-
larly in timber processing, hotel and fisheries joint ventures.42 In June 1990, the
Governor led a local delegation to several places including Moscow, Khabarovsk,
Vladivostok and Yuzhno–Sakhalinsk. In Moscow, he signed an agreement with his
Russian hosts to develop mutually cooperative relations in wide-ranging areas such
as commerce, technology and culture. The agreement was the first of its kind
between a Japanese SNG and a Soviet republic.
When Hori Tatsuya replaced Yokomichi as Hokkaido’s governor in April 1995,
he continued with the policy initiatives of his predecessor, despite his different
political allegiance. In September 1997, Governor Hori and his Sakhalin counter-
part Igor Farkhutdinov agreed to explore the possibility of joint economic devel-
opment of the four disputed islands, but the Japanese Foreign Ministry was deeply
aggrieved by Hori’s action and immediately dispatched an official to Hokkaido to
chasten the governor. As Williams observes, ‘This particular incident highlighted
the problem for both regional governments of balancing the desire for closer
economic exchange with the Northern Territories problem, within the restrictive
framework of state-level diplomacy.’43
It appears that both the Hokkaido Prefectural government and its Sakhalin
counterpart recognize their mutual economic linkages have potential value far
beyond economic benefit: these linkages can help to resolve the bilateral political
tensions at the national level. In November 1998, the parties signed an Agreement
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on Friendship and Economic Cooperation (Yuko keizai kyoryoku ni kansuru
teikei), known as the ‘mini peace treaty’. This was seen as the most symbolic
move so far by the two regional SNGs to promote mutually beneficial economic
ties. But both sides also recognized that it would provide a valuable forum for
helping to resolve the territorial conflict and could move the parties towards some
economic interdependence that can help pull the two nations closer together.
Demonstrating skilful diplomatic expertise, the two SNGs held off on a formal
agreement until concurring on their respective economic and political roles
within their sensitive national contexts. The 1998 agreement for friendship and
economic cooperation is qualitatively different from the sister-type agreements
that city and municipal governments in Hokkaido have established with Russian
counterparts since 1967.44
Data on commercial ties between the two regions indicate noticeable progress
in trade. In the 1990s, imports from Russia to Hokkaido grew but exports
remained rather static.45 Japan’s share of trade in the RFE is significant at num-
ber two after China but Russia is not a major trade partner for Japan and Russia’s
significance in Hokkaido’s trade is in imports rather than in exports.46 In 2000
and 2001, Russia was the second largest source of imports for Hokkaido after
the United States, accounting for 14.2 and 12.7 per cent respectively. However,
Hokkaido’s exports to Russia are rather modest, accounting for 2.3 per cent in
2000 and 2.5 per cent in 2001.47 Hokkaido’s exports to Russia consist of sheet
steel, steel tanks, tin cans and fishnets. Only 130 types of items were exported in
1987, but this figure grew to 600 in 1991, with most items exported in small
quantities. Hokkaido imports much more from Russia, including timber, crude
oil, bituminous coal and marine products (cod, prawns, crab and cod roe).48
Hokkaido pursues trade actively in many parts of the world but in 2000, although
47 per cent of Hokkaido firms that were engaged in international trade and
investment were operating in East Asia and 22 per cent operated in North
America, only 5 per cent operated in Russia.49
Comparative data from 1997 to 2001 suggest some strengthening in Hokkaido’s
economic ties with Russia relative to Hokkaido’s other economic partners. Russia
entered Hokkaido’s table of top ten export destinations to take ninth place in
2000–01 and moved from number three to number two as the source of Hokkaido’s
imports in the same period.50 One area where trade has flourished in recent years
is marine products, with greater involvement of joint-venture companies.
Sakhalin’s increasing emphasis on exporting marine products has drawn it closer
to Hokkaido whose consumer market is attracted to these products.51 We need to
note, however, that much of this trade is not recorded in official statistics since
mafia groups on both sides conduct trade illegally. This is recognized as a
‘guerilla’ economy where an indeterminable number of transactions are not
recorded in trade statistics because of this unorthodox business environment.52
Complicated regulatory frameworks for foreign investment and taxation, law
and order problems and market uncertainties in the RFE inhibit the potential for
commercial relations between the two sides and make many Japanese businesses,
not just those in Hokkaido, reluctant to invest in the region.53 American companies
accounted for about 98 per cent of Sakhalin’s investment inflow in 1999 while
Japanese companies accounted for 0.3 per cent.54 The state of the bilateral relation-
ship between Tokyo and Moscow is another deterrent to trade and investment
from Hokkaido. But even with these hurdles, the Hokkaido prefectural govern-
ment maintains it is committed to developing economic ties with the RFE,
particularly Sakhalin and initiatives between Hokkaido and the RFE continue.55
Postel-Vinay offers a positive assessment of how these inter-local relations
have intensified despite persisting conflicts at the national level.56 Akaha opines
similarly that developments through the 1990s indicate the willingness of the two
subnational partners to cooperate with each other despite the bleak prospects for
a national-level breakthrough.57 He points to productive fishery negotiations,
agreements between the Hokkaido government and the Soviet Council of
Ministers and initiatives taken by the Hokkaido government in the Sakhalin-1 and
Sakhalin-2 oil and gas development projects that have included study groups, lec-
tures, seminars and information-gathering activities. Smaller SNGs in Hokkaido
such as Wakkanai, Hakodate and Otaru have also become involved in economic
activities, particularly through provision of economic infrastructure. Some pro-
jects are providing transportation networks. Regular air services now operate
between Chitose in Sapporo and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and regular shipping oper-
ates between Tomakomai and Nakhodka, between Otaru and Kholmsk and
between Wakkanai and Korsakov.58 Gradual establishment of the infrastructure
needed for more intensive commercial engagement between Hokkaido and its
northern neighbour is likely to lubricate further growth of the economic relation-
ship between these subnational actors, even as territorial and other tensions con-
tinue to rupture diplomatic relations at the national level and restrain the Japanese
government in its own economic engagements with Russia.
Okinawa – an economically neglected outpost
Like Hokkaido, Okinawa has a distinctive history and is relatively distant from
Tokyo. But Okinawa has relatively dire economic circumstances as the least eco-
nomically developed of Japan’s 47 prefectures and with the lowest per capita
income, about half that of Tokyo.59 Although Okinawa is in the Pacific, from post-
war it has remained on the periphery of Japan’s economic resurgence. This is
largely because Okinawa was under US control from 1945 until 1972 and since
then has been retained as a key post for US defence outreach into Asia–Pacific,
housing the largest number of US troops stationed in Japan. For Tokyo, Okinawa’s
worth is in its strategic rather than its economic contribution to the nation and the
national government’s moves in Okinawa have been at least as much for political
compensation to the Okinawan people for housing US bases as for the people’s
economic well-being. For Okinawa, the national government’s disposition is a
festering sore. If, for Hokkaido, economics is ‘separate’ from politics, for
Okinawa the two are surely inextricably linked.
Economic geography has Okinawa well placed as a point for commercial
contacts between mainland Japan and fast growing economies in the Asia–Pacific
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region. Yet Japan’s reach to Asia–Pacific has been from and through the Tokyo–
Nagoya–Osaka corridor. The national government has been largely obstructive to
the various initiatives that the Okinawa prefectural and city governments have put
forward to revitalize the Okinawan economy.60 It has provided assistance for
transport infrastructure including new docking facilities and improvements in air-
line services connecting Okinawa with Taiwan, Seoul, Shanghai and Hong Kong.
And JETRO has tried to help Okinawa in its attempt to attract foreign and domes-
tic businesses to the prefecture.61 But the national government has conceded little
in other areas until very recently and only in the face of Okinawa’s persistence.
Okinawa has for years sought a special status for the prefecture as a free trade
zone in a bid to overcome the prefecture’s economic underdevelopment. Yet, the
national government has resisted the move claiming its opposition to the creation
of ‘two systems in one state’.62 In 1999, Okinawa’s constant pressure on Tokyo
resulted in the establishment of a special free trade zone in Nakagusuku on the
east coast of the main island. The zone’s purpose is to revitalize Okinawa’s econ-
omy and strengthen its economic self-reliance by attracting investment and
promoting trade with mainland Japan and East Asia.63
A similar breakthrough came in 2002 with the establishment of a special finan-
cial and information technology zone to serve as a tax haven for the banking and
IT industries in the rural city of Nago.64 Nago Mayor Kishimoto Tateo initiated
the proposal after observing how a special financial zoning system offering tax
breaks brought businesses and jobs to the Irish capital Dublin, earning it the
moniker ‘the Celtic Tiger’.65 Mayor Kishimoto’s hardest task was to persuade
national policy-makers, especially Finance Ministry officials, to pass special laws
that would create what national officials were resisting as ‘two systems in one
country’. The battle was won with support from veteran LDP supporter of
Okinawa and former Trade Minister Yamanaka Sadanori, who held strong con-
nections with the tax bureau of the Ministry of Finance.66 It was recognized
widely that the national government agreed to this special tax zone in the Henoko
district of Nago City to compensate Okinawa for accepting relocation of the US
airbase in Futenma in the face of vitriolic local resistance.67 Here the SNGs of
Okinawa used their forced acceptance of US bases as a compromise to secure an
economic deal from the national government, one that they hope will increase the
attractiveness of the local economy to international business and so the financial
autonomy of the prefecture’s SNGs.
The Nakagusuku and Nago zones have so far produced only limited results.
Cheap labour costs in Okinawa had already begun to attract multinational com-
panies to locate their call centers in Okinawa. At the time of the new legislation,
Citibank, Nomura Securities and IBM had brought 3800 new jobs to Nago and
the special tax incentives are expected to intensify this relocation.68 But while
some businesses have moved back-office operations to Okinawa to benefit from
cost advantages, the prefecture faces tough competition from its Asian neighbours
where production costs are much lower than even in Okinawa.
The free trade zone in Nakagusuku New Port industrial complex provides at
least one valuable benefit for Okinawa. It enables the lowest manufacturing costs
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in Japan by allowing low-priced parts to be imported duty-free from Asian countries
and these manufactures produced relatively cheaply still bear the ‘Made in Japan’
label which commands a 20–30 per cent higher price in the international market.69
But the expected results have been slow to materialize; by 2002, no Taiwanese or
other foreign companies had invested in the zone.70
Overall, the economy of Okinawa still languishes. The national government
has resisted most subnational efforts to open up Okinawa’s economic potential
which would strengthen the prefecture’s position vis-à-vis the national govern-
ment. Both the national and subnational governments recognize that while the
prefecture remains economically weak, Okinawa is more vulnerable to national-
government directives – a reason for the national level to resist Okinawa’s inde-
pendent economic growth via the international market and for the subnational
government to solicit this growth actively. The prefecture’s economic interests
thus conflict with the national government’s perception of national strategic
interests. Local leaders are willing to forge links overseas for local economic
development but the dominance of the national government’s position con-
cerning the strategic environment has impeded their independent actions. The
strategic context on the one hand limits the prefecture’s SNGs in their bids
for economic independence but on the other it gives them a small amount of
political leverage to achieve small economic gain, as we see explicitly in the
example of the Nago tax-haven. Here, we observe an interesting case of SNGs’
involvement in international matters with the national government using
economic means for political ends and the SNGs using political means for
economic ends.
Overseas offices to promote economic opportunities
Some SNGs in Japan have followed the precedent of many overseas counterparts
by establishing offices overseas to promote trade, investment and other commer-
cial activities. Overseas offices facilitate mutual flows of information and personal
interaction at the local level, which help SNGs to establish economic links either
independently of the national government or in association with organizations
such as JETRO. They are venues for promoting their locality overseas to attract
investment, tourists and multinational corporations to their areas, for supporting
commercial operators from their locality who want to pursue opportunities in the
overseas location and for learning about experiences of localities in other coun-
tries directly rather than through national organizations. They are very much the
signifiers of, and vehicles for, SNG autonomy.
Growth in the number of the SNGs’ overseas offices signifies the push by
SNGs for independent economic capacity abroad. It also indicates the central
government’s acceptance of SNGs’ greater role in this area. As noted in Chapter 3,
the national government and especially the Foreign Ministry earlier disproved of
SNGs having independent offices overseas, which forced the major SNGs that
wanted to pursue economic opportunities internationally to base operations inside
JETRO overseas offices. The national government’s recognition that it shares
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a very strong interest in local economic revitalization has seen it move to allow
SNGs to open independent offices abroad.
In 2000, Japanese SNGs had a total of 115 offices overseas, in 42 major cities
within 21 countries. These offices are for 31 prefectures and 17 cities. All of these
numbers are quite small relative to the full extent of Japanese SNGs and when we
recognize that some are representative rather than independent offices and some
operate within JETRO overseas offices, the scale of this exercise looks even less
impressive.71 Still, overseas offices are a relatively new strategy for Japanese SNGs
and a decade ago there were only a few. Maintaining an overseas office is expen-
sive, with costs of personnel, office rental and other expenses. SNGs therefore
choose locations very strategically, where economic opportunities are seen to be
strongest. It is therefore not surprising that the focus of the original major
destinations in the United States and some other Western countries in the 1980s
have shifted to some neighbouring Asian countries, particularly China, Korea and
Singapore, from the mid-1990s. In 2000, China topped the list of nations with
36 Japanese SNG offices and the United States came a distant second with 22.
More than half of all Japanese prefectures and designated cities have at least one
office in China, with Shanghai and Hong Kong being the most popular destinations.
Overseas offices are not necessarily in the SNGs’ official partner cities or
provinces, since some of these partnerships were formed on the basis of histo-
rical ties or for cultural exchange rather than specifically to pursue economic
opportunities. Overseas offices are to deal primarily with hard-core economic
matters. The goodwill generated through them is an incidental, though still
welcome, outcome.72 It is difficult to measure the success of these overseas
offices, but those that are not successful are closed.73
The offices in China, as elsewhere, collect information about local economic
conditions, arrange reciprocal visits by local officials, business groups and trade
missions, promote investment from their locality, offer advice to business groups
from their locality that seek to do business in the Chinese destination and facili-
tate relocation of Japanese production units. Kanagawa Prefecture’s Economic
Trade office in Dalian (Liaoning) provides office space at rock-bottom prices
to enterprises from the prefecture investing directly in China, with economic
information, interpreting, secretarial support, transport and office equipment
included.74 Miyazaki Prefecture’s office in Hong Kong also sells Miyazaki
produce and promotes Miyazaki as a tourist destination.
Chiba Prefecture opened an office in Singapore in 1996 to seek investment
and tourists from Singapore and learn about Singapore’s port and airport man-
agement which is highly regarded globally. Chiba was then undertaking a large-
scale development project in Makuhari that would have to compete with similar
large development projects such as Yokohama Minato Mirai, Tokyo Rinkai
Fukutoshin and Tokyo Wangan in the Greater Tokyo area, which is in close prox-
imity to Chiba. Chiba administration was convinced that the office spaces and
convention facilities available in Makuhari could not be filled by Japanese corpo-
rations and turned to prospective parties abroad. In June 1999, Chiba’s Governor
Numata opened a seminar in Singapore emphasizing the price competitiveness of
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the capital region (including Chiba on its periphery) due to falling real estate and
rental prices.75 Chiba Prefecture pursues international conferences and promotes
Chiba port for business, and here too, Singapore is especially attractive since it
serves as the hub of business in Asia. Since many SNGs in Japan have recognized
the growing importance of Asia for their current and future economic well-being,
it is not surprising that growing numbers of SNGs are opening offices in Asia,
especially in China’s coastal cities and Hong Kong.
Inward foreign investment – a weak link in 
SNGs’ economic diplomacy
Japan has been a major investor overseas but has a very poor track record in
attracting investment inward. Japan’s stock of FDI remains extremely low relative
to other economically advanced nations, both in value and as a percentage of nom-
inal GDP. At the end of 2000, Japan’s FDI stock was 1.2 per cent of GDP, which
compares with the 1999–2000 figures for the United Kingdom at 34.1 per cent, the
United States at 30.1 per cent, Canada at 25.3 per cent and France at 16.7 per cent.
The ratio is even lower as a percentage of gross domestic capital formation; in
2001, a mere 0.3 per cent compared to the developed-country average of 10.9 per
cent and the world average of 11.1 per cent. Japan’s ratio of outward to inward
FDI stock thus remained very high at 5.5 at the end of 2000, as against 1.9 for the
United Kingdom, 0.9 for the United States and 1.1 for Canada in 1999.76
Conditions at the national level disinclined SNG leaders from attracting for-
eign investment to their localities. First, the national government’s strict regula-
tory regime served as an obstructive institutional hurdle. Second, ample domestic
capital meant that local leaders had no need to seek investment from abroad in the
way local leaders in other countries such as the United States have done for sev-
eral decades. Instead, Japanese SNGs lobbied the national government for special
favours and grants for public-works projects. Third, the national-government
policy seeking to bring about ‘equality’ through tax allocations entrenched a 
non-competitive philosophy that discouraged SNGs from seeking out economic
opportunities themselves to strengthen the economy of their localities. They saw
no reason to draw into their locality, from overseas, the vehicles for economic
growth such as foreign corporations. Foreign enterprises were limited to large
centres such as Tokyo and were very rare in regional areas.
All of these conditions no longer hold. And while SNGs are forced to take
more responsibility for the economic well-being of their locality, attracting
foreign enterprises to stimulate the economy and create jobs in their locality is
an attractive option for increasing numbers of SNGs. A 1999 survey found that
70 per cent of municipal governments were ‘highly interested’ in drawing foreign
capital. In 2001 Negishi noted that ‘Touting tax incentives, lower land prices and
proximity to factories in related industries, [SNGs] are encouraging foreign firms
to ditch Tokyo and set up in other areas.’77
As governor of Mie Prefecture (1995–2003), Kitagawa Masayasu championed
the push for inward FDI. He worked tirelessly in Japanese inward-investment
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circles, spearheading ‘an integrated, industrial cluster-based, delivery-focused
approach to FDI promotion’.78 The US semi-conductor parts maker, Cabot KK
was wooed by various Japanese cities and prefectures but settled for Kitakoyama
Industrial Estate in Geino in Mie Prefecture because of a ‘good deal’ offered
by the local SNGs and proximity to clients such as Fujitsu, Toshiba and Sharp
corporations that have factories in Mie.79 Since opening its facilities in 1998,
by 2000, Cabot doubled its production space in Mie, at a time when domestic
companies were scaling back their production and workforce.
Recent examples show how this trend is taking off among SNGs across Japan.
The German firm Fresenius, the worlds’ number one in the field of dialysis, set
up in Fukuoka Prefecture in 2000 after Governor Aso Wataru’s direct negotiation
with the company president. German automotive firm Inergy Automotive
Systems set up in Kitakyushu City in Fukuoka Prefecture on the basis of the city
SNG’s direct lobbying and strengths in advanced engineering, environmental reg-
ulations, capable public service and a history of strong local leadership. Sendai
City in Miyagi Prefecture in northern Japan has a unique arrangement with
Finnish firm FINPRO that deals in services and manufactured equipment for
welfare-related businesses. Sendai and Miyagi Prefecture have focused on Japan’s
elderly population as a niche market and were recommended by the Development
Bank of Japan when FINPRO approached looking for the most suitable place for
establishing its business in Japan.80
Some instances such as Cabot KK locating in Mie, noted earlier, involve foreign
corporations that are interested in the presence nearby of other foreign companies.
These circumstances have special appeal to some SNGs that are keen to draw
bulk investment to their localities. Foreign companies interested in a cluster
arrangement create space for collaborative arrangements among SNGs at differ-
ent levels and foreign corporations, as we see in the collaboration between Hyogo
Prefecture, Kobe City and Procter and Gamble. In June 2004, Hyogo Governor
Ido Toshizo held a briefing session with the president of Kobe-based Procter and
Gamble Far East Inc., as part of their informal partnership to attract businesses to
Kobe and other parts of Hyogo. Kobe City SNG promotes its vicinities as ‘the
Best Portal Zone’ for businesses in Japan and offers a website (www.hyogo-kobe.jp)
where prospective investors can access wide-ranging information that includes
cost/benefit analyses through simulation facilities.81
Bringing foreign investment directly into their localities has consequences for
SNGs’ relationships with the national government. It enables them to improve
their own tax base and generate local employment which can enhance their eco-
nomic and political autonomy from the central government. The view put forward
by Fujimoto Kazuhiro, director of Mie Prefecture’s Industrial Site Development
Division appears to be typical of his SNG cohort, as I learned through my field-
work in SNG offices in 2002–04. Fujimoto believes SNGs need to secure inde-
pendent revenue sources to achieve policy independence; for him ‘there is no
such thing as money from the central government without strings’. He regards
local-tax revenue as ‘our own money and we can use it to have the most effect in
the economy’.82 Foreign investment directly into localities also gives SNGs direct
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connections with foreign corporations through collaboration, networking and
other grassroots personal connections and these can be a valuable resource for
SNGs when the national government needs to draw on their international corporate
contacts.
But political will is one thing for SNGs, and capacity to fulfil their ambitions
is yet another. Many regional centres find it difficult to attract foreign firms since
the regions lack the infrastructure to sustain foreign workers, including interna-
tional schools, hospitals with English or other foreign-language skilled staff and
other facilities for expatriates. Osaka, Kobe, Fukuoka and some of Tokyo’s neigh-
bouring SNGs in Chiba, Kanagawa and Saitama are best able to compete
successfully with Tokyo to attract foreign investment.83 For example, Yokohama
hosts the German, British, Canadian and US trade centres and six of Kobe’s top
11 corporate tax-payers are foreign-owned corporations. Both are port cities with
comprehensive programmes to support international investors.
Attracting direct foreign investment is still a relatively new option for SNGs,
as a source of independent revenue and of some autonomy from the central gov-
ernment. It seems likely that as momentum grows with a greater flow of inward
direct investment to the regions beyond Tokyo, their prospects for attracting
foreign corporations will improve. Smaller and non-core SNGs have much to do
to vie successfully for foreign investment. They generally lack social infra-
structure and are poor at advertising their strengths to potential investors. Most
have not equipped their websites with detailed information in English and other
foreign languages about their investment environment.84 One area for attracting
FDI is international tourism in Japan, which appears to have barely registered in
the minds of subnational policy-makers. Overall, it appears that there are still
various areas that SNGs could develop creatively to generate independent income
and jobs through foreign investment, using old and new strategies to pursue
opportunities.
Sister-city links as vehicles for economic ties
As noted in Chapter 3, sister-city ties were initially vehicles to develop cultural
and educational links, founded on the notion of building international peace
through grassroots mutual understanding in the early post-war period. But in the
present period of globalization, these ties reach well beyond the original lofty
ideals, as sister and other formalized ‘friendship’ links sometimes become an
important vehicle for SNGs’ international commercial activities. Sister agreements
provide a catalyst for developing business and other economic networks. Some
who are attached to the national level in Japan still regard sister and friendship
ties simply as an exercise in cultural activities as noted in Chapter 3. But certainly
for some SNGs that do have these links, using the formal sister/friendship tie to
foster commercial deals is no longer taboo and is, in fact, a strategically useful
approach to achieving mutual economic benefit. It can also be the basis for for-
malizing economic connections. In 2001, the mayors of Hiroshima and Chongqing
signed a memorandum on economic exchange to promote mutually profitable
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economic activities in the automotive and other industries while maintaining and
furthering exchange projects under their existing friendship agreement.85
Importantly, as discussed in Chapter 3, SNGs’ formal sister/friendship links
can be the entree for economic links curtailed bilaterally by tensions at the
national level. This was made clear in the case of Hokkaido and Niigata
Prefecture establishing economic linkages through their formal friendship ties
with counterparts in the RFE even during the Soviet period. We also noted
how Tottori Prefecture, especially Sakaiminato City, developed commercial links
with North Korea through a formal ‘friendship’ tie formed with Wonsan City in
1992. In May 2002, the Tottori prefectural government joined Tottori-based
companies participating in the international trade fair in Pyongyang and became
the first Japanese SNG to participate in a North Korean trade fair. Tottori gover-
nor Katayama saw this as a chance to help North Korea take its place in the
community of nations, and for Tottori ‘to put one foot in the door’ and boost
the Sakaiminato–Wonsan friendship tie, which is the only one between Japanese
and North Korean SNGs.86 Tottori has also done solid groundwork towards
establishing regular shipping routes with North Korea to enhance trading capacity.
Niigata City has been particularly active in forging economic relations with
formal friendship partners across the Japan Sea. Niigata City serves as the major
port for trade between Japan and Russia, which was one of the aims of Niigata
City forming ties with Khabarovsk city in April 1965. Mayor Watanabe Kotaro
made great efforts to establish the foundations for subnational diplomacy towards
Russia in the early 1960s. Extensive negotiations with assistance from the presi-
dent of a Japanese company specializing in trade with Russia and the invitation
of a high-ranking Aeroflot official to Niigata saw the two SNGs agree to establish
a new air route between Niigata and Khabarovsk in 1971, which began operating
in June 1973.87
Niigata was also pursuing low-key exchanges with Vladivostok in the
Primorsky Region from the early 1960s, when Vladivostok was a ‘closed city’
during the Cold War and a formal relationship was impossible. Soon after the
Gorbachev initiative in the mid-1980s, Niigata Mayor Wakasugi Motoki attended
the Coastal Trade Fair in Vladivostok in 1987 and the first post-war tourist vessel
departed from Niigata for Vladivostok in 1989. Missions were exchanged and a
sister-city agreement was signed in February 1991, even before Vladivostok was
formally opened to the world in January 1992. A principle purpose of the
agreement is to establish commercial and other economic links including support
for Vladivostok to complete its international airport. After his return from
Vladivostok, the Mayor of Niigata City lobbied business and other groups to
invest in the airport project.88
Central support and deregulation
SNGs have moved ahead with their own local economic agendas through strategies
designed to avail their localities of opportunities in the international marketplace,
now through both inward as well as outward engagement. But even while national
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and subnational interests in the economic outcome of these economic pursuits
coincide, national actors do not all share interests solely in these outcomes and the
national actors are clearly not monolithic. The reasons are largely conflict between
goals of national policies and conflict over bureaucratic turf. National-government
dealings with diplomatically sensitive destinations such as Russia and North Korea
demonstrate both conflicts. Defence Agency staff have disciplined SNGs in line
with national-security policy and the Transport Ministry has resisted SNGs’ inter-
national transport arrangements that the Ministry believed encroached on its
bureaucratic turf. The Foreign Ministry discountenances SNGs on both scores –
inconsistency with and incursions on foreign policy. Nevertheless, the central gov-
ernment accepts that Japan’s economic difficulties cannot be addressed through
central initiatives alone; in the interests of the national economy, SNGs must be
given some policy autonomy through decentralization and deregulation. One
example of deregulation with consequences for SNGs as international economic
actors is the central government’s move to create special designated zones (tokku),
where SNGs can undertake unregulated economic activities.
Special zones
Tokku (special zones) are a trial scheme for deregulation, put in place in 2002 as
part of Prime Minister Koizumi’s structural reform initiatives. The scheme aims
to encourage SNGs to propose and implement new ideas for operations in spe-
cially designated deregulated zones within their localities. Tokku are not required
to follow national guidelines and they receive no national government subsidy.
They are based on the principle of free-market local economic development,
through local initiative carried out by SNGs autonomously.89 Schemes under way
in 2003 included an industry-revitalization programme in the highly industrial
city of Yokkaichi whose economy suffered under regulations introduced in the
1970s, promotion of wine-making in Katsunuma Town in Yamanashi by remov-
ing restrictions imposed by the Agricultural Land Law and enabling service
providers such as non-profit organizations to provide fee-based transportation
services to mobility-impaired individuals in Yamato City in Kanagawa through
deregulation of the Road Transportation Law.90
Some observers think bureaucratic resistance to tokku is inevitable since
deregulation removes some of the power of the national bureaucrats. Nevertheless,
the initiative in itself indicates that some elements of the national leadership rec-
ognize the importance of deregulation at the local level for enabling the SNGs to
play a central role in revitalizing the subnational and the national economies.91
The move is relevant to our discussion here since some SNGs seek to revitalize
their local economies through international trade and investment links and the
tokku zone system will allow SNGs to prepare for and connect more extensively
with the international community, with far fewer regulations than in the past.
Sendai’s international information industrial zone enables SNGs in Sendai to
invite foreign participants to local events and obtain visas for these participants
on a priority basis. In the international academy of Ota City in Gunma Prefecture,
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foreign instructors teach all subjects in English and hiring teaching staff is the
responsibility of the city itself rather than a centrally established process.92
JETRO as supporter
JETRO’s actions from the late 1990s also indicate how central agencies are allowing
the SNGs more latitude in their international dealings, here at one remove through a
quasi-government organization. JETRO serves as an intermediary vehicle to support
and coordinate but not control SNG international economic activities. As discussed
in Chapter 2, JETRO is a Japanese government-funded body supervised by METI
to promote trade, investment and other commercial opportunities worldwide. With
national economic difficulties from the early 1990s, JETRO has been keen to
establish new programmes directly with SNGs to help stimulate local economies.
In 1996, JETRO launched the ‘Local-to-Local’ or ‘Region-to-Region’ programme
to encourage and support commercial links between Japanese SNGs and their
counterparts abroad through inward and outward foreign investment, trade, tech-
nology links and other tie-ups such as among academic and research institutions.
By fiscal 1999, this initiative supported some 25 long-term and 71 short-term
projects in 37 prefectures and 19 countries, in fields such as information
technology, tourism, biotechnology and agriculture. For example, Nagasaki
Prefecture and the Nordhein–Westfalen region in Germany facilitated establish-
ment of a joint-venture company producing equipment to care for the environ-
ment in Nagasaki and Kumamoto Prefecture worked with Oregon State in the
United States to establish a joint-venture software company in Oregon.93 However,
as in any commercial programme involving a mix of actors from government, the
private sector and a quasi-government body, some projects do not deliver the
desired outcomes. A case study of attempted links between Ehime Prefecture and
Queensland in Australia demonstrates that Japanese SNGs are keen to obtain
JETRO funds and develop new international projects through sister ties but that
very careful planning is also needed for these projects.94
In the early 2000s, the Ehime Prefectural Government received JETRO funding
to develop welfare and rehabilitation products and services in Queensland, with
which Ehime has a Memorandum for Economic Cooperation. The Queensland
government had identified aged-care as an industry with support available for
research and development of commercial products. Queensland helped Ehime
prepare its application for a ‘mini’ programme that was later converted to a full-
scale programme. The Queensland side participated in Welfare exhibitions in
Ehime with the visiting delegation’s expenses paid by JETRO and this served as
an important vehicle for networking on both sides. Queensland business people
have gained some exposure to the workings of the prefectural government and
Ehime officials have visited several Queensland facilities. However no direct
business has flowed from these meetings. My Queensland informant points to
several reasons for the absence of concrete results: this was an Ehime initiative
and the Queensland business people were not very interested in developing
relationships with Ehime; the Ehime side was happy to leave further development
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to the business community, but the Queensland government was interested in
more immediate business outcomes; and Ehime sent different, poorly briefed
officials to Queensland for each visit, leaving the task of briefing to the Queensland
side. A central reason is that Ehime was interested in hardware that Queensland
does not produce and was not really interested in software research and intellec-
tual property that Queensland does produce. Here we have a picture of mismatches,
misunderstandings and apparently very poor planning.
This case highlights the need for shared understandings, shared expectations
and perhaps most importantly strong knowledge of the other side, its business cir-
cumstances and practices. JETRO support cannot facilitate successful projects if
this underlay is not mutually in place before the project begins. The Ehime–
Queensland case is an exception and does not represent the typical JETRO–SNG
partnership programmes, but it does illustrate the potential weakness of programmes
driven by central agencies such as JETRO that can encourage SNGs to chase
central funding without putting sufficient effort into strategic and other consider-
ations. Still, as the examples of Kumamoto and Nagasaki prefectures indicate, the
JETRO programmes can work very well for local economic revitalization and
strengthening SNGs’ international economic role in the process.
Conclusions
Today, external and internal pressures compel SNGs more than ever to pursue
their own economic diplomacy proactively, in a post-Cold War, globalizing envi-
ronment characterized by less restrictive regimes nationally and internationally.
SNGs in Japan, like their counterparts abroad, recognize that they can no longer
rely only on central government guidance and budget allocations and the
economic flow-on of domestic corporations and local capital for the economic
well-being of their location. They have a practical need to link their locality to
economic opportunities with international partners, building the economic
strength of their localities in partnership with local and sometimes international
enterprises. Many of Japan’s SNGs now pursue an international economic role
not as an optional add-on but as a necessary part of their operations.
The international economic activities of SNGs indicate the broad range of
approaches, initiatives and collective as well as independent arrangements that
SNGs use to build the economic strength of their locality through international
engagements – both inward and outward. Some of the main arrangements exam-
ined in this chapter include overseas offices, incentives to draw FDI, sister/
partner relations as vehicles for economic relations, the tokku zones under the
national deregulation programme and JETRO’s local-to-local/region-to-region
programmes. We see in this picture, the political will and creativity of some SNGs
to pursue economic opportunities where possible, practicable and most likely to
deliver the maximum economic gain for their locality. This is very much in the
interests of their locality but it is also much in the interests of the SNGs as they
try to increase their financial independence and by extension their policy and
practical autonomy from the national government.
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The national government is generally supportive of the SNGs’ activities, having
acknowledged that Japan’s protracted economic problems are partly structural
and cannot be addressed through central initiatives alone. The Japanese govern-
ment is now moving to facilitate international economic ties by giving the SNGs
some policy autonomy through decentralization and deregulation. In taking these
moves, the central government’s motivations are to resuscitate the national econ-
omy rather than to politically liberate the SNGs from the centre’s still rather firm
hand. And even while national and subnational governments share interest in eco-
nomic gain for locality and nation, tensions arise between the national and sub-
national levels when the national level sees that the SNGs’ international moves
may intrude on national interest or on ministries’ much coveted ministerial turf.
SNGs connecting with Russia and North Korea demonstrate these conflicts well
and how SNGs will push ahead determinedly to secure international economic
linkages despite national government resistance.
The case studies also demonstrate two important features of relations
between national and subnational players on this landscape. First, the national-
government actors do not speak with one united voice since national economic
strength, national security and other ‘national interests’ can sometimes conflict,
leaving the responsible ministries in discord rather than in collaboration. Second,
while in some ways SNGs are competing against each other for economic oppor-
tunities internationally, they are also capable of recognizing their shared interests
in regional economic strength and can work as partners in regional groupings
to achieve shared interests as well as the economic interests of their locality. It is
clear that the potential for alliance and division runs across and between
these players and the private sector and quasi-government actors with which
they work to achieve local and national economic strength as well as political
objectives.
Finally, what does the ascent of SNGs as international economic actors mean
for Japan’s international relations? I argue that it is something potentially major.
Maintaining the national economy is a top government priority, so SNGs’ contri-
butions through their roles as international economic actors should give them a
more significant place in foreign affairs. Yet this contribution is likely to pass
under-acknowledged in Japan’s international diplomacy since the SNGs’ interna-
tional economic relations tend to become a ‘diplomatic matter’ usually only in
dealings with diplomatically sensitive partners such as Russia and North Korea.
SNGs in Okinawa have used the islands’ contributions to national security
through hosting US forces as a lever to try to gain local economic benefit and
autonomy through international links. Yet, there is something much more impor-
tant evolving here. It is the way in which the SNGs’ international economic
relationships can, and are already beginning to, sow the seeds of economic inter-
dependence between countries of Northeast Asia. This type of economic inter-
dependence and its geo-strategic consequences can be extremely significant in
time if the economic interdependence becomes not just a fertile underlay, but
a compulsion to maintain close bilateral and multilateral relationships among
national governments across East and Northeast Asia.
National sovereignty can be a hotly contested site. Usually contestation is between
a national government and external parties such as other national governments or
international bodies, or between a national government and internal bodies seek-
ing a new state through a separatist movement. In this chapter, we turn to another
contested aspect of national sovereignty that receives little attention, where the
contest is within the nation, between national and subnational government. Here
the national and subnational priorities differ. We see how national-government
actions to protect national sovereignty intrude on the well-being of local patches
within this sovereign space, forcing some citizens to live with consequences
impacting upon their daily lives and so to bear the burden for the rest of the nation.
SNGs represent these aggrieved citizens in the closest, most accessible politi-
cal capacity and by taking into the national-policy arena their constituents’
concerns, SNGs give political life to the tension between national security and the
quality of life for a minority of local citizens. Some SNGs have tried to resist
the powerful intrusion of national-security policy on life at grassroots level to
secure their constituents’ well-being. Some express constituents’ displeasure with
the stance of the national government on peace and war, strategic alliances and
nuclear cargo. Although some SNG actions are symbolic with no tangible effect
on national-security policy, others force the national government to accommodate
local interests within the national-security design.
In the previous three chapters we have considered areas of generally shared
interest. Through the ‘soft diplomacy’ of international exchange and cooperation
programmes, and economic ties, SNGs have worked largely in cooperation with,
or at least with tacit acceptance of, the national government. The few cases of
SNGs’ resistance to central government directives, or of central government resis-
tance to SNG actions, were exceptions rather than typical examples. A rather dif-
ferent picture emerges for the few SNGs involved in the ‘hard’ diplomacy that
surrounds national security. Here the national government tries to protect its
bureaucratic turf with an iron-fist. This is the primary area of international affairs
where the national government wants sole involvement, with the complete exclusion
of SNGs. Pluralism and decentralization have little part in this policy. We might
expect that the central government’s iron-fist would deter SNGs from coming
onto its protected diplomatic patch, especially since the highly centralized nature
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of Japan’s unitary system of government structurally inhibits SNG involvement in
sensitive national-security issues. Yet, some SNGs have brought their interests
and their actions to the centre stage of national-security policy, at times with
serious ramifications for Japanese international diplomacy.
This is not simply the result of different interests between the subnational and
national levels of government. SNGs and their local constituents surely have an
interest in the nation’s security, just as the national government has an interest in
the well-being of citizenry wherever they are located in Japan. Rather than
different interests, it is different priorities that motivate the different levels of
government – priorities shaped distinctively by the history, geographic location
and political leadership of the SNG, as well as the size of the constituent body.1
Japanese SNGs have been slower than some of their counterparts in the United
States and parts of Europe in challenging their central government on issues of
national security and international politics and are still by no means as active as
these counterparts in the West. Two factors in particular weaken the SNGs’ politi-
cal will and capacity for international action. First, Japanese SNGs are not legally
or constitutionally empowered to challenge national-policy priorities, unlike their
counterparts in less centralized systems of government (especially state govern-
ments in the United States). Second, the nature of Japan’s centralized unitary sys-
tem of government still firmly limits the autonomy of SNGs under the national
government as commander and paymaster. We have seen in each chapter of this
book how this structural arrangement has limited the political and administrative
capacity of SNGs to act autonomously and has compelled them to find ways to
take autonomous action through silences in the constitution and the law that fail
to proscribe such action.
The cases examined in this chapter reveal how some SNGs have developed
their own legitimate space for action on matters of hard diplomacy. One is through
the ambiguity surrounding legal and constitutional interpretation of what the
SNGs can and cannot do. The other is through taking efficacious action in their
own space where they have regulatory capacity, such as administration of ports
(to prohibit docking of US ships with nuclear cargo) and responsibility for streets
(to prohibit US tanks from using them). And after two decades of precedents estab-
lished by SNGs from the archipelago’s far north to far south, by the early twenty-
first century more SNGs are confident of their capacity and political responsibility
to represent their constituents’ local interests against the national-government’s
security policy and its local consequences. Today, some SNGs openly express
opinion that diverges from or even directly criticizes this policy. Some have mounted
low-key but disruptive policy challenges that have embarrassed the national
government on key national-security concerns such as Japan’s nuclear policy and
its principal security relationship with the United States.
A few SNGs in some European countries and the United States have acted
stridently to support international political movements such as for democracy,
human rights and refugees. Japanese SNGs have been unable and disinclined to
follow this lead.2 Their foremost concerns in this domain have been resistance to
national remilitarization and pursuit of international peace, especially through
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nuclear disarmament and opposition to war. Some have taken a leading role in the
peace and anti-nuclear movements globally and have formed alliances with like-
minded SNGs overseas. National remilitarization, nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace are issues literally ‘closest to home’ for the Japanese people. Their
nation has historically recent experience under a military government that took
the nation into a disastrous war and was defeated by allied powers in 1945, after
the world’s first and only cases of nuclear bombing on two Japanese cities that left
massive devastation. Today, some Japanese SNGs speak out at domestic and inter-
national forums on war, peace, security and other diplomatic issues that funda-
mentally affect the lives of local residents, to whom SNGs are much closer than
the centre and whose interests SNGs strive to protect.
We turn first to early post-war examples where the actions of progressive leaders
had some impact on Japanese diplomacy and security. We then consider specific
cases where SNGs’ protest actions had significant strategic consequences for the
central government and reveal much about SNGs’ political and administrative
capacities on issues that greatly concern SNGs and their constituents at the local
level. One is the SNGs’ agenda for international peace through the anti-nuclear
movement and Mayors for Peace Movement and the other concerns national
security and the diplomatic hinge of national-government policy, the US–Japan
Security Treaty. We examine how this is a site of continued tensions between the
national and subnational levels through three highly contentious issues: nuclear-
equipped warships, the US–Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines, and US bases
and facilities. In the third section we consider national territory, with the spotlight
on Hokkaido’s position in Japan’s most contentious territorial dispute with the
Russian Federation (and the former Soviet Union). Fourth we consider distinctive
SNG leaders whose personal style has had profound consequences for some of
Japan’s most important bilateral relationships.
Whereas some SNGs have vigorously opposed aspects of the national govern-
ment’s security and international-diplomacy agendas, others have been involved
constructively in ‘peace diplomacy’, working independently of the centre and
developing political goodwill through international movements. They use a range
of strategies from direct appeal to higher-level authorities and overseas visits to
garner support and understanding, to legal action, negotiation and reconciliation.
As highlighted in previous chapters, here too the striking feature of this landscape
is the diversity of SNGs in the nature, extent and reason for their engagement in
hard diplomacy and their different levels of political will to become involved at
all. In fact, a large majority of SNGs is disinterested or simply unwilling to take
action, believing that they have neither the ability nor the political authority to be
involved in these politically contentious issues, which are best left to the national
government.3
Early diplomatic activism
The conservatism that dominated Japan’s local politics in early post-war changed
significantly from the late 1960s with the election of progressive chief executives
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to head SNGs in many urban and metropolitan areas. Not only did these leaders
oppose national-government policy priorities that did not suit local needs, some
also challenged the national government’s foreign-policy priorities and took steps
that created difficulty for the national government. Some of these new SNG lead-
ers enjoyed more clout in the national capitals of other countries than did the
Japanese national leadership.
Policy differences between progressive SNGs and the conservative national
government in the late 1960s and 1970s were accentuated by the Cold War polit-
ical divide that polarized nations into opposing ideological camps. The Japanese
government had tied itself firmly to the United States through its bilateral secu-
rity treaty and other diplomatic and commercial agreements. When progressive
leaders supported by the Japan Socialist and Japan Communist parties made their
debut at the local level, they voiced their displeasure at the national government’s
strategic policies and its unequivocal support for the security framework of the
United States as Japan’s principal military ally.4 Kanagawa Prefecture and partic-
ularly its progressive governor, Nagasu Kazuji (1975–95), remained critical of the
US–Japan security relationship, especially since it allowed nuclear weapons to be
stored within the prefecture’s administrative jurisdiction in Yokosuka and made
Kanagawa the second largest US military base after Okinawa.5
Approximately 12 years before Nagasu was elected as Kanagawa governor,
Asukata Ichio was voted in as mayor of Yokohama City in Kanagawa Prefecture.
Asukata took an active interest in diplomatic issues through what some described
as ‘diplomacy from opposition’ (yato gaiko).6 A prominent JSP leader of national
status, Asukata tried to carry out some of his Socialist Party’s policy agenda
through his actions at the local level, while an overwhelming majority of conser-
vative forces dominated the national parliament. Asukata spearheaded an anti-
Vietnam War campaign from his locality to raise public criticism of Japan’s
support for the United States in the Vietnam War. Vietnam-bound US tanks were
stopped in Yokohama for more than 90 days in August 1972 on the ground that
permission had not been obtained from Yokohama city authorities for heavy, over-
sized vehicles to pass along the city’s roads.7 A panicked national government was
forced to negotiate with city officials before the tanks could be released.8
Asukata’s ‘diplomacy from opposition’ tested the public mood and drew over-
whelming support. This action by his administration generated more than sym-
bolic ‘opposition’ to the war, since it sent a clear message to the national
government that the SNGs could make life very difficult for the national govern-
ment if it attempted to pursue ‘security’ measures without full cooperation of
the SNGs. The Yokohama resistance demonstrated that SNGs could use their
own regulatory capacity creatively to achieve outcomes obstructive to a national
policy overriding political sentiment at the local level.
Mayor Asukata not only played the politics of ‘opposition’, but contributed
positively to promoting Japan’s national interests, as the Socialists perceived these
interests at that time. In November 1971, even before the national government
moved to negotiate with the PRC on normalizing bilateral relations, Mayor Asukata
led a mission to Shanghai seeking to restore Japan’s diplomatic relations with China.
Asukata’s mission proposed a draft agreement to establish a friendship relation-
ship between Yokohama and Shanghai and this was signed formally in 1973.9
Another high point of this ‘diplomacy from opposition’ came in April 1974
when Yokohama hosted the Second Asian Table Tennis Tournament. Some were
apprehensive about possible conflict between Yokohama and the national govern-
ment since Japan did not have diplomatic relations with certain countries such as
Vietnam,10 which Yokohama City office had invited. Mayor Asukata used his
opening speech to express views dominant at the grassroots level in Yokohama
and raised the motto of ‘contributing to peace in Asia’, claiming:
I believe that the only way to make fundamental changes in the problems of
the Japanese government’s diplomatic stance and the aggressive international
economic expansion of major Japanese companies may be for the Japanese
people themselves to join hands with the peoples of Asian nations to deepen
understanding. On this understanding it would be unacceptable to fail to crit-
icize these major Japanese companies and censure Japan’s advancing trade
economy, this ‘ignoble Japanese conduct’. I was delighted, in this context, to
take on the hosting of the Second Asian Table Tennis Championships in
Yokohoma.11
The 75 participants included representatives from eight Arab nations.
Significantly for its organizers inside and outside the Yokohama City office, the
event drew huge press coverage that raised community interest in broader diplo-
matic issues such as those emanating from the 1973 oil shock and the Vietnam
War. Holding the championships was part of Asukata’s agenda to encourage par-
ticipation by the local people (shimin sanka) in public life, in international as well
as domestic matters. The event provided opportunities for ordinary Japanese
people in Yokohama and beyond to mingle with international participants in a
classic example of the ‘public diplomacy’ (shimin gaiko) that Asukata advocated
and worked to generate.
Other progressive SNG leaders were instrumental in building bridges between
Japan and the PRC beyond Mayor Asukata. One was the egregious governor of
Tokyo, Minobe Ryokichi (1967–79). In 1971, when the Japanese government led
by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku was keen to ‘normalize’ Japan’s diplomatic rela-
tions with China, it could not find a diplomat acceptable to the Chinese leader-
ship who could initiate the process of negotiations with Beijing. Ultimately,
progressive Governor Minobe was asked to deliver to the Chinese leadership a
letter written by the LDP Secretary-General, during the governor’s trip to the PRC
and North Korea in November 1971.12 Minobe was a subnational rather than a
national leader and was supported by the Socialists and the Communists rather
than the conservative LDP that dominated national politics. Minobe fulfilled the
task to serve what he recognized as the interests of the nation, believing that rec-
onciliation with the PRC was worth achieving even under the rule of his political
adversaries in the conservative party.13 The move indicates how the national gov-
ernment used the elevated political standing of a subnational leader to have him
represent the Japanese nation rather than simply his electorate of Tokyo Metropolis.
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It also demonstrates how an SNG leader could command more clout overseas
than Japan’s national leaders could at that time and place.
There are various instances where SNG leaders have worked to prepare the
ground for achieving an amicable settlement of troubled relations with
immensely important neighbours. One is the former Soviet Union (now Russia)
with which Japan has yet to sign a peace treaty, and another is North Korea with
which Japan does not have diplomatic relations and which is perceived as a major
security concern for Japan. We consider some of these instances in later sections
of this chapter. Here, we need to note that a few SNGs under progressive leaders
have been serious in pursuing ‘hard’ diplomacy even since the 1970s. The initially
slow accretion of SNG efforts provides examples to other SNGs of approaches
and methods. They are also proof of SNG capacity to work for and actually
register local concerns, in the face of national-government resistance to SNGs
entering its sacred ground of international diplomacy.
SNG agendas for peace and against nuclear weapons
Peace is a palpable concern for many Japanese citizens who remember and/or hope
to prevent repeat of Japan’s experience as vanquished nation in 1945. Japan is the
only nation with first-hand experience of the devastation of nuclear bombing that
destroyed most of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Pursuit of peace, often conflated with
rejection of war and of nuclear weaponry, remains high on the agenda for many
Japanese. The spirit of peace is embedded firmly in the Japanese constitution pre-
pared in early post-war. Article IX renounces the threat or use of force to settle inter-
national disputes and prohibits Japan from maintaining military forces14 and the
preamble sets out the goals of ‘peaceful cooperation with all nations’ and ‘peace for
all time’. The national government claims to follow the ‘letter’ of the constitution,
but through legislation and a security framework with the United States as Japan’s
chief military ally, the national government has made numerous moves in national
security that raise serious public concern about their constitutional validity.
Some citizens have responded through their SNGs, aiming to reach a seemingly
impenetrable national government through the levels of government below it.
With public support on the ground before them, many SNGs have opposed
national-government policies that their citizens generally regard as unconstitu-
tional and have initiated local policies to defend the constitution and to pursue the
overall objective of world peace. Since Japanese SNGs do not have constitutional
or legal rights to establish legislation, they have pursued their objectives through
two means, always backed by popular support. One is passing resolutions, decla-
rations and pronouncements in their assemblies. The other is through protest
action such as speaking out against war at public rallies or formal organized
events in support of peace movements and forming networks at national and
international levels to pursue shared goals.
Post-war, most Japanese initially saw issues of peace and war as matters for
the national government with active involvement almost exclusively by those in
localities affected directly by the war through nuclear bombing (Hiroshima and
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Nagasaki) and protracted US occupation (Okinawa). In time, across Japan, these
localities came to be at the forefront of peace movements. SNGs that actively
support peace and denounce Japanese involvement in any activity associated with
nuclear weapons act autonomously from the national government, recognizing it
is their duty to try to secure peace through legitimate and democratic means to
truly represent the voice of their constituents. Their approaches are consistent
with the tendency nationwide, on the basis of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
nuclear bombings, to conflate pro-peace with ‘anti-nuclear’, as the popularity of
anti-nuclear movements indicates.
Anti-nuclear and peace movements
An ever-increasing number of Japanese SNGs has made official peace declara-
tions since the 1950s. Japan’s anti-nuclear movement by SNGs has its roots in
Gensuikyo (the national movement to prohibit atomic and hydrogen bombs). The
disaster of the 1954 Bikini Atoll underwater nuclear detonation precipitated the
August 1955 World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in
Hiroshima, which culminated in Gensuikyo as a national movement.15 Gensuikyo
was highly politicized from its birth and in the 1960s split into Socialist and
Communist groups. They sparked some public interest in the anti-nuclear move-
ment, but as Kamimura notes, despite their strong international moral appeals,
the anti-nuclear groups had little impact on the policies of successive conservative
national governments throughout the Cold War.16 Very few Japanese SNGs were
willing to endorse or participate actively in this highly politicized movement.
Conservative-supported SNGs completely shunned involvement recognizing that
their primary interest was to obtain benefits for their locality from the national
government, which was one of the movement’s arch enemies.
Fresh impetus to the anti-nuclear movement in Japan came in the late 1970s
and early 1980s through strong anti-nuclear movements worldwide, after posi-
tioning of United States and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe
and UN official resistance. Japanese citizens responded with vigour to the 1978
and 1982 United Nations Independent Commissions on Disarmament and
Security Issues that urged citizens across the world to lobby their UN representa-
tives for abolition of nuclear arms. The SNGs’ role in the anti-nuclear movement
began in earnest in 1982 after the UN Special Arms Reductions Conference.
Following a European trend, the number of Japanese SNGs making anti-nuclear
declarations adopted and approved by their local assemblies began to grow
phenomenally in the 1980s – from less than 10 at the start of 1980 to more than
2000 by 1995.17
Many SNGs had made anti-nuclear and peace declarations and erected signs or
statues in 1960 to protest the national government’s renewal of the Japan–US
Security Treaty. Akashi City in Hyogo Prefecture had issued a ‘Nuclear
Disarmament City Declaration’ even before revision of the Treaty, prohibiting
manufacture, storage and bases housing nuclear weapons in the city.18 The value
of these declarations is their symbolic significance, which when aggregated even
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at a rhetorical level, indicates to the central government the level of public
disproval at its actions on national security.
The advent of the hawkish Nakasone government (1982–87) was another
trigger to action. This administration pushed to strengthen the military with a
greater role for the Self Defence Forces (SDF, or military by another name) in
revised national defence plans. Yoshida argues that much was expected of SNGs
in the intensified struggle against military revival since the SNGs were closer
than the central government to the people who elected them and could voice their
constituents’ protests in their capacity as officially elected representatives.19
Demands from SNGs that the national government observe the constitution’s
three anti-nuclear principles intensified as Nakasone drew the nation more firmly
under the US nuclear umbrella and the number of SNGs making Anti-Nuclear
City Declarations shot up dramatically. In 1982, 57 SNGs declared their localities
nuclear-free; 410 SNGs made this declaration in 1984. By 1995, approximately
two thirds of all Japanese SNGs including 2019 cities had declared their locali-
ties nuclear-free.20 A 2001 report put this figure at 2497 or about 75 per cent of
Japanese SNGs, with many also demanding that the national government adhere
strictly to the three non-nuclear principles.21
The concept of non-nuclear localities appeals widely, not just to residents but
also to the majority of the SNGs that have embraced these declarations in public
policy. The nature and content of these declarations vary widely, although Yoshida
has made three general observations. First, their content is usually vague and they
are addressed to ‘peoples’ or ‘citizens’ of the world, although some specifically
address the Japanese government and countries that have nuclear-weapons capa-
bility. Second, the declarations of cities that host military bases are quite different
from those that do not. The former criticize the national government’s nuclear-
weapons policy and demand dismantling of US military bases in Japan on the
grounds that they store nuclear weapons. Even some SNGs that do not host US
bases have made similar declarations (e.g. Toshima Ward in Tokyo and Tokushima
Prefecture). Third, some SNGs such as Nakano Ward in Tokyo bolster their
declaration with defence of the constitution.22 These declarations are not legally
enforceable but they do send signals to the national government as a barometer of
community response. They may also serve as vent for community anger at the
national government’s apparent abuse of Article IX of the constitution and the
spirit of peace in which it was composed and ratified.
In 1984, 200 (10 per cent) of the declared nuclear-free localities in Japan
established the Consortium of Nuclear-Free Subnational Governments (Nihon
Hikaku Sengen Jichitai Kyogikai), which mobilizes support for peace movements
and helps localities and other groups to organize rallies, raise funds to promote
peace studies and conduct similar activities inside Japan. It also establishes links
with counterpart bodies overseas.23 The Consortium’s philosophy is that cross-
border promotion of peace by SNGs helps to act as a check on military expansion
and promotes peace across the globe. Some see the Consortium as a ceremonial,
consultative body with little influence on the nuclear disarmament movement
domestically or internationally.24 Others believe that it acts as a useful pressure
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group, with capacity for greater clout if it partners with NGOs to mobilize support
and lobby the national government as a united front.25
The ‘anti-nuclear’ issue has the potential to unify large numbers of SNGs
against the national government through their shared grievances, as we see with
the SNG Consortium. It is also a potentially potent a site for confrontation
between the two levels of government, as SNGs try to bring the voice of the peo-
ple to the seemingly deaf ears of the national government. So far the SNGs have
rejected confrontation and have taken careful measures not to get too far offside
with their central policy masters. SNGs recognize their need to represent their
constituents’ voice against nuclear weaponry but also their far greater need to
secure funds from the central government so that they can attend to virtually all
other needs within their locality. The national government’s response here has
been to reassert its control over SNGs’ capacity to take diplomatically significant
action, especially actions protesting the national government’s stance on issues so
contentious within and outside Japan.
The Mayors for Peace Movement
The two cities at the forefront of the peace movement in Japan are Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the only two cities in the world that have suffered the consequences of
nuclear bombing, just before the end of the Second World War. The SNGs of these
two cities have taken a keen role in contributing institutionally through the
Mayors for Peace Movement. Hiroshima City Mayor Araki Takeshi proposed the
body as a pioneering initiative at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament
at UN Headquarters in June 1982. This was at the height of Cold War tensions
when the Japanese government was on the verge of revamping the nation’s
military role. The proposal to promote the solidarity of cities working for total
abolition of nuclear weapons offered a vehicle to consolidate a trans-national
movement at grassroots level. This evolved into the Mayors for Peace Movement
(Heiwa Shicho Kaigi), registered officially as a Category II NGO with the
UN Economic and Social Council in May 1991. In September 2003, 554 SNGs
in 107 countries officially supported this organization.26
Successive mayors of Hiroshima in particular have taken a range of initiatives
to build an international community to promote peace through disarmament and
opposition to nuclear arms. They have travelled widely to meet with senior offi-
cials, politicians and NGO leaders, they have addressed legislators and city coun-
cillors, presented seminars, and invited pre-eminent leaders to Hiroshima to
understand more deeply how a city suffers from nuclear bombing. Mayor Akiba
Tadatoshi travelled to England, France, Russia and the United States in 2001, to
the UN Headquarters in 2002 and to India in 2003 to meet with officials and leg-
islators, spread the message of peace to nuclear-weapon states and solicit support
for the Mayors for Peace Movement.27
Other Japanese members of the Mayors for Peace Movement have also voiced
criticism of their national government’s stance on nuclear weapons through
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international forums. The WHO and the UN General Assembly sought an
advisory opinion in 1995 from the International Court of Justice in The Hague as
to whether the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict violates international
law. Representatives of various countries and organizations expressed their view
before the Court. Whereas the Japanese government called the use of nuclear
weapons ‘inhumane’, mayors Hiraoka Takashi of Hiroshima and Ito Itcho of
Nagasaki declared these weapons ‘illegal’. Commentators claimed that ‘The
[Japanese] government has avoided calling use of nuclear weapons illegal, appar-
ently because of Tokyo’s security dependence on the nuclear umbrella of the
Unites States’.28 Here the national government pursued a moral dimension, while
the SNGs favoured a legal line. It was almost the reverse of the approach taken
by the two levels of government inside Japan where in most diplomatically sensi-
tive matters, the national government insists on determination by legal judgement
while almost all that the legally unsupported SNGs can mobilize is the weight of
moral judgement.
Some Japanese mayors have even sharply criticized the US government for its
nuclear policy. City officials and peace activists in Hiroshima and Nagasaki crit-
icized a subcritical nuclear test in Nevada in early December 2001.29 Hiroshima
mayor Akiba Tadatoshi sent messages of protest to both US President George
W. Bush and US Ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker. Akiba condemned the
nuclear test as a betrayal of the people’s desire for abolition of nuclear weapons.30
Speaking on the fifty-nineth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in 2004, the two city mayors reserved their most scathing remarks for
the enhanced nuclear capabilities of the United States.31
The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki take their message internationally in host-
ing the four-yearly World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City
Solidarity (Sekai Heiwa Rentai Toshi Shicho Kaigi), with executive meetings held
periodically to take stock of the movement. An October 2003 executive meeting held
in Manchester discussed new strategies for launching a campaign to ban nuclear
weapons and devised plans to lobby national delegates and work in cooperation with
NGOs to heighten public awareness of nuclear issues. Another concern was to focus
the attention of the UN conference on reviewing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
in 2005, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings.32
Some Japanese observers have made general observations that the SNGs and
others who are involved in Japan’s pro-peace and anti-nuclear movements achieve
almost nothing, that their initiatives and actions are simply symbolic and that they
shrink from any initiative that might jeopardize US nuclear deterrence and capa-
bilities.33 Others perceive SNGs as actually playing a diplomatic role through
supporting the peace movement and opposing nuclear armaments, since the sym-
bolism is itself a type of force that helps to promote world peace.34 Certainly, the
actions of some SNGs and their leaders demonstrate the will and capacity of
SNGs to put forward dissenting voices in national and international venues and
to initiate and develop networks of like-minded SNGs internationally to bolster
their cause, for domestic and international peace.
Hard diplomacy: SNGs and national security 149
Japan–US security relations
Japan’s principle bilateral security relationship with the United States is a source
of deep contention between the national government and some SNGs across
Japan. The US–Japan Security Treaty was signed alongside a peace treaty in 1951
and was renewed in 1960 and automatically extended from 1970. The treaty sets
out how the United States provides security to Japan including protection under the
US nuclear umbrella. The Japanese government sees this as a desirable arrange-
ment since it spares Japan the need to develop a fully fledged military force and
its own independent nuclear-weapons programme – an enormously contentious
issue, even to approach. However the treaty requires that Japan host US bases in
Japan, which many in the Japanese population and some SNGs that represent them
locally have struggled vigorously to resist. Thus, although there is widespread sup-
port for the Security Treaty, ‘there is strong opposition to concrete manifestation
of the treaty: US bases and deployment of military personnel’.35 Here, we consider
the three most significant sites of tension: (1) visits to Japan by US warships;
(2) the Japan–US Defence Cooperation guidelines; and (3) US bases in Japan,
through case studies of Okinawa Prefecture and Zushi City.
Protests against nuclear-equipped warships
Japan’s national-security policy explicitly disavows nuclear weapons through the
‘three non-nuclear principles’ enunciated formally by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku
in 1967. These principles are that Japan will not possess or manufacture nuclear
weapons or allow such weapons to be brought into Japan. The national government
has found upholding the third principle particularly troublesome. To allow entry of
US navy ships carrying nuclear arsenal into Japanese ports, the Japanese govern-
ment’s stance is to simply accept the US position of ‘neither confirming nor deny-
ing’ the presence of nuclear facilities. But the actions of Kobe City in 1975
considerably upped the ante on the port issue for the national government.
After the end of the Second World War, Kobe port was placed under US
military occupation and was used as home for the US Seventh Fleet until the port
was returned fully to Japan in 1974 with the end of the Vietnam War. During the
Vietnam War, US aircraft carriers often used the port and US military ships made
423 visits from 1960 to 1974. The Kobe City administration brought visits by US
navy ships to an abrupt end in March 1975 when the City assembly passed a
resolution requiring all foreign warships to produce a certificate certifying the
complete absence of nuclear facilities on board.36 Newly elected progressive
mayor Miyazaki Tatsuo had strong backing from Kobe citizens and other groups
that provided electoral support, enabling him to have this resolution passed by the
City assembly. Usually the non-nuclear declarations of cities are not supported by
mechanisms for concrete action, but here Kobe City used its authority over the
city’s ports to give substance to its anti-nuclear stance, through a space where the
law and the constitution did not rule out an SNG’s resistance action.37
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The Kobe non-nuclear formula has been the subject of national debate and
national and international attention, especially since Kobe port’s capacity for
docking US navy ships is greater than that of any other Japanese port. Of most
gravity to the Japanese government, the Kobe strategy serves as a model for
SNGs in port cities across Japan to pass similarly obstructive assembly resolutions.
The legal basis for Kobe City’s resolution is the Port Law (kowan-ho) that gives
authority to manage port administration to the city-level SNG. US diplomats in
Japan claim that the US–Japan Security Treaty gives the US military the right
to access any facility in Japan and that SNGs should not have the authority to
obstruct US ships if the Foreign Ministry allows their entry. But Japan’s politicians
and the Foreign Ministry have taken a middle path through this divisive patch,
reaffirming the rights of the United States and the basic tenets of the security treaty
and making it clear that they will not force a showdown with Kobe on this issue.38
Kobe City claim of its right to manage the city’s port and enforce the certificate
requirement appears to be enshrined in the constitution and fully defensible under
law. Even former, pro-military Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro could not deny
the legality of the Kobe Declaration when questioned on it in parliament.39
Kobe’s successfully obstructive approach and the possibility that other SNGs
may adopt a similar resolution naturally drew a backlash from US authorities. The
US government and its representatives in Japan have continued to press Kobe to
abandon its formula and allow US warships to enter Kobe port without the ‘non-
nuclear’ certificate.40 The US authorities have used both carrots and sticks to win
unfettered access to Kobe port for the US navy. They have promised city adminis-
trators, politicians and labour unions more investment in Kobe if the Declaration is
abandoned. But sometimes the pressure is less co-optive and more admonitory;
once the US Consul General commented that ‘if Kobe retains the Kobe Formula
rejecting the entry of US military ships, it would be misinterpreted that Kobe is an
anti-US city’.41 The US strategy has also involved peer pressuring; US ambassador
Thomas Foley informed a group of Japanese SNG officials in 1999 that he wanted
US warships to be able to visit Kobe port before he left office.42
SNGs depend on the national government for financial and other support and
risk losing some of the favour with which this support is endowed if they move
against the central government’s position on a strategically sensitive issue. But
some SNGs recognize a degree of reverse need on the national government’s part.
Kobe as a large and prosperous city is less dependent on the national government
than localities that are smaller or have less opportunity for partially sustaining
themselves economically as we see with Okinawa in the next section. Kobe’s anti-
nuclear port stance has not affected the city’s economy in any significant way, nor
weakened its clout vis-à-vis the central authorities. The relationship between
Kobe City and the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Agency is strained, but Kobe
appears to have significant sway with other ministries as evident in its ability to
score a new airport in Kobe despite the presence of two major airports in Kobe’s
neighbouring city, Osaka. US authorities also appear to recognize Kobe’s eco-
nomic and political strengths with their use of a co-optive, conciliatory approach
rather than confrontation to try to prevail over Kobe on port use.
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The revised US–Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines
In April 1996, US President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto
issued a Joint Declaration to revise the 1978 US–Japan Defence Cooperation
Guidelines and a revised version of the Guidelines was released in September
1997. The revised Guidelines sparked controversy nationally and internationally
as they specifically expanded the earlier defence cooperation beyond repelling an
attack directly against Japan as specified in the 1978 guidelines, to include coop-
eration during crisis situations in ‘areas surrounding Japan’ (shuhen jitai). Some
observers saw this as a major and portentous leap from the position specified in
the original guidelines.43 The revised defence guidelines had taken ‘national secu-
rity’ and the responsibility of Japanese defence forces demonstrably offshore,
beyond the narrow limits of the Japanese nation that had contained the defence
zone in the original guidelines. One of the many pieces of legislation to enable
implementation of the revised guidelines was therefore the proposed Law
Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations
in Areas Surrounding Japan (Shuhen jitai anzen kakuho-ho) (hereafter the
SASJ law). This would give Japan’s SDF new legal capacity to operate in ‘areas
surrounding Japan’, by extending rear-area support and engaging in search-and-
rescue operations with US forces.
Controversy at the SNG level was instant. The concern for SNGs was less
about Japanese forces operating offshore than about US forces operating more
extensively within the SNGs’ localities. The proposed SASJ law required SNGs
to provide their port and airport facilities to US warships during a crisis situation
in Japan’s vicinity and to cooperate with US requests for logistical support in such
conflicts.44 Attention flooded back onto the contentious Kobe anti-nuclear port
model that the Japanese, US and Kobe City governments had been happy to keep
well away from front-page news. Support for SNGs to follow the Kobe port ‘no
nuclear’ declaration grew gradually, but gained real momentum by mid-1999, just
before parliament finally passed the SASJ law. Calls for SNGs to adopt ‘no-
nuclear’ certificates based on the Kobe model came from SNGs nationwide and
continued to needle the central government on its most important bilateral secu-
rity relationship. An Asahi Shinbun survey in February 1999 found that 177 SNGs
in 32 prefectures had adopted statements either protesting the revision of the
guidelines or expressing concern about them.45 Another report claimed that by
May 1999, 215 SNGs in 35 prefectures were demanding action against the
revised guidelines.46
There was diversity among SNGs, even in their resistance.47 For example, the
Kazo City assembly in Saitama Prefecture opposed the SASJ bill on the basis of
the City’s status supporting peace and ‘no nuclear’, and reaffirmed the principles
of global peace and security. The Nikko City assembly in Tochigi Prefecture went
further, declaring that for these reasons Nikko City ‘could’ not cooperate in
military resolution of disputes. The small SNG of Higashi Iwai Gun with a
population of approximately 20,000 in Iwate Prefecture resolved not to accept the
SASJ law on two grounds: (1) the cooperation required with the US military
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would expose local citizens to the US military’s oppressive behaviour, threaten-
ing citizens’ lives and security; and (2) the SASJ law violates the constitution.
A few SNGs indicated that the peace and security of their locality were already
threatened by low-flying US aircraft and they would not be able to endure further
intrusion under the new guidelines requiring them to make their ports and airports
available to the United States.48 The Nakagawa Gun assembly in Hokkaido went
so far as to demand that the Japanese government offer an apology to surround-
ing countries since peace must be the first consideration in foreign policy.49
One of the most controversial proposals came from Governor Hashimoto
Daijiro of Kochi, a small prefecture on Shikoku Island. In February 1999,
Governor Hashimoto proposed that the prefecture adopt a no-nuclear ordinance
to help the prefecture prevent foreign warships carrying nuclear weapons from
calling at the prefecture’s ports.50 It would also protest against the national gov-
ernment’s failure to cooperate in trying to resolve the problem of low-flying US
military aircraft passing over the prefecture. The governor’s proposal to regulate
foreign military ships through a ‘no-nuclear certificate’ ordinance – a legal
instrument – had more political muscle than the assembly resolution – an admin-
istrative instrument – used in Kobe’s prohibition formula.51 The Governor’s
proposal seriously alarmed policy-makers in Tokyo and Washington since it was
the first time that a prefecture proposed passing such an ordinance and the
national government had twin concerns and matching counterclaims against the
SNGs. First, it wanted to protect its foreign policy turf. Chief Cabinet Secretary
Nonaka Hiromu put forward stridently the claim that matters relating to defence
and diplomacy are within the jurisdiction of the national government and LDP
assembly members of Kochi Prefecture parroted Nonaka to declare foreign policy
issues outside the jurisdiction of SNGs.
Second, the national government claimed that Kochi’s proposed ordinance
would violate the constitution since Article 73 stipulates that management of for-
eign affairs is the responsibility of the cabinet. However, supporters of the Kochi
proposal challenged the national government’s position on the ground that Article
73 sets out the cabinet’s responsibility only in relation to the other two branches of
the national government, the judicial and legislative arms; since it does not define
the relationship between the national and subnational level of government, SNGs
are not bound by this article.52 Moreover, Article 94 of the constitution gives SNGs
‘the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their
own regulations within law’. And while Article 65 vests executive power in the
cabinet, the exception is in areas where power is already vested in SNGs.53
Newspapers flowed with opinions and editorials on this issue. Mainichi Daily
editorialized in favour of Kochi’s proposal on the basis that it was consistent with
the government’s three non-nuclear principles as the basis of national-security
policy. Kochi Prefecture was therefore taking steps to reinforce, not contravene,
national policy.54 Similarly, Asahi Shinbun questioned why a proposal giving
substance to the government’s three non-nuclear principles would arouse such
strong resentment on the government’s part. Asahi observed that the port law
leaves control of port facilities to SNGs partly in repentance for allowing the
military to have top priority in using port facilities during the Second World War.
The editorial went so far as to claim that the controversy had brought to light that
‘the three non-nuclear principles are fictional’ and reminded citizens of their
leaders’ fears that if a non-nuclear certificate is required of US vessels at a time
of crisis, Japan could not cooperate effectively with US forces.55
In the face of the media brouhaha and pressure from both the prefectural
assembly and the central government, Governor Hashimoto backed down on his
proposal. There was strong opposition from an LDP-dominated assembly and
only tepid support from the public and his peer group of governors. But although
the proposed ‘no nuclear’ ordinance did not eventuate in Kochi, other SNGs have
raised the prospect of establishing such an ordinance to follow the Kobe model.56
Johnston reported in 2001 that an estimated 20 local governments around Japan had
considered, or were considering, some version of the Kobe declaration, ‘not just to
keep nuclear weapons out, but to send a message to the US and to the central
government that they do not want to become pawns in a regional conflict’.57
The national government upholds that an assembly resolution does not have a
legal basis and that local assemblies’ resolutions and citizens’ requests do not
influence the administrative exercise of authority. Many still counter the former
claim, arguing through the legal logic of default that SNGs are not bound by law
to not declare themselves nuclear-free or to require foreign ships to certify the
absence of nuclear weapons in their cargo, since by law SNGs are ultimately
responsible for port management. But the second claim appears to be manifestly
proven in the Kochi example: citizens’ requests did not influence the administrative
exercise of authority – at least not at the national level that used political channels
through the top-down unitary system to subvert popular dissent at grassroots.
Nevertheless Kobe’s ‘no nuclear’ resolution on docking in its ports should
make it clear that a resolution can be a powerful tool for SNGs. Even though
without the legal force of an ordinance, it carried a load of potential to stimulate
copies by SNGs across the country. The potential threat that it raised to the
national government certainly made the Kobe precedent more than symbolic. In
this light, we see how revisions to the Japan–US Defence Cooperation Guidelines
and the SASJ law helped to intensify the impact of the Kobe port model on
Japan’s foreign relations and particularly on Japan’s most important bilateral
relationship, in the sensitive, hard-diplomacy area of security and defence.
Bases and facilities for US troops
We find very similar currents in the most overt and politically contentious
manifestation of the US–Japan Security Treaty inside Japan: the US bases. Here
too, the ‘international’ dimension of the security treaty has become the site on
which local politics is battled, again mostly because of the clash in the priorities
of subnational and national interests. The heavy presence of US troops in Japan
has been a festering sore for the SNGs that have US bases in their localities. Very
few SNGs have opposed the US–Japan Security Treaty outright, but they have
certainly struggled against the national government to obtain reduction of both
troops and intrusive military activities such as low-altitude flying and night-flying
exercises. Some have called for the bases to be totally withdrawn from their locality,
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a classic example of NIMBY (not in my backyard), although Okinawa’s protest
has been more about sharing responsibility for hosting bases throughout Japan.
SNG leaders have been elected and defeated on these issues.58
Here, we observe the Japanese national government taking shelter under the
US–Japan Security Treaty that it assumes will provide a national cloak of accept-
ability for its actions, while it shunts aside the serious concerns of citizens in locali-
ties whose lives are very much imposed upon by US bases. Some SNG leaders have
not hesitated to bypass the national government and appeal directly to Washington
through petitions and personal visits to concerned authorities and other interest
groups, including the media. Let us consider two very important examples of these
localities. Okinawa, Japan’s southernmost prefecture, has the heaviest concentration
of US bases in Japan and is relatively distant from Tokyo, while Zushi is a city that
houses a US base quite close to Tokyo – politically as well as geographically.
Okinawa
Okinawa is historically very distinctive within the Japanese national context.
It was assimilated into Japan as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879 after the Japanese
government deposed the last king of what was until then the Ryukyu Kingdom.59
Okinawa was a site of fierce battle during the Second World War when some
230,000 lives were lost. Okinawa is also geostrategically distinctive, as a pivot to
and from East Asia. The island chain is physically quite removed from the rest of
the Japanese archipelago, with the Pacific Ocean on one side, and the East China
Sea and beyond it mainland China and Taiwan, on the other.
After Japan’s defeat by the Allied Forces in 1945, Okinawa was kept under US
occupation until 1972. Particularly during the Occupation and throughout the Cold
War period, US authorities saw Okinawa as strategically crucial to their security
design for Asia–Pacific. Thus, even after the return of sovereignty to Japan,
Okinawa remained home to a heavy concentration of US troops in Asia–Pacific,
by far the largest within Japan. The end of the Cold War and changes in regional
geopolitics did not change Okinawa’s status as the most concentrated base for
US troops. Okinawa has less than 1 per cent of Japan’s land area but hosts some
75 per cent of all US troops based in Japan. Accidents and misdemeanours arising
from the bases abound. SNGs in Okinawa have continued to oppose the intrusion
of the bases on their localities, which the local people see as ‘discrimination’
against them. Tokyo has continued its cool response to their demands for fairer
treatment, upholding the nation’s critical security treaty with the United States.60
Reported cases of rape of local citizens by US servicemen since the 1972
reversion exceed 100. After a US serviceman raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl in
1995, locals could no longer suppress their anger and mounted opposition to the
US-bases policy on an unprecedented scale. The rape incident inspired a ‘people’s
rally’ of 85,000 participants protesting at how policies made in Tokyo about US
bases in Okinawa overrode Okinawan interests.61 Okinawa Governor Ota
Masahide (1990–98) fought firmly for his prefecture’s interests, using legal and
popular mechanisms.
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Governor Ota demanded that the number of US troops be reduced immediately.
Then he went much further; he refused to sign land-lease agreements associated
with the US bases by challenging the tenuous legal basis on which the national
government takes prerogative over Okinawan land for these bases.62 The Supreme
Court rejected Ota’s law suit in August 1996. Yet, there is no doubt that if the gov-
ernor had not taken such a recalcitrant stance and spoken out with conviction for
the ordinary residents of Okinawa, the national government would not have taken
up the issue of crime and other grievances arising from the bases in Okinawa to
the level that it actually did. Ironically, here the issue was certainly ‘security’, but
for whom and of what? At the local level in Okinawa, security must include pro-
tecting ordinary people from crime and personal harm, which may well arise from
intrusive US bases right within their localities. At the national level, as construed
by politicians in Tokyo, security is a matter of protecting national borders from
external intruders. For the national government, the US military help to repel
external intruders; for the people of Okinawa and their local leaders, members of
the US military are the external intruders.
To protect local interests, Governor Ota negotiated with the national govern-
ment, challenged it in the courts and travelled with delegations several times to the
United States to seek the support and understanding of US officials and the
American public. Both the Japanese national government and the US leadership
appeared to take the challenge rather seriously. US President Bill Clinton publicly
expressed regret over the incident and his administration established jointly with
the Japanese government a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).63 In
the previous year, the Japanese government agreed to establish the Consultative
Committee on Okinawa Base Problems (Okinawa Beigun Kichi Mondai Kyogikai)
for prefectural representatives to negotiate directly with top-ranking national offi-
cials on matters concerning the US bases in Okinawa, the first of its kind in Japan.
Thus, by 1996 the prefectural government had forced two sets of direct negotiation
processes between the three key players to address the US bases problem – one set
between Okinawa and Tokyo, the other between the Japanese and US governments.
Ota’s tough stance on the bases issue brought the relationship between
Okinawa and Tokyo from a center–periphery type onto a more equal footing. Ota
sought to change not only national policy on US military bases in Okinawa, but
also the process by which this policy is made. It meant seeking a greater role for
prefectural governments in contributing to national policy on security and
defence matters, the very policy area that the national government is most
reluctant to relinquish. Ota’s response to the 1995 rape incident and the public
outpouring of anger that it inspired, forced the Japanese government to
renegotiate with him over continued use of US bases under his SNG prefectural
administration.64 Some have observed in Ota a new breed of determined local
politician who was willing to oppose the national government when national
policies undermined local welfare.65
In 1996, Ota and his supporters stridently opposed the relocation of Futenma
Air Base to a floating/anchored airfield. Futenma symbolized the base-related
concerns of Okinawans such as aircraft-noise pollution and the danger of crashes.
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The base occupied a quarter of the total area of Ginowan City, right in the city’s
centre. Roads, waterworks and sewerage systems had to be detoured around
the air station and the height of buildings near the base was restricted to avoid
inconvenience to approaching US aircraft. These presented major obstacles to
improving the city’s infrastructure.66 Ota’s opposition was not to the SACO
recommendation that Futenma Base be moved, but to the chosen site for the
replacement heliport offshore from Nago and still in Okinawa. Ota and his sup-
porters saw the relocation as a burden to all Okinawans, particularly those near
Nago and the local assemblies in Kadena and Nago affected by the recommenda-
tions passed unanimous resolutions against the construction of the proposed
heliport.67 A 1997 referendum in Nago City that rejected the relocation created
further difficulty for the Japanese and the US governments.
In the following year, Ota lost the gubernatorial election. As a progressive
governor supported by leftist parties, Ota could not prevent the erosion of his
public support by the national government effectively threatening to hold back
economic aid to the prefecture if an anti-base candidate were re-elected. Pro-base,
LDP-supported Inamine Keiichi won the election. Inamine has taken a deliber-
ately conciliatory approach but has requested that the US bases in Okinawa be
used only up to 2015.68 Despite his political colour, Governor Inamine shares
Ota’s feelings that the US military presence must be reduced and makes similar
demands on the Japanese government to renegotiate the 1972 Status of Forces
Agreement that governs operation and management of US troops in Japan.69
Local resistance to the US bases in Okinawa gives us useful insights into SNGs
as international actors. First, we see how SNGs can be drawn into the international
arena whether they seek this role or not. They can become potent diplomatic actors
by harnessing popular support to challenge the central government on such crucial
national matters as defence and security, with serious implications for Japan’s
foreign policy.70 Second, we observe the capacity of SNGs to act independently,
especially when their SNG policy priorities conflict with those of the national
government and few other SNGs share so deeply a particular concern (such as
intrusive US bases). Okinawa is not a sovereign entity and cannot stand on an equal
footing with national government in Tokyo or Washington. Yet, Governor Ota built
a direct bridge between Naha and Washington and his six visits to the city resulted
in closer ties between authorities in Okinawa and the US administration.
This highlights the third lesson: the value for SNGs of making direct contact
with parties abroad, including potential allies as well as adversaries. Direct
personal links with Washington gave Okinawa some bargaining power with the
Japanese government that it could not have developed without the direct contact.
Some SNGs have learned strategically that they can bolster not only their access
to the centre’s favours but also their own capacity to influence Japan’s foreign
affairs through building bridges and forming alliances directly with the media,
public opinion makers, pressure groups and politicians beyond the national
boundaries. The fourth lesson comes in on the previous point: the capacity of
the national government as SNG paymaster and policy-maker to firm up its
diplomatic ground by using an ultimate political retaliation: money and political
favour. It can threaten to wield financial stick and to withhold financial carrot
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to help create local political conditions that are more conducive to the prefer-
ences of the national government as we see with Ota’s gubernatorial loss and
Inamine’s win.
Finally we see the unmistakable influence of an SNG leader’s personal style.
Under the Progressive Governor Ota, Okinawa was very much at the forefront of
opposing the heavy concentration of US troops and further pressuring the central
government to reconsider its national security arrangements with the United
States. Governor Ota took initiative, direct action and determinedly resisted pres-
sure from the central government to toe the line on national security or at least not
to redraw the line further back inside SNG policy territory. In this sense, Ota is a
good example of how the work of SNG leaders to challenge the US–Japan
Security Treaty can help to uphold the norm of anti-militarism.71 The case of
Zushi City, to which we turn here, illustrates this further.
Zushi City
Zushi City is in Kanagawa Prefecture neighbouring Tokyo, and so is much closer
to the main stage of national politics than the far flung islands of Okinawa.72 In the
mid-1980s, residents of Zushi City mounted a movement against a proposal to
construct a housing complex for the families of US military personnel. Since the
housing complex was to be situated in a 290-hectare forest area of the Ikego Hills,
residents opposed the site of the housing to protect local flora and fauna. This
is more a combination of concern for the environment and NIMBY opposition
than Okinawa’s resistance. Voters forced out of office the incumbent pro-
housing complex mayor who served as ‘agent’ of the national government, and
voted in a local leader to serve the interests of most Zushi residents who stridently
opposed both the complex and the national government’s position on it. Pro-
conservation mayor Tomino Kiichiro, elected in November 1984 to oppose the
proposed housing, took the movement from the local to the national and interna-
tional arenas. His appeal to the national government had yielded the response that
the Japanese government could really do very little. The housing complex was
in response to the US government demand for this facility under the ‘overriding’
mandate of the US–Japan Security Treaty, so the national government’s hands were
tied – or perhaps were holding on tightly to those of their top security partner.
In February 1988 after some three and a half years in office, Mayor Tomino
went to the United States to solicit American understanding. He intended that his
visit to explain the position of Zushi residents to the US public and policy-makers
would also provide proof that US-style liberal democracy had taken root in 
post-war Japan. He advised the US authorities that some 70 per cent of Zushi
residents supported the Security Treaty, but that a large bulk of his constituents
firmly rejected the housing plan seeking to preserve the ecology of the Ikego
forest. The mayor drew no assurances from the authorities in the United States,
but his visit generated a great deal of support from other quarters, especially from
NGOs and academics specializing on US–Japan relations.
The housing complex went ahead in the name of the US–Japan Security Treaty
and what the national government claimed as the national interest, despite
158 Hard diplomacy: SNGs and national security
grassroots opposition and a slim band of overseas support. Yet, not only did
opposition considerably slow the project and its completion, it also served as 
a lesson for the national government and the US authorities that the acquiescence of
local residents in Japan should not be taken for granted. Here, the citizens of Zushi
indicated that they would no longer silently accept ‘orders from above’ and would
struggle to protect their local ecological interests, even if these conflicted with the
housing complex that the national government tied to the US–Japan Security Treaty
as an inviolable national interest. Like the Okinawa opposition movement, the Zushi
movement shows that SNGs can make it difficult for the national government to
presumptuously impose its policy priorities on seemingly vulnerable localities, in
the name of the Security Treaty, national defence and the national interest, when
these trample upon the priorities and the well-being of local residents.
To conclude this section, the case studies considered here make it clear that the
US–Japan security relationship is indeed a site of continued tensions between
the national and subnational governments. The cases examined demonstrate how
SNGs are becoming linked inextricably in the politics of such vital national
concerns as peace and war, nuclear-weapons policy, and Japan’s relations with its
most valued security partner, the United States. These matters have enormous impli-
cations for Japan’s foreign policy, particularly national-security policy, and for how
and by whom these national policies are implemented and decided. Here SNGs are
articulating the dissenting voices of the people, triggering public debate and ques-
tioning the national government on highly sensitive national-security matters. As
throughout this chapter, we see that the SNGs are pursuing local interests that have
a quite different, lower priority for both the national government and other SNGs in
different geo-strategic, economic and political circumstances elsewhere in Japan.
Territorial issues
Another area involving hard diplomacy is territorial disputes, which like the
previous sections in this chapter concern not just national sovereignty but also
national security. Japan has disputes with a few of its neighbouring nations in
relation to territorial claims. The issue of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands or
Diaoyutai (Chinese term) flares from time to time between China and Japan,
leading to claims and counterclaims by both parties.73 Similarly, Japan and South
Korea have a long-standing dispute over a group of strategically insignificant
islands, the Takeshima (in Japanese) or Tokdo (in Korean). These disputes have
sporadically become sites of nationalistic fervour and have led to occasional
grandstanding at the political level, but neither has reached anywhere near the
point of a breakdown in the national-government relationships between Tokyo
and Beijing or Tokyo and Seoul.
The ongoing dispute between Japan and Russia over the island territories north of
Hokkaido is, however, a quite different concern – with much greater political and
diplomatic import and deep-seated tension. Both national governments have
remained instransigent in their claims to sovereignty. Because of this, Japan and
Russia have yet to sign a peace treaty for a war that ended in 1945 and official
relations are still rather frosty even with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.
Sixty years after Russia (then as lynchpin in the Soviet Union) took control of the
disputed territory at the end of the Second World War, little progress has been made
in resolving this dispute as both national governments hold on to national pride and
the desire to control this strategic patch between northern Hokkaido and southern
Sakhalin. The Japanese refer to it as Hoppo ryodo (the Northern Territories).
The territory under dispute comprises four islands: Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan and the Habomai islets. These are currently held by Russia but Japan
lays claim to them on historical and legal grounds.74 Despite the rigid attitude of
the Japanese and Russian national leaderships to the territorial issue, SNGs in both
countries have shown a much more flexible stance. Some have forged multifaceted
relationships in the face of powerful resistance at the national level, as we have
seen in earlier chapters concerning SNGs’ cooperation and economic programmes.
In this discussion of Japanese SNGs’ views and responses on the territorial dis-
pute, we therefore bring to light an important but usually unrecognized aspect:
some SNGs very much desire resolution and are trying actively to achieve it. Their
localities have a strong interest in resolving national-level tensions.
These SNGs are working to develop an underlay of economic interdependence,
personal linkages and strong goodwill believing that this will prepare the way for a
better bilateral relationship at the national levels of government and eventually for
signing a peace treaty between the two nations. Some prefectures and cities have
actively sought cultural and economic ties with Russia for some time and even dur-
ing the Cold War. Our discussion here will focus on Hokkaido Prefecture and
SNGs within it. This prefecture is geographically closest to the four disputed islands
and naturally has a vested interest in good neighbourly relations with the RFE that
is its neighbour just above the disputed islands.
Hokkaido, like Okinawa, has worked actively on hard-core diplomatic issues.
Hokkaido’s diplomatic activities are more systematic, persistent and structured
than those of other prefectures.75 Its SNGs from prefectural to village level firmly
believe that through subnational activism they can help to create an environment
that will eventually lead the two nations to sign a peace treaty. The Hokkaido
Prefectural Government and other municipalities have played a crucial role in
ensuring that the long-standing territorial dispute between Japan and the former
Soviet Union/now Russia did not get out of hand even during the heightened
tensions of the Cold War years. They forged cultural and economic ties even
during the Soviet period, as discussed in earlier chapters.
The Foreign Ministry has opposed Hokkaido’s activism when the Ministry has
perceived it to be out of sync with the national government’s approach. In Chapter 5
we considered a classic example of hard diplomacy by all players when the
Foreign Ministry barred Hokkaido Prefecture from establishing a prefectural
office in Sakhalin in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, skilful diplomatic manoeu-
vring by the Prefecture SNG enabled it to establish as good an office, not contra-
vene the Ministry’s directives and pave the way for the central government to open
a consular office in Sakhalin’s capital city Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and subsequently
open the Prefecture’s own official office in that city.
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Hokkaido’s strategic importance was heightened considerably during the Cold
War, as part of a northern frontier for the Western alliance. Sakhalin and the Kuril
Islands served as crucial strategic points for the Soviet Union in defence against
US-led forces in East Asia. Hokkaido was therefore a key location for protecting
Japanese territory from possible Soviet invasion, for both Japan and the United
States. Sakhalin and Hokkaido were both heavily militarized. Japan deployed
some 40 per cent of its SDF facilities to Hokkaido to defend Japan against possi-
ble attack from the north. Even in such an environment of military hostility, some
Hokkaido SNGs made diplomatic initiatives towards neighbours to the north and
conducted low-key cultural and economic programmes at the SNG level despite
Cold War tensions.
The end of the Cold War and dismantling of the Soviet Union has brought little
progress towards settlement of the territorial dispute while both sides play ‘the wait-
ing game’.76 The Japanese government maintains its uncompromising policy of ‘no
territorial settlement, no economic cooperation’, although in the late 1990s, ‘new
thinking’ appeared to have emerged within the Foreign Ministry to not always link
politics with economics.77 SNGs on both sides unequivocally support their national
governments’ claims to the territories, but this has not stopped SNGs on either side
from pursuing their local interests in the more relaxed post-Cold War environment.
Some SNGs have demonstrated great pragmatism in their capacity to facilitate res-
olution of the dispute through various mutually beneficial cooperative arrange-
ments. They see tension at the national level as compulsion for them to work as
bridge builders till such tensions are resolved.78 In this capacity, they are certainly
functioning at least as surrogate diplomats in a sensitive area of hard diplomacy.
In 2000, the governors of Sakhalin and Hokkaido signed agreements on
economic cooperation, environmental protection and disaster prevention measures
as well as ways to improve regional relations.79 Sakhalin’s Governor Farkhutdinov
has proposed a plan under which Russians and Japanese could both live in the dis-
puted islands under joint management and Russian sovereignty. Governors on both
sides see that the territories need foreign investment for development, which has
been a spur to the SNGs’ cooperative programmes. Hokkaido Governor Yokomichi
Takahiro (1987–95) and his successor Hori Tatsuya (1995–2003)80 took practical
steps to develop regional cooperation and contacts for settlement of the territorial
issue. Although the Foreign Ministry discouraged economic interaction with the
islands, Governors Yokomichi and Hori upheld the view that regional interaction
would serve as a foundation for successful settlement of the territorial dispute.81
Dialogue ’92 was an important diplomatic initiative of Governor Yokomichi.
He pursued the dialogue eagerly not just to meet the principal aim of holding
serious discussion on the territorial issue, but also to make the point to the
Japanese government that a prefectural leader was capable of organizing such a
serious dialogue.82 Sakhalin responded positively to the initiative since with the
Cold War over, the RFE and other regions in the Russian Republic had just
entered a new era of regionalism where they could act independently of Moscow
in pursuit of regional interests.83 Yet the Japanese Foreign Ministry was less
willing to hand over responsibility to an SNG. The Ministry frowned upon
Hokkaido’s independent action and deputed a high-ranking official to the meeting
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to keep the Ministry informed of developments. It was the first time that residents
of the two regions met to discuss the Northern Territories problem at an open
forum, and drew praise as an unprecedented, epoch-making event, where local
governments discussed a territorial problem involving state sovereignty.84
The implementation of visa-free visits in the early 1990s was another landmark
development in which SNG leaders played a crucial role. Successive Hokkaido
governors conducted a major campaign to make it possible for the former resi-
dents of the disputed territories who now live in Hokkaido to visit their ancestral
land. The visa-free visits arrangement was announced at a meeting between Prime
Minister Kaifu Toshiki and President Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1991 and in
October the foreign ministers of the two nations signed an agreement on the
scheme.85 Under this programme, Hokkaido and Sakhalin accepted exchanges
involving current residents of the disputed islands and former residents of the
islands who now reside in Japan. This arrangement was based on Yokomichi’s
conviction about the benefits of regional cooperation and person-to-person
connections to build mutual understanding and trust and eventually to achieve a
territorial settlement.86
Okuyama argues that successive governors in Hokkaido have pursued regional
linkages in the hope that these will produce political leverage for them to help set-
tle the territorial dispute.87 Certainly, pressures from both the local community
and the Hokkaido regional administration to develop regional cooperation helped
to nudge the central government to modify its principles, replacing its policy of
tying together politics and economics with a strategy of ‘expanded equilibrium’
and a multi-dimensional approach in the 1990s.88 Since the mid-1990s, the
Japanese government has given financial support to some large development
projects such as Sakhalin II and has backed Russia’s entry into the Asia–Pacific
regional forum, APEC.
But SNG leaders have been able to pursue an alternative approach to this
knotty diplomatic issue only because they had strong local support for their posi-
tion. Local perception of the issue in Hokkaido generally differs from the national
government stance. Polling of Hokkaido residents taken in the mid-1990s found
very few residents supported the national government’s position that politics and
economics must be linked and more than 70 per cent favoured economic cooper-
ation even without a political solution of the dispute. They see that promoting
regional economic assistance, creating effective communication networks and
interchange of personnel between the two regions will help towards resolving
the territorial dispute.89 Yet, viewpoints vary depending on local and personal
interests. For example, fishers in Nemuro, which is adjacent to the disputed
islands and the frontline in the Northern Territories Return Movement, generally
favour return of only two of the four islands (presumably Habomai and Shikotan)
as once agreed in the 1950s, since this could be achieved more quickly than hold-
ing out for all four and would give them access to the islands’ rich fishing
grounds. Some Hokkaido residents claimed they are not concerned if sovereignty
over the islands is not ever returned to Japan.90
Both the central government and Hokkaido Prefecture SNG have an interest in
halting the spread of such ideas and maintaining national unity on the claim to
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all four islands.91 Hokkaido Prefecture SNG has always upheld the national
government’s position affirming Japan’s full claim on the territories, if not the
best way to secure their return even while some in Hokkaido accept a more
relaxed position on sovereignty. The prefectural SNG has tried to promote
regional cooperation and to create an environment conducive to a peace treaty,
since the SNG sees these to be in the prefecture’s economic and diplomatic inter-
ests. But it has never deviated from the national government’s position on return
of sovereignty. Importantly for Hokkaido, if the islands are returned to Japanese
sovereignty, Hokkaido will be the administering SNG, replacing Sakhalin which
currently holds administrative jurisdiction. This factor may also inspire the
Hokkaido Prefecture SNG’s careful diplomacy on the disputed territory issue.
Other political and diplomatic issues
Let us turn to consider the contributions of individual SNG leaders to the hard
diplomacy of their SNGs. This provides another set of insights into how SNGs
become involved in hard diplomacy, in this context through the distinctive
personal styles of their individual leaders.
Governor Ishihara Shintaro of Tokyo is notorious for his inflammatory remarks
about other countries and their citizens. Before his election as governor of the
largest, most powerful SNG in the country, he gained an international reputation
for his fiery publication, The Japan that Can Say No. Here, he added fuel to an
already heated debate on US–Japan relations through his techno-nationalist posi-
tion that Japan can simply ignore the United States, or say ‘no’.92 As governor of
Tokyo, he has continued the outbursts criticizing some of Japan’s most important
regional neighbours, particularly China. He claimed publicly that in times of
major disasters, very serious riots could occur involving sangokujin (literally
‘third-nation residents’ but usually understood as a derogatory reference to
Chinese and Koreans). While in Taiwan in May 2000 to mark the inauguration of
President Chen Shui-bian, he remarked that ‘Jiang Zemin should not annex
Taiwan by force, because such an action could make him be perceived as the
Hitler of China.’93 A year later, in an attention-grabbing interview with Business
Week, he claimed China is the world’s only remaining empire.94 He again
criticized China’s attitude towards Taiwan and its positioning of nuclear weapons
at India. And to raise the hackles at home he spoke of China’s irredentist position
on Okinawa, claiming that one day China might claim ownership on historical
grounds. He welcomed US President George W. Bush’s election in 2000 since
Bush would be tougher on China than his predecessor. He perceives a new kind
of cold war played out between the United States and China, with danger that
Japan might be caught in the crossfire.
The media and the public now expect Ishihara’s polemical words to pack a
heavy political punch. He was formerly an influential LDP politician who served
as minister in the national government, and now as governor of the nation’s most
powerful SNG he has huge influence nationwide and beyond. Today, Ishihara is
renowned for his diatribes, which some observers see as a political strategy to
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gain popular support. In terms of what this says about his capacity for hard
diplomacy, since he speaks as Tokyo governor his words are seen internationally
as carrying some political and electoral weight. He does, after all, have fairly
strong support in SNG elections. Some may also perceive that because of his
experience in national politics and his present place, virtually at the apogee of the
local-level administrations, Ishihara sometimes voices what other politicians, par-
ticularly in the national government, feel that they cannot voice. To whatever
extent he truly represents the interests of constituents who elect him to office,
Ishihara certainly delivers some of the hardest diplomacy of any politician in the
country and sometimes, because of external perception that his views reflect
those of his country, he creates hard diplomacy for the national government.
While representing Japan’s most populous SNG, Ishihara has projected a
negative image of Japan’s powerful and crucial neighbour China. Other leaders,
however, have worked tirelessly through SNGs to improve relations with Japan’s
neighbouring nations. One is Governor Katayama of Japan’s least populous pre-
fecture, Tottori. This governor talks of substance over form and focuses on real
links between people – software rather than empty hardware. Katayama has taken
initiatives to opening ‘pipelines’ to North Korea through visiting in an unofficial
capacity. In August 2002, he sought to open a regular sea route to Tottori, moving
beyond intermittent vessels carrying to Tottori their cargos of crab. Katayama has
even criticized what he sees is the Foreign Ministry’s rushed approach to ‘nor-
malization’ of relations with North Korea, which he claims is out of sync with
public opinion. He believes educating the Japanese public about North Korea is
the first step towards building a better relationship; the bilateral relationship
should not be normalized until the Japanese community has some understanding
of North Korea and no longer fears its unidentified vessels and Taepodong mis-
siles.95 Although favouring improvement of relations with North Korea, he is also
emphatic that the North Korean government must inform the citizenry of its
actions (including abduction of Japanese citizens and so forth).96
SNGs have showed resilience and are not necessarily swayed by swings of
national mood due to international developments. When relations between Japan
and the Soviet Union cooled after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979 and the Russian downing of a civilian aircraft in the Republic of Korea in
1983, the Russia–Japan Governors meetings were suspended. But Niigata City
authorities were resilient in the face of national-government resistance and did
not suspend the Coastal Mayors meetings, which continued as before. As Ichioka
observed, ‘Niigata’s view was that national diplomacy and local diplomacy have
different interests in international affairs’.97 More recently, at the time of the Iraq
War, many SNGs passed a resolution against Japan’s endorsement of the US-led
coalition’s invasion of Iraq, which was not backed by a UN resolution. By late
February 2003, at least 112 local assemblies had passed resolutions against the
US-led invasion of Iraq and favoured a peaceful resolution via the United
Nations. These included the nine prefectures of Hokkaido, Fukushima, Kyoto,
Osaka, Hyogo, Kagawa, Tokushima, Fukuoka and Oita and the five designated
cities (seirei shitei toshi) of Sapporo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Osaka and Kobe.98
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Conclusion
The preceding discussion challenges conventional wisdom that the hard-core
diplomatic issues of war, peace, territorial conflict, security and defence are
exclusive jurisdictions of Japan’s national government. Many Japanese SNGs
have pursued some of these issues and are becoming more active than ever in
these pursuits. Some actions by SNGs such as non-nuclear declarations may
mostly have symbolic value, but even on this matter Kobe demonstrated a much
more instrumental outcome in banning US nuclear-bearing warships. Other
pursuits such as promoting peace internationally through advocacy and network-
ing may also not influence the course of Japanese policy. But some actions such
as those taken by Okinawa and Hokkaido at Japan’s far south and far north
have impacted upon national policy, just as national policy has impacted –
deleteriously – upon these prefectures. They pursue their interests passionately
while national-security policy impinges deeply on the lives of their local citizens.
With the end of the Cold War and easing of conventional security issues, both
Hokkaido and Okinawa are inclined to take an independent position on issues of
security and national territory. Nevertheless, they are by no means the only SNGs
to resist the national government’s position on matters of hard diplomacy. 
A number of other SNGs, as discussed throughout this chapter, have pursued
some locally contentious issues with full political force, and in some cases were
successful in forcing national policy to accommodate subnational concerns.
What do we learn from this discussion of hard diplomacy in relation to this
book’s two central strands: the impact on the national–subnational relationship
and implications for the management of Japan’s foreign relations?
First, despite sharing views on certain policy matters, the national government
and the SNGs pursue different lines of action as the policy priorities determined
by national and subnational governments diverge. Both levels of government, for
example, hold similar views on controversial diplomatic issues of the Northern
Territories and North Korea. But some SNGs because of their proximity to the
disputed areas and in pursuit of local economic and politico-strategic benefits,
pursue different strategies with the aim of securing friendly and interdependent
relations at the subnational level despite tensions at the national level. The exam-
ples of Tottori, Niigata and Hokkaido in relation to North Korea and the RFE
clearly illustrate this point. The national government does not easily allow SNGs
to take action where it perceives this action to work against national policy. And
where SNGs do not conform with the central government’s perception of the
national interest, the central bodies generally achieve compliance through advice
and negotiation. Where this fails, legal, constitutional, juridical and political tools
are put to work. We have seen this in Hokkaido’s proposal to open an office in
Sakhalin, Kobe’s declaration requiring no-nuclear certificates, Kochi’s attempts to
follow the ‘Kobe model’ and Okinawa’s refusal to renew land leases for US bases.
As discussed, SNGs do not acquiesce easily to the central government. They can-
not contravene national laws or the constitution, but some have demonstrated their
creative capacity to find other routes to satisfy their local interests through areas
where they have regulatory capacity, such as ports and streets. Hokkaido was able to
open an office in Sakhalin via an alternative arrangement to the one the national
government prohibited. Some SNGs have even challenged the national government
on legal grounds such as Okinawa contending against the national government in
the Supreme Court. Some SNGs have appealed directly to the people and policy-
makers overseas to garner support for their cause, as did both Okinawa and Zushi
appealing to US authorities and opinion-makers. Neither was completely successful
in achieving their desired results, but both were able to influence the course of
Japanese national policy to accommodate local priorities: the crucial issues of hous-
ing facilities for US military personnel in Zushi and stationing of US troops through-
out Okinawa. Most noteworthy is that in both cases the policy-making process
concerned US bases, which are a central plank in Japan’s national security arrange-
ment with the United States. This is a fiercely protected domain of the national
government and yet SNGs were able to break both new policy ground and old
boundaries on exclusive bureaucratic turf. Here the need for nationwide sharing of
the burden of national defence – and US bases are popularly recognized across Japan
as a burden on any local community – was brought into the policy arena and the need
for compensation was used for political leverage over the central government.
Some SNGs do more in their international reach than self-interestedly pursue
local concerns. Some have also tried to pursue humanitarian concerns by pro-
moting peace and disarmament through advocacy and international networking.
The Mayors for Peace movement and Hiroshima’s role in it are noteworthy. These
movements have help to act as a counter force to some national-government pol-
icy preferences, particularly through criticizing the actions of Japan’s most impor-
tant ally, the United States. Their actions usually have not brought immediate
results and must always accommodate political pressures from multiple sources,
but they nevertheless act as a partial restraint on unbridled national-government
policy action.
Nation states are still the main actors in issues that involve national sovereignty.
Here, particularly when the national government sees that national security is
brought into contention, this level of government stands firm; pluralism is not on
this agenda. Nevertheless, international and domestic circumstances push or pull
other actors such as SNGs into the complex web of strategic issues concerned
with security, war and peace. The cases we have examined through this chapter
reveal that national governments can no longer simply ignore the views of SNGs
on these matters. Now SNGs put their viewpoints into action that compels the
national government to respond. Security for the Japanese people no longer fits
the national government’s conventional definition of ‘national security’ and
responsibility to spread the burdens of achieving this national security has been
forced further to register in the channels where national-policy decisions are
made. SNGs as the level of government working in closest contact with the
people they represent have brought the voice of the people from villages, towns,
cities and regions across Japan to register in national policy. SNGs have come
some way in meeting with the national government’s hard diplomacy to accom-
modate the preferences of the people nationwide who all levels of government are
elected to represent.
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Conclusion
Early in the twenty-first century, Japanese SNGs are clearly becoming significant
actors in the international arena. In the last two decades, they have developed
wide-ranging policies and spent millions of dollars annually within and outside
Japan, pursuing international activities very similar to those taken up earlier by
counterparts in the West. In Asia, Japan’s SNGs have rapidly become the pioneers
of such international activism. This is despite their relatively late start and has
occurred without fanfare or acknowledgement of their evolving role as vital
players in Japan’s international affairs. As Arase notes astutely:
In their development visions Japanese subnational authorities in the postwar
period viewed their relationship with Tokyo as central and the international
dimension as peripheral. Today, however, almost without exception these
actors locate themselves in a global setting with their proximity to foreign
neighbours a point of emphasis.1
SNGs’ reach into international affairs is not surprising as much of ‘the local’ is
now internationally conditioned. Forces driven by technological revolution, the
globalization of capital and markets and the ending of the Cold War have trig-
gered a reconfiguration of the international arena and the nature of Japan’s polit-
ical economy within it. These factors have enmeshed national and local policies
and therefore also all levels of government, across international as well as
national concerns. Yet, the new conditions have also created new areas of compe-
tition and further unhinged the alignment of interests and priorities between and
within the players each side of the national–subnational divide. We therefore see
a new arrangement of alliances, cleavages, flexibilities and possibilities between
and within players in the subnational and national levels. We also observe more
complex interdependence between levels of government as SNGs are drawn
further into more strategically entangled international roles. Many Japanese SNGs
have become diplomatic entities because of their international pursuits and
in spite of the will of some of the central bureaucracies.
The rise of SNGs as significant international actors has profound implications
for Japanese politics. Two of the most important have been addressed throughout
this book: (1) national–subnational relations; and (2) the management of Japan’s
international affairs. In this brief conclusion, we draw together the findings from
each chapter to make overall observations on both domains. We then consider the
implications of both for the capacity of SNGs to operate as local administrators.
We close by considering what conclusions can be drawn about the overall role of
Japan’s SNGs as international actors and future prospects arising from recent
developments in this arena.
Subnational–national government relations
Some studies of domestic policies have concluded that the Japanese state is more
complex than the term ‘centralized’ connotes. SNGs have more autonomy from
the central government than is generally understood, but both the degree and the
exercise of autonomy are diverse, depending on such factors as the SNGs’ loca-
tion, political leadership and resources available.2 This observation is also true of
the SNGs’ actions in international affairs. The structure of Japan’s unitary system
of government has shaped but not determined the international roles that SNGs
develop and indeed by now we can also speak of a reverse flow of influence: the
international roles of Japanese SNGs surely do not determine the structure of
Japan’s system of government but they have reached a stage where they surely do
influence the power relationships exercised within this unitary system, as demon-
strated throughout the book.
We have seen here the various ways in which SNGs have pursued international
action to increase their financial and policy autonomy from the national govern-
ment, which in a limited way makes them more independent political entities.
Conversely, the national government has needed to call on the SNGs and incorpo-
rate their international activities within foreign policy to meet the multiple-
policy demands that the national level is unable to address but that which the SNGs
can perform efficiently. The Foreign Ministry has decentralized some foreign-policy
areas, such as ODA delivery and cultural relations, so that SNGs have some
responsibility for their international actions. But institutional arrangements have
also been established to enable the central government authorities in Tokyo to
guide, coordinate and supervise much of this action. This is consistent with the
ethos of the central government that national sovereignty and national security are
the last bastions of ‘foreign affairs’ and thus central to its bureaucratic prerogative.
Clearly, the evolution of SNGs as international actors has induced a more com-
plex, interdependent relationship between the national and subnational levels. It
coincides with and in some ways precipitates new competitive forces that realign
the domestic and international interests of players on both sides and compel new
and more flexible alliances across a range of parties inside Japan and beyond.
Neither national nor subnational levels are monolithic – in their disposition, their
interests, or their ways of pursuing their interests. Some incompatibility arises
from the different priorities that each government body pursues to best meet the
perceived needs of their constituency. It produces conflict even on matters of
hard-core diplomacy such as management of the US–Japan security treaty.
Although this treaty is the lynchpin of Japan’s security policy, some SNGs have
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tenaciously resisted the national government in its management of some aspects
of the treaty such as in Okinawa.
Yet the expansion of SNGs’ international roles and the parallel pluralization
of foreign policy mean that there are also more areas for cooperation between
both levels of government and with other actors that have both international
and domestic interests. Sometimes SNGs work in partnership with the central
government or with guidance and advice from it. Some SNGs work collectively
in regional and micro-regional groups, particularly for pursuing economic aims.
Some have also demonstrated a surprising degree of independence in their inter-
national pursuits and some pursue careful strategic planning that functions as
local foreign policy without government guidance or support. National and
subnational governments appear to share interests most strongly in the SNGs’
international economic pursuits, but the motivations of both sides differ some-
what. The national government keenly supports these economic pursuits with an
eye on resuscitating the national economy. SNGs are eager not just for local eco-
nomic benefit but also for the partial liberation from the national government that
their economic self-sustenance brings.
It is difficult to identify the type, extent and value of the political leverage that
SNGs gain from their international engagements and the manner in which they use
this leverage in domestic and international political life. SNGs derive from their
international involvements some combination of financial and policy indepen-
dence, valuable international connections experience and confidence in their capac-
ity to act independently of the national level and collectively with other SNGs
within and outside Japan. All of these enhance the political cachet that SNGs use in
their overall politicking with the central government. Valuable diplomatic cachet
is likely to derive from SNGs’ successful pursuit of the international relationships
that the central government cannot and will not pursue at all. These relationships
provide the national government with a viable and legitimate alternative to its own
incapacity and provide the SNG with expectation of a later reward.
Management of Japan’s international affairs
SNG involvement in international affairs is one of many indications that interna-
tional diplomacy is no longer the sole preserve of the national government in
Japan as elsewhere. The transformation of the nation-state system has forced the
Japanese government to incorporate the contributions of subnational and non-state
actors within the nation’s international diplomacy. Particularly from the mid-1990s,
the Foreign Ministry has followed a path of cautiously pluralizing Japan’s foreign-
policy actors because the Ministry and other central government bodies could not
effectively meet what the foreign-policy slogan cast as ‘Japan’s international con-
tributions’. These ‘contributions’, ranging from foreign aid and other forms of
international cooperation, to assistance with international disasters, crime and
peacekeeping, reached well beyond the Foreign Ministry’s capacity to deal with
them. Perhaps to reinforce its own dominance as the pre-eminent government
player in international affairs, the Ministry recognizes SNGs not as actors from
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another level of government but as private-sector bodies. This helps reinforce the
authority that the Ministry struggles to preserve around its position of final
responsibility for the nation’s international affairs.
The pluralized lineup of international actors now includes NGOs, corporations
and other private bodies and citizens, alongside national and subnational-
government bodies. To a limited extent, and in some policy areas such as foreign-
aid delivery and international-cooperation programmes, the Foreign Ministry has
ceded some responsibility to the SNGs. Yet, it has maintained its hand firmly on
the helm of foreign-policy overall, with advice, coordination and support. As we
have also seen with Okinawa, Hokkaido and other SNGs along the Japan Sea,
the Ministry can also deploy constitutional, legal and political tools to coerce
compliance with its vision of the nation’s foreign policy if it deems this necessary.
SNGs have gained experience and confidence in their capacity for international
engagement. They are becoming increasingly strategic in their approach and more
carefully assessing challenges and possible rewards on the basis of both their own
experiences and the precedents of their counterparts. They have demonstrated in
a relatively short time that the SNGs can make valuable and needed contributions
to Japan’s foreign policy. Throughout this book we have seen that SNGs are some-
times able to do what the Foreign Ministry is demonstrably incapable or unwill-
ing to do precisely because it is the Foreign Ministry. Clearly SNGs have the
capacity to supplement the business of formal foreign affairs.
SNGs as local administrators
Overall, it is clear that SNGs’ pursuit of international opportunities has been
beneficial for their local and regional constituents. Economic relations have
yielded economic benefits and in a few cases revitalization for some localities,
particularly in rural areas suffering economic downturn in response to forced mar-
ket liberalization. Similarly, SNG involvement in sister city and other cultural pro-
grammes has generated cultural and other benefits, and international-cooperation
programmes have yielded an array of economic, socio-cultural and strategic
rewards for local communities.
We can also suggest that for a number of reasons international experience
strengthens the capacity of SNGs to deliver effective and efficient local adminis-
tration. Here, I offer five of the most significant reasons. First is the stronger
financial capacity and consequent political autonomy that international engage-
ment brings to localities. Second is the policy and administrative expertise
specific to local conditions, which the SNGs can learn through engagement with
counterparts abroad. Third are the socio-cultural linkages that can enrich local
communities, such as through the JET programme that brings a regular flow of
young people from countries across the world to support language and interna-
tional programmes in local communities and strengthens opportunities for forg-
ing connections with the sending country. Fourth is the experience that the SNGs
gain from working with people from other cultures, an important concern when
we realise that with internationalization growing numbers of foreigners are living
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within Japanese communities. Fifth and perhaps delivering the most important set
of benefits, the SNGs secure various advantages for their locality by proactively
shaping the course of their locality’s international relations rather than simply
living with the consequences of national government action.
Most SNGs work much more closely with the people they are elected to repre-
sent than do the national-government actors. This is a distinctive feature for the
SNGs as international actors for two reasons in particular. First, it means that the
SNGs have the experience and skills of working at grassroots level that enables
them to perform similar tasks in overseas destinations as part of international-
cooperation programmes and they have precisely the expertise that the Foreign
Ministry and other central actors need to effectively implement parts of the
national ODA programme. Second, proximity to constituents means that SNGs
serve as a vent or channel for people at grassroots level to register their views,
especially dissent, with the seemingly impenetrable Foreign Ministry and
Defence Agency. The discussion through Chapter 6 highlights some SNGs’ resis-
tance to national-government strategic policies and directives on international
matters such as upholding nuclear prohibitions, stationing US troops in parts of
the nation (particularly Okinawa) that are vulnerable to central government fiat
and developing relations with neighbours such as in the RFE that the national
government frowns upon. Here we observe the will of some SNGs to stand up for
aggrieved citizens locally and in some instances to use their political clout
astutely as bargaining tools for political or economic compensation. We may
expect this style of popular politicking through the SNGs against the central gov-
ernment’s international actions to become more salient, as SNGs strengthen their
skills in international diplomacy and the citizens they represent become more
vocal. Strong expressions of public dissent at Japan’s contributions to the recent
Iraq war indicate both the political efficacy of SNGs conveying constituents’
voices to the national government and the capacity of SNGs to act as a restraint
on politically wilful but publicly opposed national policy.3
Overall, then, international engagements help SNGs to become more effective
administrations and to directly or indirectly deliver a range of benefits for indi-
vidual localities or regions. Some SNGs remain focused more narrowly on
domestic affairs with little interest in international pursuits. It is thus likely that
there may be a widening gap in performance between the SNGs that pursue
rewarding international relationships and the SNGs that close their localities to
the possible rich rewards of international engagement through their inexperience,
inertia or simply their preferred political style.
The role of SNGs as international actors
Overall, we have strong reasons to assess the international role of SNGs as very
favourable for Japan’s international diplomacy. For five decades, some SNGs
have taken pioneering roles, generally unnoticed, in international policy. But
what began as fairly benign international cultural exchanges for a handful of
SNGs, is today a significant international role for many SNGs, one that places
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them as indispensable actors in the conduct of Japanese international affairs.
SNGs have made important contributions to gaps in Japan’s international diplo-
macy – particularly through contributions to cultural diplomacy whereas foreign
policy focussed on the national economy through the 1970s and 1980s and
through aid diplomacy and other areas from the 1990s as the national government
needed to incorporate the contributions of SNGs to meet Japan’s ‘international
contributions’. The mutual flows of people and goodwill that have stemmed from
many of the international engagements of SNGs can never be evaluated, but we
may reasonably conclude that they are diplomatically invaluable.
Some of the value of SNGs’ roles as international actors lies in the capacities
and expertise that SNGs possess and the national government does not. The
national level lacks the expertise, experience, local contacts and grassroots
administrative capacity that many SNGs have. And SNGs are not weighted with
the national diplomatic status and consequent need for diplomatic formality that
the national level on some rare occasions needs to disengage from, in attempting
to manage sensitive international relations most effectively.
Their ambiguous status as neither national government nor non-government
has at times enabled SNGs to pursue relationships with foreign counterparts
where the national government bodies are inhibited by bilateral sensitivities. Here
the SNGs’ roles have been enabling for the Foreign Ministry. As we see in the
examples of SNGs in Hokkaido, Tottori and elsewhere dealing with the RFE
and North Korea, the national government can use the SNGs to further its own
purposes in forging stronger economic linkages at subnational level while the
national level appears to remain true to its articulated policy that precisely
prohibits such moves. This is a valuable if unrecognized role that some SNGs play
as surrogates for the Foreign Ministry, while the latter appears ‘policy pure’.
Yet, we must also mention some noteworthy limitations on SNGs as inter-
national actors. First, their geographic reach is limited, with focus generally on
those parts of the world with which Japan has closest connections. Not surpris-
ingly, today we see a concentration of activity in Northeast Asia, particularly in
China, the rising power virtually on Japan’s doorstep. Second, the capacity of
SNGs to adopt international roles is also limited. A locality’s size, resources,
location, political leadership and constituent support naturally help to determine
what an SNG can undertake and achieve through international engagement. So
too can the capacity of the SNG to creatively use its regulatory space, as we saw
with Kobe closing its ports to US navy ships carrying prohibited nuclear cargos
and Yokohama’s decision to close its streets to US army vehicles. A third factor
concerns the current trend of amalgamating SNGs in line with the national-
government ethos that ‘bigger is better’.4 The folding down of some SNGs
may end their relationships that were formalized through sister and other types
of bilateral or multilateral linkages. A fourth limitation is financial, arising
from stagnation in SNGs’ income from taxes. Budgetary decline is likely to
force SNGs to reduce expenditure on cultural and symbolic programmes. Both
the amalgamations and the budgetary decline create new imperatives that will
force SNGs to adopt a more strategic approach to the types of international
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engagements they pursue and with which international actors they pursue these
programmes.
Future roles of SNGs as international actors are naturally contingent on
national circumstances and developments in the global political economy. Of
particular importance here is the state of the Northeast Asian region. Japan is
located in very close proximity to the world’s rising power China, the volatile
Korean Peninsula and the RFE to the north. Here the SNGs can make significant
contributions to regional stability. International economic relationships pursued
by SNGs are already beginning to sow the seeds of economic interdependence
between the countries of Northeast Asia. This interdependence is likely to become
not just a fertile underlay, but also the compulsion to maintain close bilateral
and multilateral relationships between national governments across East and
Northeast Asia.
Present trends suggest it is very unlikely that SNGs will wind down their inter-
national programmes since they gain significant economic benefits, autonomy,
connections and to some extent opportunity for domestic political leverage
through successful international linkages. Indeed, the rewards accruing from
specific types of international engagements suggest that in time we are likely to
see a more focussed strategic approach by the SNGs in their newly amalgamated
forms. In all likelihood they will continue to make valuable contributions to Japan’s
international affairs and become even more influential in foreign policy.
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43 The new guidelines also attracted the wrath of some of Japan’s neighbours, particularly
China. This issue does not relate to my analysis, but has been analysed in a recent paper
by Midford, 2004.
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security problems at local level: dilemma between national interest and local
autonomy), with articles that analysed security from local perspectives and the
dilemmas of potential conflict between national interest and local autonomy.
45 Asahi Evening News, 25 February 1999.
46 Tamaki, 1999, pp. 78–79.
47 A number of examples of assembly resolutions are discussed in Inokura Kichi Mondai
Kenkyukai (ed.), 2001, pp. 65–70.
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54 Mainichi Daily, 1 March 1999.
55 Asahi Shinbun, 24 February 1999.
56 See Inokura Kichi Mondai Kenkyukai (ed.), 2001, pp. 84–119.
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example of the contention, the mayor of Okimi Town which is a small SNG in
Hiroshima Prefecture was forced to stand down after retracting a proposal to host an
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a range of different perspectives see, for example, Johnson (ed.), 1999; Hook and
Siddle (eds), 2003.
60 Pollard’s study has detailed Okinawan grievances back to the late 1940s. See Pollard,
2002, p. 31.
61 Ota, undated, pp. 85–86.
62 At the end of war in 1945, the US seized the land of farmers for US bases through force
as the occupying power. Since the 1972 reversion, the central government leases
Okinawan land for US bases. Its instrument of coercion is the 1952 Special Measures
Law that enables land owned by Japanese citizens to be expropriated for US bases. The
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applied in Okinawa.
63 The stated aim of SACO was principally to ‘reduce the burden on the people of
Okinawa and thereby strengthen the US–Japan alliance’.
64 Kamimura, 2001, p. 21.
65 Smith, 2000, pp. 75–76.
66 For details of Futenma see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
futenma.htm (accessed 31 August 2004).
67 Johnson, 1999, p. 218; Eldridge, 1998, p. 14.
68 Schirmer, 2000.
69 Gabe, 2003, pp. 59–60.
70 Smith, 2000, p. 113.
71 Hook et al., 2001, p. 144.
72 Details of this case are drawn from Jain, 1991b.
73 The islands are currently in Japan’s possession, but both China and Taiwan claim
sovereignty. A diplomatic feud erupted as recently as in March 2004 when Japanese
police arrested seven Chinese nationals who landed on Uotsurijima, part of the
Senkaku Islands. See Asahi.com, 25 March 2004.
74 A number of studies provide detailed accounts of this issue. For a comprehensive treat-
ment see, for example, Hasegawa, 1998.
75 On 9 April 2002 during my interviews in the International Division of the Hokkaido
Prefectural headquarters (Docho) in Sapporo, I was advised that the division has
some 50 staff members. The Division has a separate desk for Russian affairs,
the Roshia-shitsu, that deals specifically with issues concerning the Northern
Territories.
76 Braddick, 2000.
77 Hook et al., 2001, p. 99.
78 Okuyama, 2003, p. 42.
79 Okuyama, 2003, pp. 42–43.
80 In April 2003, an LDP-supported former METI official Ms Harumi Takahashi was
voted in to replace Hori as Hokkaido governor.
81 Okuyama, 2003, p. 44.
82 Williams, 2003, p. 170.
83 Stephan, 1998, p. 505.
84 This was the view of Professor Minagawa Shugo of the Slavic Research Centre at
Hokkaido University, quoted in Williams, 2003, p. 174.
85 Akaha, 2003, p. 97.
86 Okuyama, 2003, p. 44.
87 Okuyama, 2003, p. 46.
88 Okuyama, 2003, p. 52.
89 Okuyama, 2003, p. 49.
90 Okuyama, 2003, p. 51.
91 For example, the Japanese government has provided special extra-budgetary funding to
the Nemuro region through the Hokkaido Development Agency. Hokkaido Prefecture
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not only lobbies Tokyo for this subsidy but also has its own programmes to stimulate
the Nemuro regional economy. See Williams, 2003, p. 249.
92 Ishihara, 1989, p. 21.
93 Daily Yomiuri, 21 May 2000.
94 ‘This Cold War is much more dangerous’, interview with Shintaro Ishihara, Business
Week, May 28, 2001, p. 22.
95 Katayama and Kenmotsu, 2003, p. 137.
96 It is interesting to note Katayama’s apparent double standards here since he does not
acknowledge Japan’s own history of invasion or its responsibility for the suffering of
millions of people in dozens of Asian nations during the Second World War.
97 Ichioka, 2000, p. 210.
98 Niigata Nippo, 28 February 2003.
Conclusion
1 Arase, 2002, p. 186.
2 Jacobs, 2003, pp. 601–02.
3 By late February 2003, at least 112 local assemblies had passed resolutions against the
US invasion of Iraq and favoured a peaceful resolution via the United Nations. Niigata
Nippo, 28 February 2003.
4 As of April 2004, there were some 3100 municipalities (shichoson) – but that number
is likely to halve by the end of 2005, given the current prospect of mergers under the
twin forces of declining population in regional areas and greater demands on services
due to ageing population. See ‘New trends in local government’, Asia-Pacific
Perspectives: Japan, June 2004, pp. 18–19.
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